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S U M M A R Y
This study adopted a qualitative approach to address a range of questions intended to 
clarify and explain the ways in which performance management and measurement 
(PMM) has been used as part of the Kingdom of Thailand’s public service reform. 
The study examines the origins of Thailand’s public sector development within the 
context of wider debates about New Public Management, bureaucracy and post­
bureaucracy, and the emergence of HRM. By adopting a qualitative approach, based 
on interviews with over 60 managers and employees, it provides a rare insight into the 
ways in which PMM is experienced by those who are required to implement it and 
who are subject to it. These insights are especially interesting as they also provide one 
of the few qualitative studies into Thai organisational practices. In order to evaluate 
how far the responses to PMM are specific to the public sector, a comparison is made 
with a private bank in order to control for some of the influence of national culture. 
The findings suggest that, despite a rhetoric of ‘performance’, the public sector 
organisations are finding it difficult to make PMM operate effectively. In particular, it 
is shown that there is a persistent bureaucratic culture that inclines employees to 
frame PMM in terms of compliance to hierarchical authority rather than identify with 
it as a means of improving real performance. This is seen to be associated with 
challenges to psychological contracts and the established patterns of trust, discretion 
and power. In contrast, the private sector organisation had managed to establish 
‘performance’ as a substantive feature of its management processes, especially HRM, 
and had adopted forms of management that appeared closer, in some respects, to ideas 
of post-bureaucracy.
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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION
C H A P T E R  O N E  
IN T R O D U C T IO N
This chapter comprises a brief introduction to the research problem, objectives and 
research questions.
The overall purpose of this thesis is to investigate the nature and practice of 
performance management and measurement (hereafter PMM) systems through the 
data provided by semi-structured interviews and document analysis. The informants’ 
real-life experiences and documented evidence from the public and private sector 
organisations in which PMM practice has been adopted and implemented are 
expected to provide the data for an exploration and evaluation of the PMM policy for 
the Thai public sector.
A multiple case study design in which data are collected in the form of face-to-face, 
open-ended, semi-structured interviews was used. Two government organisations 
were sought as key data sources and one private sector company for contrast and 
comparison.
In the interviews, all respondents responded to questions about how they felt about 
and understood PMM processes in their organisations. The emphasis was on obtaining 
rich data about the actual experiences of PMM in practice that could be compared 
with formal policy claims. From the literature it was determined that PMM cannot be 
treated as only a formal structural process but has also to be considered in the light of 
differing stakeholder impacts and the contingencies facing different organisations.
1
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Therefore understanding from the multiple perspectives of employees, middle 
managers and senior managers in different organisations is important to fully 
understand how the process actually operates.
The study was carried out in the Kingdom of Thailand from the December 2006 to 
May 2007 where sixty-six informants from three case organisations were interviewed, 
making it one of very few studies conducted on this basis in the Kingdom of Thailand. 
As such it hopefully makes a contribution to the understanding of Thai organisations 
and the attitudes of Thai workers and managers as well as adding insight into the 
practices and effects of PMM, in particular by drawing on theories and concepts from 
organisational sociology, organisational behaviour (OB) and human resource 
management (HRM) within the context of the debates about New Public Management 
(hereafter NPM).
NPM originated nearly thirty years ago in the western world as an alternative to the 
perceived weaknesses of the traditional model of bureaucracy. This was associated 
with public sector reforms in many world leading countries such as the UK and the 
USA to improve efficiency and effectiveness.
As a result, NPM has been widely promoted by big international bodies such as the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), to many developing countries as 
a model of progressive development. However, whether NPM is applicable in other 
countries, in particular developing countries which have different cultures and 
fundamental needs, is still debatable. This also applies to the notions of PMM that are 
central to NPM.
2
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Like its neighbours (e.g., Indonesia, Singapore), the Royal Thai Government also has 
tried to adopt NPM policies modelled on private sector practice. In particular, PMM 
has been expected to have a significant influence on improving public services. As a 
result many changes have been made in the Thai public administration such as the 
introduction of Balanced Scorecards and strategic planning, all of which make PMM 
a core component of their operation.
However, due to their origins, these practices often give rise to fundamental tensions 
between public and private sector methods of working and PMM has been identified 
by many scholars as an area of particular difficulty. Whilst it may be desirable to 
bring in lessons from the private sector to the public sector, at the same time it is 
necessary to understand how specific processes such as PMM operate under different 
conditions and how they can be used to achieve established goals. At present whether 
the current PMM is effectively being carried out by the Thai public sector is still 
questionable. Although formal systems have been adopted, there still seems to be 
resistance and indifference from staff who appear to often be sceptical about the value 
of such approaches. This may mean that rather than promoting greater efficiency and 
effectiveness, the use of PMM is, at best, adding little value and, at worst, 
contributing to an undermining of the government’s capacity to reform the public 
sector through NPM. As such, to understand the nature and operation of PMM in the 
Thai context is an important part of the country’s development which has not, yet, 
been studied in detail.
As a result, this study aims to investigate the nature of PMM in different areas of the 
Thai public sector. However, rather than focus 011 this sector alone, it will be
3
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compared with the PMM approach adopted by a cutting-edge private sector 
organisation. This will allow it to be seen whether any issues that are identified with 
PMM are associated with the nature of the public sector or may be influenced more 
generally by the nature of the Thai society culture; i.e., affecting both the public and 
private sectors. Thus, comparative case studies will be used in order to seek an 
understanding of the organisational dynamics of PMM and to suggest how the 
adaptation and implementation of the better practice in the public sector could be 
approached. Since all case organisations in this study have adopted and implemented 
PMM for more than 3 years, all respondents selected have experience of PMM and 
are likely to have grappled with many of the issues of interest.
The aim of this study is, on the basis of comparisons with other 
organisations/departments, to explore the nature and effectiveness of PMM within the 
Thai public sector, focusing on the Revenue Cluster within the Thai Finance Ministry.
As PMM is a relatively new management practice for Thai government agencies 
including the Thai Finance Ministry, it is important to investigate how the processes 
are being implemented and how they are performing. The Finance Ministry is a key 
part of the public sector and is more advanced in these matters than other ministries. It 
is therefore appropriate to study this ministry as a ‘critical case’; i.e., if PMM is 
causing problems here then it is also likely to do so for other less developed 
ministries. The Revenue Cluster was selected because of the researcher’s own 
knowledge of this and the opportunities for access.
4
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This study therefore comprises four main objectives intended to support the overall 
aim above.
1. To understand and compare the nature of PMM practices in the public and 
private sectors in the Kingdom of Thailand.
2. To specify factors that appear to influence the success of PMM in both sectors.
3. To use existing theories of PMM to explain how PMM is being implemented 
but also to consider what other theories/concepts can be used on the basis of 
an inductive assessment of the emerging data.
4. To provide a rich source of qualitative data that provides insights into the 
complexity of PMM as it is experienced by employees and managers from 
different organisational standpoints.
To meet these objectives, it was considered necessary to select a private sector 
company as a basis for comparison; i.e., to control for cultural influences. As one of 
the leading private sector companies in the Kingdom of Thailand, the Bank has 
financial activities (e.g., sales and services) which are rather similar to those 
government organisations in the Revenue Cluster of the Thai Finance Ministry. 
Moreover, the Bank is regarded as one of Thai leading private sector companies in 
which PMM has been well established for several years. In this respect it can be seen 
as a useful model of how PMM is organised in a Thai setting and thus provides an 
instructive comparison for the public sector.
On the basis of the literature review, the aim and objectives above were converted 
into five research questions that will guide the nature of the data to be collected.
5
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i) Is there a shift away from a bureaucratic model towards a post bureaucratic 
model in the case organisations?
ii) To what extent have the case organisations undergone structural and 
cultural changes to accompany the introduction of PMM?
iii) To what extent have the case organisations adopted human resource (HR) 
initiatives to provide the strategic and operational context for the 
introduction of PMM?
iv) How effectively have the case organisations integrated their PMM system 
with other organisational and individual activities?
v) How have the organisations formulated and communicated the use of 
PMM system and how has this affected individual responses to it?
The structure of this thesis is organised into six sections: 1) Introduction; 2) NPM and 
PMM in the Thai context; 3) Literature review on theories of public administration 
and theoretical frameworks on PMM; 4) Research methodology; 5) Results and 
discussions (3 chapters); and 6) Conclusions.
6
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C H A P T E R  T W O  
N P M  A N D  P M M  IN  T H E  T H A I C O N T E X T
The Kingdom of Thailand was known by foreigners for hundreds of years as “Siam”, 
where the resident foreigners (e.g., Chinese, French, Japanese, Malays, Portuguese 
and Persians) made the Siamese capital one of the most cosmopolitan cities in 
Southeast Asia (G4; please note: because many government publications have no 
named author or date of publication, they will be referred to below by the initial G 
followed by an identification number; full details are given in the reference section). 
According to G1 and Wyatt (1982), there are four historical periods of the Thai 
development: Sukhothai Period (1238-1350), Ayutthaya Period (1350 - 1767), 
Thonburi Period (1767 - 1782), and Rattanakosin Period (1782 - present). The Royal 
Thai government has witnessed administrative reforms since the establishment of the 
first Thai state around 700 years ago. As will be seen, there were only two major 
administration reforms in the history of the nation prior to the major public 
administrative reform in 2002.
Sukhothai (1238-1350) was the first period of the nation’s history in which the first 
capital of the Thai kingdom was established in Sukhothai. Although it was short­
lived, it had cultural significance to the nation’s history (G3). The first Thai state, the 
Kingdom of Sukhothai, was a paternalistic form of government under the absolute 
power of the King. Sukhothai was known as a fragmented city-state and depended 
upon a decentralised government system.
7
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Ayutthaya (1350- 1767) saw Ayutthaya as the second Thai capital until it was sacked 
and burned by the Burmese in 1767 (G3). Ayutthaya arose as a result of a decline of 
the previous kingdom. It adopted a Khmer system of government based upon the 
Hindu concept of divine kingship. In particular, during the period of 1448 to 1488, 
which was under the reign of King Borommatrailolckanat, Ayutthaya witnessed a 
major reform in its political administration. The “Sakdina”, a feudal system in which 
land was allocated according to the rank of a land owner, was adopted and lasted until 
the nineteenth century. In addition, the separation between the civil and military 
administrations was made and the government was centralised.
Thonburi (1767 - 1782) was the shortest-lived in the nation’s history. Thonburi, as the 
third Thai capital, was established by King Talcsin after a Thai revival within a few 
months (G3).
It was not until 1782 that Bangkok was founded by King Rama I as a new capital city 
and marked the beginning of Rattanakosin Period (1782 - present). The Ayutthaya 
system of government, however, still persisted without any major change until the 
mid eighteenth century at which time the threat of imperialism approached the 
kingdom. Under the reign of King Rama V (1868-1910), there was a significant 
modernisation in the Thai public administration aimed at maintaining national 
independence. This public administration reform resulted in a major reorganisation of 
the central and local administrations, in which the central government was divided 
into a number of departments and the local administration was led by an appointed 
governor of each province. The Royal Thai government system thus was centralised 
and well equipped with a foundation for a modem system of government (G17).
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However, it was not until June 24, 1932 that the there was a bloodless coup d’etat led 
by the group of intellectuals, who called themselves “Khana Rat”, attempting to 
change the regime from Absolute Monarchy to Parliamentary Democracy with the 
King as head of State (G18; G2; G17). The purposes of the coup were to provide 
equality as well as education for all Thai people, and to solve the economic slump that 
was weakening the government’s status at that time (G3). In that year, the first Thai 
constitution was granted as a result of King Rama VII’s abolition of absolute 
monarchy. There have been numerous amendments and promulgations of the 
constitution and charter in response to the changing environment.
The constitution and charter provide the principles of upholding the democratic 
regime of government with the King as head of State, who exercises his legislative 
power through parliament, executive power through the Cabinet, and judicial power 
through the courts. The legislative power resides in the Parliament which is made up 
of the House of Representatives and the Senate. Its duty is to issue laws and to 
counterbalance the executive power through the right to raise queries or no- 
confidence debates against the government’s operation (G2).
The Cabinet, which is headed by the prime minister, exercises executive power. The 
prime minister is the leader of the party that holds the majority votes in a general 
election. Before the major public reform in 2002, the administrative power of 
government consisted of fifteen ministries, including the Office of the Prime Minister. 
The Cabinet consists of no more than thirty-six members, including the Prime 
Minister (G2).
9
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According to Government documents (G16) these fifteen ministries were: the Office 
of the Prime Minister; the Finance Ministry; the Foreign Affairs Ministry; the 
Defence Ministry; the Agriculture and Co-operatives Ministry; the Education 
Ministry; the Transport and Communications Ministry; the Commerce Ministry; the 
Public Health Ministry; the Science, Technology and Environment Ministry; the 
Ministry-level Bureau of University Affairs; the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Welfare; the Ministry of Industry; and the Interior Ministry.
Judicial power is independent and separate. In particular, the Kingdom of Thailand 
has adopted a Western-style legal system of Magistrates Courts, Appeal Courts, and 
the Supreme Court. Apart from three major courts, there exist some special courts 
(e.g., the Juvenile Court, the Labour Court, the Local Administration Court, and the 
Military Court) to serve a wide rage of lawsuits sufficiently (G2).
Unlike other previous constitutions, the 1997 Constitution is known as “The People’s 
Constitution” since the drafting was made by representatives elected by the people. 
This constitution reflects the increasing desire to develop a democratic system that 
results in later political reform (G2). The major public administrative reform in the 
Kingdom of Thailand was firstly introduced in October 2002. According to the former 
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, “Toward Participatory and Transparent 
Governance” was a subject placed at the top of the Royal Thai Government’s agenda. 
This reform was intended to cover a five year period but has continued beyond this 
(G6).
10
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The objective of the reform was defined by the former Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra as “the benefit and happiness of the people and the country as a whole” 
and this was understood as the ultimate goal to which public administration would 
adhere. Moreover, all state officials were urged to adopt three joint missions in the 
next four years: firstly to overcome the nation’s poverty; secondly to attain a moral, 
knowledge-based society and family happiness; and thirdly to achieve sufficient 
infrastructure in terms of health care system and social security (G6).
In doing so, the Royal Thai Government has implemented its bureaucratic reform into 
three areas covering structural reform, regulatory reform, and budgeting reform. 
Structural reform attempted to maximise efficiency in government structures and 
decentralise government power by passing new laws on government restructuring and 
on good governance. This resulted in not only restructuring government agencies 
according to an agenda-based structure in order to form a matrix organisation, but also 
in downsizing central government agencies and delegating more power to local 
authorities. Regulatory reform aimed at updating the country’s legal infrastructure by 
means of amending obsolete and redundant laws and regulations according to 
changing environments. Budgeting reform had a focus on achieving better resources 
allocation and higher cost-effective government operations by means of a strategy- 
based approach (G6).
According to the State Administration Act (Volume 5) of 2002, the Departmental and 
Government Agency Improvement and Administrative Reorganisation Act of 2002, 
the Public Sector Development Commission (PDC) was set up as a major government 
agency to facilitate public sector development (GI 1) and, at the same time, the Office
11
CHAPTER TWO NPM AND PMM IN  THE THAI CONTEXT
of the Public Sector Development (OPDC) was founded as an administrative and 
secretarial agency in support of PDC (G12).
The former Secretary-General of OPDC, Thossaporn Sirisamphan, identified five key 
areas for development: government structure, working procedures with the support of 
information technology (IT), new working culture, effective communication among 
civil servants, and the recruitment of the new generation of government personnel 
(G6).
In the first phrase, the reform mainly placed a focus on restructuring government 
agencies and resulted in the formation of six new ministries. The restructuring was 
intended to achieve greater efficiency in the government system which consisted of 
total 20 ministries. The second phrase of restructuring was planned to proceed in 
October 2005 at which time the total number of ministries would drop to 18 (G6). 
Apart from restructuring, new working procedures would have a focus on e- 
administration, which was introduced to government agencies in three key areas 
including the Government Fiscal Management Information System (GFMIS), e- 
services, and “Smart-Cards”. In addition, new administrative tools such as the 
geographic information system and the management information system were also 
introduced (G6). The GFMIS provides online real-time monitoring of fiscal and 
management system as a whole (e.g., financial management or personnel 
administration) in order to ensure efficiency, accountability, and transparency and the 
Royal Thai government is one of the first countries in the world using this system 
(G6). E-services have been introduced by the Royal Thai Government in various 
forms such as e-procurement, e-revenue, e-budgeting, and e-passports. In particular e-
12
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auction is an electronic system used in bidding for government projects to ensure 
transparency and cost-effectiveness (G6). The “Smart Cards” system is based on the 
concept of people empowerment with greater and better choices of services in various 
fields, including education and health care. These cards would serve as multipurpose 
ID cards for e-citizens (G6).
Moreover, in regard to the new working culture, several management models (such as 
the result-based system, key performance indicators (KPIs), balanced scorecards, and 
performance-related pay (PRP)), and new management practices such as citizen- 
centred management, and a Chief Executive Officer scheme have been borrowed from 
the private sector (G6). A new working style was regarded as a critical factor to 
success. In this respect the private sector’s working culture was to be ‘borrowed’ to 
combine with the existing culture such that public administration would be carried out 
based on goals, rather than rules and regulations. The focus was on quick operations, 
efficiency, and cost-effectiveness. As a result, this new working style was to be based 
on citizen-centred management to allow for more participation of government 
stakeholders in the decision making processes. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
Scheme would place an emphasis on various areas including leadership and 
teamwork, a shared vision, mission, and strategy, and management skills, 
responsibilities, and accountability. In this regard, seventy-six CEO Governors as well 
as sixty CEO Ambassadors were equipped with authority, teams, and resources in 
order to carry out government policies in an integrated manner.
The current public sector reform in the Kingdom of Thailand has been carried out 
based on NPM notions (e.g., accountability, the link of effectiveness to resource
13
CHAPTER TWO NPM AND PMM IN  THE THAI CONTEXT
allocation and rewards, restructuring of organisations according to duties and 
responsibilities; see subsequent chapters; G13; G15), in order to respond to its 
citizens’ demands for efficiency (G15). This can be seen in the emphases of several 
sections of the Good Governance Act 2003. Section 2, for instance, is concerned with 
public administration for citizens’ happiness, Section 3 with public administration for 
state’s effectiveness, Section 4 with public administration for efficiency and economy, 
Section 5 with reduction of state’s working procedures, Section 6 with amending of 
government agencies’ missions, Section 7 with quality of services in response to 
citizens’ demands, and Section 8 with performance measurement in government 
agencies (G13).
In response to the idea of NPM, over the past few years the OPDC has not only 
campaigned for changes in civil servants’ attitudes, values, and cultures, but also 
hosted related seminars and training programmes for top and middle executives of 
central government agencies and local authorities (see http://www.mmpm4u.com.). 
The need for PMM in the Thai public sector became evident through popular and 
media concern about government performance since the first administration 
established under the 1997 Constitution (G5). For example, in February 2004, a 
survey of public opinion about government performance was conducted by the 
National Statistical Office under the Ministry of Information and Communication 
Technology among 5,800 respondents throughout the nation. The survey included 
questions on customer satisfaction with government performance, government 
activities, government policies, the performance of Cabinet members, and the 
economic and social situation (G5). The results of the survey showed most 
respondents were satisfied with government performance, which accounted for
14
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82.7%. The numbers of those who were not satisfied with government performance 
and of those who had no opinion were nearly equal, each of which accounted for 
about 8%. The government activity that respondents were satisfied most was on 
public health, followed by sports, education, tourism, economic management, public 
relations and dissemination of information, finance, transport, politics, social affairs, 
foreign affairs, security, and the supervision of government agencies. According to 
one of government policies, the government’s nationwide poverty registration 
programme appeared to be one of the most successful programmes as it accounted for 
93.5% satisfaction rate. Owing to economic and social situation, more than half of the 
respondents (55.4%) agreed that the overall Thai economy was improved comparing 
to the last year’s performance. About one-quarter of the respondents (74%) said there 
were no differences between the current year and the last year’s economy. Less than 
10% of the respondents thought that the current economy was worse than the last 
year’s.
As has been seen, the contents of the survey were mostly focused on the 
government’s popularity. In other words, the survey was likely to be employed as a 
means for the government to improve its image to achieve its political objectives 
rather than reflecting its actual performance. Another initiative as part of this 
development was the Performance Agreement (PA). This is used as a public 
administration tool which reflects principles of good governance, accountability, 
effectiveness, value for money, efficiency, and quality (section 12 as well as chapter 8 
of the Good Governance Act 2003, G14). Since 2003, all Thai government agencies at 
all levels have responsibility to formulate strategic plans and determine KPIs to 
complement the Annual PA and systematically undergo a performance measurement
15
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process. In recent years, the Royal Thai Government has launched the State 
Administration Plan (2005-2008). As a result, all government agencies have to 
modify and make existing strategic plan consistent with the government strategies 
included in the State Administration Plan (2004-2008) (see below) (G14).
F i g u r e  2 . 1 :  T h e  C a s c a d i n g  P r o c e s s  o f  G o v e r n m e n t  S t r a t e g i e s  
P l a n n i n g  A s s e s s in g
B u d g e t in g
Source: G14
In measuring government performance, a balanced scorecard is applied to four 
perspectives, each of which is given a specific weight of ratings. To help government 
agencies to determine the right KPIs and targets, the PDC sets up a negotiating 
commission. Thus performance evaluation is conducted by government agencies 
using a Self-Assessment Report and third party evaluators twice a year. In addition to 
a Self-Assessment Report (SAR), the assessments also require results of a customer 
satisfaction suivey. In each year, after the Thai Cabinet’s approval, the OPDC 
allocates incentives to government agencies (G14).
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In particular, Section 8 of the Good Governance Act 2003 is concerned with 
performance measurement in the public sector and has encouraged the introduction of 
strategic management. Government Strategic Management is composed of three 
major stages: strategic planning (see below); implementing and executing strategy; 
and strategically evaluating and reviewing performance (G13).
F i g u r e  2 .2 :  S t r a t e g i c  P l a n n i n g  
State Administration Plan 2004-2008
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In the first stage, strategic planning attempts to systematically link a government 
agency’s strategy to government strategy as a whole. The Public Administration Plan 
2004-2008, which was established by the central government, would be cascaded 
down the government hierarchy from the ministry level to the local authority level, 
and then incorporated into a four year master plan for each agency. The four year 
master plan would include goals, KPIs and Balanced Scorecard, as well as a PA in
17
CHAPTER TWO NPM AND PMM IN  THE THAI CONTEXT
which top-executives are required to commit to an agreed performance result (G13). 
The PA consists of four perspectives: strategic effectiveness; service quality; 
operational efficiency; and organisational development (G15).
In the implementing and executing strategy stage, action plans are established and risk 
analysis conducted in accordance with organisational strategies. These activities are 
linked to annual budget expenditure and, at the same time, change management is 
introduced in order to reshape systems in areas such as structure, technology, working 
procedures, development of personnel competency, and amendment of laws and 
regulations (G13).
In the final stage which involves strategically evaluating and reviewing performance, 
each government agency conducts a self-assessment and makes a report to show 
progress on budget expenditure, organisational performance, and KPIs for each 
quarter and for a whole year. In addition, there is an official visit and an auditing of 
the annual SAR twice a year by an external third party and the Public Inspection and 
Evaluation Commission. Financial and non-financial rewards are provided in order to 
motivate the executives and civil servants to comply with the NPM scheme (G13).
With the Thai Cabinet’s approval on July 8, 2003, four ministries including the 
Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce, and the 
Ministry of Justice were selected as the first group to carry out the Chief Change 
Officers programme. Each of four ministries had to establish a strategy of 
development and submit to the Cabinet by November 8, 2003. This resulted in a PA 
and a ministry-level strategy (G9). The Finance Ministry will be the focus of this
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study as one of the key areas in the development of PMM in the Thai public sector. 
The reasons for this choice will be fully discussed in the following chapters. But first 
some detail about the Ministry will be provided.
The Thai Finance Ministry evolved from the Royal Treasury Department which was 
established by King Boromtrilokanat in the 15th century as a principal government 
agency to collect various taxes and import duties, to deal in trade with foreign 
merchants, and to operate the Crown's warehouse business and merchant fleet. Due to 
inefficiency of the then tax system, the tax concessionaire system was adopted during 
the reign of King Rama III (1824-1851). The system appointed the highest bidders as 
tax collectors for given types of business in which the Royal Thai 
government maintained monopolies. Tax collection agencies, at that time, were 
undertaken by diverse departments, members of royalty or high ranking officials. Due 
to the Bowring Treaty signed with England in 1855, a wider door to the international 
trading community was opened. Although the country was at a disadvantage, 
international trade grew. As a result, the first Royal Mint was set up in 1860 to 
increase money in circulation (G7).
The Royal Treasury, as a central agency for revenue collection, was established in 
1873. Then, two years later national revenue management was put under the 
jurisdiction of one agency, the Royal Treasury Department. This instituted the official 
system for disbursement of the treasury fund, auditing, levying and collection of 
various categories of taxes, and duties and liens. It also laid down the responsibilities, 
for administrative ranks of civil servants and the legal duties for tax and customs 
officers in the collection of revenues (G7). Following the transition from Absolute
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Monarchy to Constitutional Monarchy in 1932, the Ministry of Finance came into its 
own with the Civil Service Reform Act of 1933. The Royal Treasury Ministry was 
then changed to the Ministry of Finance (G7).
The Thai Finance Ministry at the time of the study consisted of nine departments and 
nine state enterprises (See Figure 2.3 below). The nine departments encompassed the 
Office of the Permanent Secretary, the Fiscal Policy Office, the Treasury Department, 
the Comptroller General Department, the Customs Department, the Excise 
Department, the Revenue Department, the Public Debt Management Office (PDMO), 
and the Office of State Enterprise and Government Securities (OSE) (G10). The state 
enterprises under the supervision of the Finance Ministry included the Government 
Lottery Office, Thailand Tobacco Monopoly, Government Saving Bank, Government 
Housing Bank, Krung Thai Bank Public Company Limited, Bank for Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperatives, Liquor Distillery Organisation, Playing Cards Factory, and 
Export-Import Bank of Thailand (G10).
The Finance Ministry’s role and responsibilities has developed over time in 
accordance with a series of national development schemes. The Ministry is, as defined 
in The Public Administration Act, in charge of managing an array of matters ranging 
from public finance to taxation, treasury, Government property, operations of 
Government monopolies, revenue-generating enterprises which can be legally 
operated only by the Government, and other organisations to which the Government 
has contractual obligations. The Finance Ministry is also responsible for providing 
loan guarantees for government agencies, financial institutions, and state enterprises, 
whereas, the Finance Minister, as the head of ministry, sets the overall policy
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directions with assistance from his Deputy Ministers. The Permanent Secretary for 
Finance oversees the management and functioning of the Ministry’s and the 
Directors-General executing matters concerning their own individual departments 
(G8).
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Figure 2.3: The Thai Finance Ministry’s Organisation Chart
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Conclusion
What can be seen from this overview is that in formal terms it appears to be clear that 
the Thai public sector appears to be moving in the direction of NPM, including the 
emphasis on PMM -  these terms will be fully discussed in the following chapter. 
However, based on the researcher’s own experiences of working within this sector, it 
appeared to be clear that the rhetoric of progress towards NPM and a performance- 
driven form of organisation did not appear to be apparent in reality. It appeared that 
many parts of the organisation that he was familiar with were finding it difficult to 
change from their traditional ways of organisation and practice and that, in particular, 
there was dissatisfaction with the PMM system. Given the importance of this project 
for the Thai public sector, it therefore appeared important to be able to investigate 
systematically these observations and to explore the possible reasons for the ways in 
which PMM was being developed within the sector and thereby to identify 
weaknesses and lessons that could be used for the future, both in terms of 
understanding the nature of PMM itself and for its application in complex situations.
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C H A P T E R  T H R E E  
L I T E R A T U R E  R E V I E W
Introduction
The previous chapter aimed to provide the background of the research as a gateway to 
the rest of the thesis. This chapter presents a review of the literature in key areas 
relevant to the study in order to show how the questions stated in Chapter 1 were 
generated as a guide to the investigation. Because of the complexity of the issue 
concerned, the approach taken will be cross-disciplinary and will draw on literature 
from the main areas that are relevant to understanding PMM in the public sector: the 
NPM debate; organisational structural issues, including organisational culture and 
HRM; and issues related to PMM itself. The approach is therefore concerned to 
emphasise the contextual nature of understanding PMM -  i.e., that it cannot be 
understood in isolation but must be related to the wider organisational processes 
within which it is located.
A shift to new public management has made performance measurement and 
management a key concern for the public sector where it has been seen as a critical 
part of reforms to improve government performance. As will be shown below, 
performance management, although taking various forms, always involves some form 
of measurement of activities (the ‘performance’) that provides the basis for the 
approaches to its management. For this reason, the term PMM (performance 
management and measurement) will be used throughout this thesis to emphasise this 
factor and, as will be seen, to retain attention on the fact that it is often the issue of
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measuring performance that makes performance such a difficult and contentious issue 
in most organisations. However it is first necessary to explore the origins of the 
approach by reference to its more usual label of performance management. The term 
‘performance management’ appears to have originated in the work of Beer and Ruh 
(1976) and was used by these authors to differentiate it from the term ‘performance 
appraisal’. Performance management became a new approach to managing 
performance in the USA and in the UK in the mid 1980s (Armstrong, 2000; 
Armstrong and Baron, 1998), and has been a key factor in many public sector reforms 
(OECD, 1997). The terms ‘performance management’ and ‘performance appraisal’ 
have been used interchangeably but this has been argued to be a confusion (Aguinis, 
2009; CIPD, 2009; Risher and Fay, 2007; Armstrong and Baron, 2005). Performance 
appraisal can be described as a single HR operation (Stredwick, 2000) that typically 
involves managers making top-down assessments and rating the performance of 
subordinates at an annual appraisal meeting (Risher and Fay, 2007; Armstrong and 
Baron, 2005; Armstrong, 2000). Although performance appraisal is widely-used for 
identifying individuals’ strengths and weaknesses it remains only ‘a part of a bigger 
whole’ of performance management (Aguinis, 2009). By comparison, performance 
management is regarded as a holistic approach to people management, which 
embraces a broad range of HR activities e.g., recruitment, training, and pay and 
rewards (Stredwick, 2000). It is intended to be a continuous and forward looking 
process (Risher and Fay, 2007; Armstrong, 2000) that allows managers and their 
subordinates to work together towards personal development and performance 
improvement. Thus the term PMM will be used here to cover a broad range of 
activities that encompass organisational level policies and goals and the assessment of 
individual performance, both of which appear to be closely interconnected. Thus
2 5
CHAPTER THREE LITERATURE REVIEW
rather than try to separate them artificially, the different levels of activity will be 
identified within the context in which they are encountered empirically. However to 
enable this distinction to be made when it is encountered in the empirical study, it is 
first necessary to examine the various dimensions analytically through the relevant 
literature.
It can be therefore suggested that to accomplish a thorough understanding of PMM, a 
multi-level analysis is required. Such an analysis will need to cover the history and 
origins of PMM as contemporary approaches will be influenced by past practices. It 
also will need to take account of the context within which PMM has developed and is 
implemented -  as was seen above, this importantly includes a recent shift from private 
sector origins to the public sector. In addition the analysis will need to cover the 
institutional or organisational level, that is, how PMM is used as part of organisational 
strategy and is incorporated into formal organisational policies and practices. For this 
purpose, the chapter will be divided into sections that reflect these levels. The first 
main section will examine the context of PMM, covering the rise of NPM, 
organisation structures, and the emergence of HRM. The second section will focus on 
the PMM process and examine micro- and macro-level processes of PMM.
This framework assumes a contingency and contextual approach to understanding 
organisational processes and practices, rather than assuming these to be objectively 
determined and given for all social contexts. This allows situational factors or specific 
events to emerge from the context of the investigations and to be taken into account. 
The intention is to construct an understanding of the meanings attached to PMM in 
the Thai context, as the process was experienced by participants, rather than viewing
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it as a purely objective set of practices that could be applied unproblematically in a 
uniform manner.
T he Context o f P M M
The rise of PMM within the public sector can be seen as part of a wider pattern of 
change that has taken place over the 20th century affecting the nature of organisations 
and employment practices. In the broadest terms this can be seen as part of the so- 
called decline of bureaucracy and the emergence of ‘post-bureaucracy’. Associated 
with this change in organisation structure has been a shift in employment practices 
from the so-called ‘Traditional Personnel Management’ (TPM; associated with 
bureaucratic principles) towards Human Resource Management (HRM; associated 
with post-bureaucratic ideas and an emphasis on flexible performance-driven 
policies). These two tendencies have been associated in debates about the public 
sector with the idea of NPM as a reflection of these two patterns of change in the 
delivery of public services. It will be shown in this section that although these ideas 
have a theoretical coherence, empirical research in this area reveals greater 
complexity and variation than these macro-theoretical ideas suggest.
From Private to Public -  The Rise of NPM
This section examines the origins of the so-called NPM, in particular the significance 
of private sector management practices, and demonstrates how the adoption of NPM 
has made PMM a central feature of attempts to change public sector employment 
relationships. It will be shown that although NPM takes different forms in different 
international contexts, the notion of PMM remains a core component. The research 
reviewed in the section shows that, although the principle of PMM appears to be a
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universal feature of NPM, the exact way in which this is put into practice can vary. In 
addition to national context, two further influences on this variation are identified: the 
nature of organisation structure (in particular, the extent to which bureaucratic 
principles are retained); and the approach that is adopted towards the management of 
human resources (the extent to which individualism is emphasised over collectivism). 
These factors are discussed in the following sections of this part.
Although PMM originated in private sector settings, its concepts and practices have 
now been transferred to the public sector and become significant part of public 
reforms in many countries (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004) where it is expected to offer 
the same outcomes for the public sector. However, evidence suggests that the practice 
of PMM has varied according to the context in which it operates. Thus it is necessary 
to discuss NPM and its initiatives, as it significantly provides the context for PMM in 
the public sector.
The term ‘public sector reform’ has been widely recognised since the late 1980s and 
1990s (Pollitt, 2003). It has emerged after the questioning of the old bureaucratic 
model of public administration of the 1970s. There are several terms used by authors, 
to describe this reform process, such as ‘new public management’ (Hood 1991); 
‘market-based public administration’ (Lan and Rosenbloom, 1992); the ‘post- 
bureaucratic paradigm’ (Barzelay, 1992); ‘entrepreneurial government’ (Osborne and 
Gaebler, 1992); and ‘managerialism’ (Pollitt, 1993). However it is labelled, this has 
resulted not only in a shift in terminology (Farnham and Horton, 1996; 1993a), but 
also a shift in the basis of decision making from ‘rules’ to ‘performance’ (OECD, 
2003). The new model is now most widely referred to as ‘NPM’, with a strong
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emphasis on management processes (e.g., output and performance measurement; 
Hughes, 2003; OECD, 2003) and business values from the private sector (Denhardt 
and Denhardt, 2000, p. 551; Hood, 1995, p. 94).
It is claimed that the NPM first originated in the United Kingdom (in the early 1980s) 
and then spread to the United States, Australia and New Zealand, Scandinavia and 
Continental Europe, respectively (Lane, 2000). In particular, the success of public 
sector reform agenda in the NPM pioneer countries stimulated other governments all 
over the world towards new standards and new roles (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000, 
p.551). Although NPM has had a considerable impact on both theory and practice of 
public administration there is no consensus on exactly what constitute NPM initiatives 
in the literature (Torres and Pina, 2004, p. 451; Hughes, 2003). As a result, NPM 
reform has been characterised in different ways. For example, Hood (1995, pp. 95-96) 
asserts that there are seven common characteristics of NPM widely identified:
1) a shift towards greater disaggregation of public organisations into 
corporatised units organised by product/service;
2) a shift towards greater competition both between public sector 
organisations and with private providers;
3) a move towards greater use of private sector styles of practices;
4) a move towards greater stress on discipline and frugality in resource use;
5) a move towards more emphasis on visible hands-on top management;
6) a move towards explicit formal measurable standards and measures of 
performance and success; and
7) a shift towards greater emphasis on output controls.
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Hughes (2003) reviewed the work of OECD (1991), Hood (1991), Holmes and Shand 
(1995), and Pollitt (2001), and found a substantial overlap of NPM initiatives. He 
offers thirteen main points associated with the public sector reform: 1) a strategic 
approach; 2) management not administration; 3) a focus on results; 4) improved 
financial management; 5) flexibility in staffing; 6) flexibility in organisation; 7) a shift 
to greater competition; 8) the new contraetualism; 9) a stress on private sector styles 
of management practices; 10) relationship with politicians; 11) relationships with the 
public; 12) separation of purchaser and provider; and 13) re-examining what 
government does. More recently Pollitt (2007a, p. 110) describes NPM as a two level 
phenomenon. At the higher level, it is a theory of public sector improvement through 
the importation of private sector management tools and techniques. At the lower level, 
it is a collection of particular management concepts and practices including: an 
emphasis on performance measurement, especially measurement of outputs; a shift 
towards more flexible forms of organisation (lean, flat, small, and specialised); a 
replacement of hierarchical relations with contracts as the principal coordinating 
device; an emphasis on market-type mechanisms of competitive tendering, league 
tables, and performance-related pay; a focus on treating customers or public service 
users along with the application of quality improvement programmes, in particular 
Total Quality Management (TQM).
As has been seen, the concept of NPM has been developed by different and even the 
same author over time (i.e., Pollitt, 2007a; 2001). This suggests a constant movement 
of NPM initiatives in the literature. This leads Homburg and Snellen (2007) to 
conclude that “NPM takes many forms and shapes, and is implemented in a variety of 
ways in diverse institutional contexts” (p. 135). But despite its considerable variations
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in the form (Pollitt, 2007b; Hood, 2005; 1995, p.95; Farnham and Horton, 1996), an 
emphasis on greater performance through the use of tools and techniques, in 
particular, performance management has been a consistent feature (Adolfsson 
and Wikstrom, 2007, p.73; Pollitt, 2005, p.25). In addition, the NPM phenomenon 
has spread throughout the world in a manner that affects all countries, albeit to 
considerably different degrees (Lane, 2000; Hood, 2005; 1995, p. 95; Farnham and 
Horton, 1993b).
However, in his analysis on the ways in which a traditional Portuguese bureaucracy 
adopted NPM, Araujo (2001, p.930) notes that the implementation of NPM initiatives 
was limited and constrained by the Portuguese government’s institutional framework 
and prevailing culture. Similarly, the findings of Torres and Pina (2004, pp. 446-447) 
on the nature and extent of modernising Spanish public administration (compared 
with NPM developments in the UK) show that although Spain had apparently 
implemented many NPM initiatives, there were few visible changes in its government 
structure and behaviours. Rather they refer to the Spanish reform as a repertoire of 
readjustments for improving the image of the government.
In a study on NPM transformation in the non-Anglo-Saxon EU countries (classified 
into three groups according to public administration models: Germanic [Austria, 
Germany, and Switzerland]; Nordic [Finland, Norway, and Sweden plus the 
Netherlands] and Southern European [France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Belgium]), 
Torres (2004) found evidence to suggest that although all countries studied were 
carrying out modernisation reforms in their public administration, there was no single 
model across the three groups, even within similar public management styles.
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Moreover, he observed that most EU countries seemed to emphasise their own 
interests (e.g., making their public administration more transparent, accountable and 
closer to citizens) rather than paying attention to what could be referred to as ‘the 
Anglo-American global reform package’ (p. 110).
Similarly, Pollitt (2007b; 2003) observes that NPM ideas have been greeted 
differently by different countries. Some big and important countries (e.g., Japan and 
Germany) have shown reluctance to take on NPM ideas, while many others (e.g., 
Canada, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, Denmark) have been cautious and 
selective in taking from the NPM package. This leads PUMA (2001) to conclude that 
a ‘one size fits all’ approach to public sector reform has never existed, and by 
contrast, any country that wishes to implement public sector reform programme needs 
to make such reform institutionalised within its government system to ensure constant 
adaptability to changing external and internal environments. However, the extent with 
which new approaches can be institutionalised is likely to also reflect the nature of the 
organisation structures that will be in place as these will exert an influence on how far 
and how quickly radical changes can be initiated. This is therefore the next issue that 
must be examined to understand the impact of the changes outlined above.
Organisational Context: Bureaucracy and Post-bureaucracy
This section examines the ways in which organisational design has changed and how 
this has influenced the way in which performance is defined and developed. One of 
major drivers of public sector reforms in many western governments in the late 1980s 
was the idea that the bureaucracies were too focused on rules and official positions, 
and not enough on satisfying the citizens who use their services (Hughes, 2003;
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Pollitt, 2003). Such demands for greater responsiveness increased and made 
government’s traditional bureaucratic structure seem ineffective (PUMA, 2001). In 
other words, the term ‘bureaucracy’ was regarded as a barrier to freedom, creativity 
and efficiency in public services (O'Toole and Meier, 2003, p. 43; Pollitt, 2003). In 
response to this, public reforms around the world have aspired to move away from 
purely hierarchical systems towards alternative forms and processes, in particular 
‘post-bureaucratic’ models (Hughes, 2003; O'Toole and Meier, 2003, p. 43; PUMA, 
2001; Kernaghan, 2000, p.93). As Bellamy (1999, p.89) puts it: “Government is to be 
streamlined; services are to become more responsive to citizens; and the costs of 
complying with government bureaucracy are to be substantially reduced”. However, 
the extent to which this shift towards post-bureaucracy is an empirical reality or a 
rhetorical aspiration must be considered as there has been considerable debate 
regarding this issue in the literature.
According to Albrow (1970), the term ‘bureaucracy’ can be divided into three major 
concepts. First, bureaucracy is seen as a fundamental form of government. Secondly, 
it is a system of administrative efficiency and, thirdly, a negative connotation for 
public services involving ‘red tape; and obstruction. O'Toole and Meier (2003) 
describe the term ‘bureaucracy’ in this last sense as “equated with stodgy, hidebound, 
and inefficient operations...” (p. 43). Although it is the latter notion that has often 
been used to justify the emergence of the post-bureaucratic idea, the other two usages 
cannot be discounted (and some claim would have been overlooked in the rising 
acceptance of the view that ‘bureaucracy is dead’; Smith, 2009).
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Thus, in dealing with the claimed shift from bureaucracy to post-bureaucracy, it is 
necessary to examine firstly the nature of bureaucracy. Despite its various definitions 
(Lawton and Rose, 1994), the term ‘bureaucracy’ had been a common form of 
organisation that can be found in both the private and public sectors in the twentieth 
century with little fundamental difference in management structures or styles between 
the two (Hughes, 2003). In the study of the public administration, Weber’s theory of 
bureaucracy has been regarded as the most influential (Hughes, 2003; Lawton and 
Rose, 1994; Morgan, 1990). Weber saw bureaucracy as a method of rational 
organisation (Lawton and Rose, 1994) and set out ten principles to provide an ideal- 
type model of the application of rational-legal authority (Gerth and Mills, 1948, pp. 
196-198):
1. Fixed and official jurisdiction ordered by laws or administrative regulations;
2. Regular activities distributed in a fixed manner;
3. Authority by directives according to fixed rules;
4. Rights and duties of administrators prescribed by law;
5. The principles of office hierarchy and of levels of graded authority where 
there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones;
6. The management of the modern office is based on written documents which 
are preserved, and the official activity separate from private lives of the 
officials;
7. Separation of public from private lives of officials;
8. Office management based on thorough and expert training;
9. The official activity with demand for the full working capacity of the official;
10. Management of the office following specific rules which are stable and able to 
be learned.
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Moreover, Weber also identified the position of the official (the terms and conditions 
of work) as logically following from the ten principles above (Gerth and Mills, 1948, 
pp. 198-204):
1. Office holding is a vocation;
2. The official usually obtains a social esteem;
3. The official is appointed by a superior authority, not elected by the governed;
4. The official position is held for life;
5. The official earns a normally fixed salary in relation to the rank and the length
of service;
6. The official is set for a career within the hierarchical order of the public 
service.
The two principles given by Weber above (i.e., the ideal-type bureaucracy and 
position of the official) were claimed to exemplify the three general aims of certainty, 
impersonality, and efficiency, ensured through the hierarchy of authority, the system 
of rules for consistent decision-making, and the productivity of specialisation. In this 
ideal-type form bureaucracy was regarded by Weber as the highest form of 
organisation (Meier and Hill, 2005; Hughes, 2003; O'Toole and Meier, 2003). Much 
of the claimed efficiency of the bureaucratic was associated with the practice of work 
flow formalisation and this has been extensively researched, particularly in relation to 
“the extent of written rules, procedures, and instructions” (Adler and Boryes, 1996, 
p.62). Formalisation creates rule-based mechanisms of control which impact 
alignment of task requirements and job design; the degree of formalisation will 
determine the number of procedures and degree of autonomy and control, which are 
applied into the organisation (Fox, 1974) and varying degrees of formalisation can
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result in different employee attitudinal outcomes (Adler and Boryes, 1996, p.65). This 
can play a major role in shaping employees’ attitude and behaviours at work either 
positively or negatively, especially when combined the potential conflict between 
expert power and position power (Adler and Borys, 1996, p.62). The former is seen as 
gained from “the exercise of control on the basis of knowledge” (Adler and Borys, 
1996, p.62) such that individuals obey because “the rule of order is felt to be the best 
known method of realising some goal” (Gouldner, 1954, p. 22), creating a positive 
sense of role responsibility and required behaviours. However, the latter can be 
derived from “incumbency in a legally defined office” (Adler and Borys, 1996, p. 62), 
which, if it lacks technical or professional expertise, can create a rule-bound 
administrative approach (Gouldner, 1954) that suppresses creativity, produces 
dissatisfaction, and de-motivation for workers (Adler and Borys, 1996, p.61). 
However, contingency approaches assume that the relationship between formalisation 
and attitudinal outcomes depends on the context within which formalisation operates. 
It argues that “employees can react positively both when high levels of formalisation 
are associated with routine tasks and when low levels of formalisation are associated 
with non-routine tasks” and vice-versa (Adler and Borys, 1996, p.65). As a result, 
bureaucracy with high levels of formalisation does not always produce disaffection 
(Horton, 2006, p. 536; Bozeman, 2000).
However, Weber’s model of bureaucracy, whether regarded as an ideal-type or a 
fundamental theory of public administration, has been challenged by many. Hughes 
(2003) identifies a tension between bureaucracy and democracy stemming from the 
concept of the official secret and, in addition, points to the public choice critique 
which claims that government bureaucracy takes away freedom of the individual in
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relation to choice, and distorts the operation of markets. This can be seen as one 
strand of the argument that has challenged the traditional model of public 
administration and encouraged the more market-oriented debates about the need for a 
NPM approach. From an organisation structure perspective, Alvesson and Thompson 
(2005) present two major critiques of the nature of bureaucracy: first, bureaucracy 
produces degrees of inefficiency, dehumanisation, and ritualism, widely known as 
‘dysfunctions’; second, bureaucracy works well only within certain environments 
(i.e., predictable and stable), and not in those with a high degree of unpredictability 
and instability in which innovation and flexibility become a source of competitive 
edge. The former critique is associated with the claim that the enforcement of 
bureaucratic regulation can lead to either over-conformance with rules and 
regulations (Merton’s [1940] concept of goal-displacement and Blau’s [1955] concept 
of ‘work to rule’), or rules are often completely ignored (Crozier, 1964; Gouldner, 
1954), which leads to technical inefficiency, undermining claims of bureaucratic 
efficiency and rationality. The second critique is associated with contingency 
theories. Bolin and Harenstam (2008, pp. 543-544) point out that Bums and Stalker’s 
(1961) description of the mechanistic model overlaps with the notion of bureaucracy, 
and the organic model with post-bureaucracy, also emphasising the view of the 
bureaucratic structure as dysfunctional within a dynamic environment. Thus, the shift 
away from the bureaucratic model mirrors a contingent relationship between 
organisation structure, environment and organisational performance. In fact, as 
Alvesson and Thompson (2005) go on to point out, the focus of the critique of 
bureaucracy has shifted from its dysfunctions and limits to the claim of the demise of 
bureaucracy. For example:
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Hierarchy is dead. The organisation of the future will be virtually 
layerless and increasingly boundaryless, a series of information networks 
in which more electrons and fewer people will manage processes. 
Information will become transparent. No leader will be able to hoard the 
facts that once made the corner office so powerful. (Welch and Byrne,
2001, p.433).
It is increasingly assumed that bureaucracy is no longer workable in a contemporary 
environment. Intensification of competition, deregulation, globalisation of production, 
increasing rates of product innovation, the increased significance of knowledge and 
information technology have rapidly changed customer preferences, and the 
dominance of intangible services are frequently cited drivers of this break with 
bureaucracy and the emergence of post-bureaucracy (Alvesson and Thompson, 2005).
The term post-bureaucracy is often adopted to denote a trend of significant change in 
organisation structure and operational principles (Grey and Garsten, 2001, p. 230), 
also referred to post-hierarchical, post-modern organisation, the virtual corporation, 
the cellular form, and the boundaryless corporation (McSweeney, 2006, p. 22). 
Heckscher (1994) has been regarded as a pioneer in the construct of a post- 
bureaucratic ideal-type, and identifies twelve distinct elements of his model:
1. an emphasis on institutionalised dialogue to create consensus;
2. dialogue defined by the use of influence which is derived from knowledge and 
experience to persuade others;
3. influence underpinned by trust (i.e., the belief that all different parts of the 
organisation are moving toward the achievement of over organisational goal) 
and interdependence (i.e., the fortunes of all are dependent on the performance 
of all);
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4. an emphasis on organisational mission for communicating what is sought to 
achieve with insiders and outsiders, and for linking overall organisational 
goals with individual goals;
5. the wide spread sharing of information about organisational strategy to link 
individual contributions to that mission;
6. a focus on principles which allow for greater flexibility and responsiveness to 
changing circumstances to guide actions that are expected to achieve that 
mission;
7. frequent restructuring of decision making process on the basis of contingent 
relationship between the ways the problem to be resolved and the nature of 
problem itself;
8. relationships of trust strengthened by the support of information technology 
(IT) that provide information about who to go to for a particular problem or 
issue;
9. the use of thorough and open process of association and peer evaluation to 
establish social recognition and foster trust among members;
10. the emergence of the new form of labour market as a result of the open 
boundaries of post-bureaucracies;
11. an emphasis on performance-related pay (PRP) and a shift from collectivism 
toward individualism in employment relations;
12. a concentration on flexible time frames which are subject to constant change.
The model of post-bureaucracy (above) reflects a radical move from administrative 
stability towards greater flexibility and incorporates new concepts and practices, 
mostly in the area of people management (e.g., commitment and trust,
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individualisation of employment through PRP, knowledge sharing, temporary and 
contract employment, strategic management). Bolin and Harenstam (2008, p.542) 
review works associated with the rise of post-bureaucracy such as Pollert (1988), 
Wood (1989), Sayer and Walker (1992), Karlsson and Eriksson (2000), Maravelias 
(2002), and Lounsbury and Carberry (2005), and find both variations and similarities 
in how it is treated. For some, post-bureaucracy is a distinct form of organisation, 
opposed to bureaucracy, whereas for others it is an extension of bureaucracy. Some 
writers argue that post-bureaucratic characteristics can coexist with those of 
bureaucracy, whilst others maintain that post-bureaucracy is largely a rhetorical 
fiction rather than a description of actual organisations. For example, Meier and Hill
(2005) argue that despite the claim of the downfall of bureaucracy, there are still a 
wide range of areas where bureaucracy remains necessary (e.g., national defence). 
Similarly the importance of the distinctive bureaucratic ethos and values (including 
political neutrality, loyalty, honesty, trustworthiness, fairness, incorruptibility, and 
serving the public and these) which make government organisations different from 
private sector companies (Farnham and Horton, 1996) has been highlighted by du 
Gay (2007; 2003; 2000; 1996):
This epochal schema in which ‘bureaucracy’ or ‘administration’ is 
reduced to a simple and abstract set of negativities contrasted with an 
equally simple and abstracted, but positively coded, set of 
‘entrepreneurial’ principles systematically evacuates the field of...any of 
its characteristic content. How could anyone be for bureaucracy if it is 
defined simply as a dysfunctional, outdated and inefficient form of 
organisation? Who could not be supportive of a form of organisation that 
shares none of those deficiencies and guarantees a better future? 
However, when attention is focused on the specific purposes of public 
administration and its particular political and constitutional 
embeddedness, the generalised articulation of bureaucracy with the 
outmoded and dysfunctional is less obvious and the generalised 
superiority of ‘entrepreneurial principles’ much more problematic, (du 
Gay, 2007, p. 147).
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Thus the distinctive ethos and values of bureaucratic public administration would 
appear from this perspective to be significant to the legitimacy of any government and 
its quality of public services delivery. Thus, on further inspection the term ‘post­
bureaucracy’ in the public sector appears to be not as clear as often suggested by 
supporters in the literature (e.g., Kernaghan, 2000). Although there does seem to have 
been a move away from the classical Weberian ideal type, there is doubt about 
whether the new form is really merely a variant on the bureaucratic form rather than a 
radical alternative (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). In this respect changes such as 
merging or splitting units to enhance coordination, sharpen focus or encourage 
specialisation, and process changes such as setting quality standards or introducing 
new budgeting procedures, may involve only limited changes to the substantive 
organisation structure below the appearance of difference. In fact Heckscher (1994) 
does identify ‘variants’ of conventional bureaucracy that he claims could be confused 
with post-bureaucracy, as follows:
1. The Cleaned Bureaucracy is seen as a reaction to a dysfunctional 
bureaucracy which involves recovering original bureaucratic principles by 
removing excessive rales and regulations which has grown over time. He 
argues that increasing the autonomy of operational parts or the separation 
of distinct areas of expertise is not anti-bureaucratic but a bureaucratic 
strength that strengthens an all-powerful centre.
2. The Closed Community Heckscher claims is an “alternative” bureaucracy, 
citing IBM as an example, based on shared values and strong unity of 
purpose, emphasising loyalty and cooperation. As a problem with this 
form he notes that the promises of security which are provided can make
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they/the system rigid and can lead to a loss of loyalty and a sense of 
betrayal in response to change.
He also talks about Market Models and Simple Federations which he regards as non- 
bureaucratic structures but not equivalent to the post-bureaucratic form because of 
their reliance on market competition rather than trust. Similarly, Hales (2002) 
supports the idea that the ‘cleaned’ bureaucracy may often be what is referred to 
when commentators talk of post-bureaucratic organisations and he refers to this as 
‘bureaucracy-lite’ :
Despite the claims, the absence of any substantive change to 
organizational structures or middle managers’ roles was the result...these 
organizations were only different in that the elimination of one or two 
layers of management had reduced the size and height of the hierarchy 
through which regulatory control and coordination was imposed and the 
focus of the rules had switched from processes to performance. If  they 
were no longer archetypal bureaucracies, neither were they anything 
radically new: they were, rather, attenuated versions of the bureaucratic 
formula -  “bureaucracy-lite” so to speak...bureaucracy-lite is more 
consistent with the ethos of bureaucratic control than the more bloated 
versions. (Hales, 2002, p.61).
An alternative typology related to variations in government bureaucracies is proposed 
by Considine and Lewis (1999). It differentiates between procedural/ideal type 
bureaucracy, corporate/managerialist bureaucracy, market bureaucracy, and network 
bureaucracy, each of which represents an ideal type (Considine and Lewis, 1999, p. 
468). The first three types characterise government systems in the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation Development (OECD) member countries whilst the network 
bureaucracy represents a form of governance which they describe as “evident to some 
degrees in emergent structures in specific policy fields such Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), pollution control, and city management” (Considine
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and Lewis, 2003, p. 133).
Table 3.1: Governance Types
Source of Rationality Form of Control Primary Virtue Service Delivery Focus
Procedural
Bureaucracy
Law Rules Reliable Universal Treatments
Corporate
Bureaucracy
Management Plans Goal-driven Target Groups
Market
Bureaucracy
Competition Contracts Cost-driven Price
Network
Bureaucracy
Culture Co-Production Flexible Clients
Source: Considine and Lewis (1999, p. 468)
The procedural bureaucracy corresponds to Weber’s ideal type and was claimed to be 
in decline by the end of the 1970s (Considine and Lewis, 1999, p.469). By the 1980s, 
there had emerged corporate bureaucracies, viewing public organisations as 
‘corporations’ that should be run by business managers (Considine and Lewis, 2003, 
p. 133). In this regard, the role of management was strengthened through budget 
reforms and decision making processes became more goal-oriented. This framework 
can be seen in the UK Thatcher government’s Financial Management Initiative in the 
mid 1980s, the Australian Labour government’s Financial Management Improvement 
Programme in 1984-86, or New Zealand’s State Owned Enterprises Act of 1986. 
However, the corporate bureaucracy was also seen to have limitations, in particular 
the operational link between decision making, resource allocation, and formal 
planning processes was often found missing. One step further from the corporate 
bureaucracy was the market bureaucracy, also known as ‘contractualism’ or 
‘entrepreneurial government’, which was intended to give greater flexibility, reduced 
planning, and less regulation (Considine and Lewis, 2003, p. 133). This model, as a 
stronger version of the previous model, was intended to focus on competitive tenders,
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contracting-out and market incentives. Under this type of bureaucracy, agencies and 
public programmes operate on a performance basis, while citizens become decision 
makers on which public programmes should be given continued public supports. 
However, the characteristics of the market model, such as. entrepreneurial behaviour, 
were found likely to result in goal displacement, corruption of central policy goals by 
contractors seeking to take advantage of short-term profits, and civil servants 
considering subsequent job prospects with outside contracts (Considine and Lewis, 
1999, p.471). The network bureaucracy was claimed to have evolved as a means to 
rectify the problems that arise from the previous models, in particular coordination 
dilemmas posed by multi-actor systems (e.g., the market bureaucracy was seen as 
falling shorting of mobilising support, sharing information, investing in new 
technologies, creating common service standards, and focusing upon the individual 
needs of supplies and clients). Thus the network form was intended to create more 
flexible hierarchies with matrix qualities by letting civil servants link between 
suppliers, co-producers, and customers, using new technologies within a shared 
organisational culture of trust, and strategic partnership, which would bring together 
governments, citizens, and other stakeholders (Considine and Lewis, 2003, pp.133- 
134).
As ideal types, in practice these forms of bureaucracy are likely to be found together 
in the form of a combination of characteristics or as hybrid forms with an 
evolutionary characteristic, as Horton (2006, p.533) observes:
Large, highly structured state monopolies, regulated by rules and 
procedures and coordinated through hierarchies, are being replaced with 
often competitive smaller, matrix structures, partnerships and networks 
coordinated by contracts and performance agreements involving complex 
relationships between public, private and voluntary bodies.
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This reflects Bums and Stalker (1994) earlier view that “...the effective 
organisation...does not approximate to one ideal type of management system, but 
alters in important respects in conformity with changes in extrinsic factors” (p. 96). In 
this respect, bureaucracy and post-bureaucracy can be seen as possible ends of a scale 
and the degree of shift away from bureaucracy in different organisations can differ 
according the context in which they operate. The variation also has considerable 
impact both on the formal and informal structure of organisation, which will in turn 
shape the nature of performance management practice (as will be discussed further 
below).
Further complication is added when empirical data from different countries is 
considered, where it can be seen that the move away from bureaucracy varies 
considerably (Kernaghan, 2000, p.94). A study by the OECD (1997) on performance 
management practices associated with NPM also shows that many OECD member 
countries have attempted to move towards a new form of organisation, i.e., ‘manager- 
dominated and market-oriented’ (based on a comparative analysis of ten case studies 
in OECD member countries including Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
(see Figure 3.1).
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Figure 3.1: Bureaucracies and Markets, Administrators and Managers: 
A Mapping of Country Shifts
Source: OECD (1997, p. 11)
As can be seen from the matrix above, the ten countries all have moved away from a 
highly traditional public service structure, represented by strong 
administrative/bureaucratic positions. France has shifted to a managerial approach 
within the bureaucratic setting, while New Zealand and the UK have moved to market 
orientations with strong managerial positions. The others, including Australia, 
Canada, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the USA, reflect managerial approaches with 
more or less emphasis on market orientation. Denmark moved to a higher emphasis 
on internal management, while Finland moved to more market type mechanisms. This 
study also examined the relationship between policies and policy components of 
programmes in terms of consolidated and disconnection of policies and centralisation 
and decentralisation of organisation (OECD, 1997) (see Figure 3.2).
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Figure 3.2: Consolidation versus Decoupling, and Centralisation versus Decentralisation, 
Devolution and Subsidiary: Mapping of Some Member Countries
Consolidation
Decoupling
Disconnection
Source: OECD (1997, p.13)
The basic lesson to be learned from these arguments therefore is the complex and 
contingent nature of the shift from bureaucratic practices, meaning that even though 
there appears to have been significant change in the organisation of public sectors on 
a global basis, this cannot simply be regarded as representing a simple move from 
bureaucratic to post-bureaucratic organisation, but is more likely to involve the 
development of more or less bureaucratic hybrid forms of organisation that reflect 
their national and local operating conditions and their particular evolutionary histories 
of development. In short, although there appears to have widespread movement away 
from bureaucracy, the point of arrival is variable and evolving, although it has 
generally been towards flatter and more responsive organisational forms.
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This has been argued to also mean that such organisations have also undergone 
cultural changes (Vigoda-Gadot and Meiri, 2008, p. 126; Schedler and Proeller, 2007, 
pp. 196-197; PUMA, 2001). Organisational culture has been regarded as an object of 
management which can be a means to performance improvement (Schedler and 
Proeller, 2007, p. 189; Claver et al., 1999, p. 456) by having direct effects on those 
who work in the public sector in terms of roles, work conditions, and employment 
relations (Horton, 2006, p.534). Claver et al. (1999, p.459) draw on various works 
(Ban, 1995; Adams and Ingersoll, 1990; Feldman, 1985; Deal and Kennedy, 1982) to 
offer a generic model of the ‘classical’ bureaucratic culture;
1. Authoritarian management style with a high degree of control;
2. Little communication and the management with a univocal, top-down focus;
3. Individuals searching for stability and having limited scope for initiative 
with orientation towards obeying orders;
4. Repetitive and centralised decision-making process;
5. Reluctance to start innovative processes;
6. High degrees of conformity;
7. Highly reluctant to change.
However, this again must be regarded as an ideal-type and in empirical research there 
is no consensus among organisational researchers on the methods for studying and 
understanding organisational culture (Denison and Spreitzer, 1991, p.3) or even on 
typologies of differences (Cameron and Quinn, 2006; Rashid et al., 2003, p. 164).
As has been seen, Considine and Lewis’s (2003; 1999) typology (discussed earlier) 
suggests that the values of the public sector have developed overtime and, following
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on from this, there appears to be no clear trend towards one specific culture. Horton
(2006) observes that “public organisational cultures do not appear to have been 
entirely replaced but rather infiltrated with values and norms and institutional 
frameworks, which are in many instances in conflict with the traditional normative 
and ethical frameworks of traditional public administration systems”, or in other 
words, “what appears to be the case is that in spite of all the changes much of the 
traditional public administration cultures remain” (p. 537). This raises the possibility 
of ‘value clashes’ as an unintended outcome of the move away from bureaucratic 
models (Kernaghan, 2000, p. 100), resulting from the importation of private sector 
values, the key feature of NPM reforms (Noordhoek and Saner, 2005, p. 41). In the 
management of culture, it is often the practitioners of HRM who have been 
considered central and recent developments in HRM have often placed culture- 
management as a core activity. The same study that documented the rise of NPM in 
OECD member countries has also shown an increasing concern with HRM within the 
public sector (Aijala, 2001). Therefore it is to the nature of HRM that the next section 
is focused.
H u m a n  R e s o u r c e  M a n a g e m e n t  ( H R M )
This section examines the ways in which public sector employment relations have 
shifted from the so-called TPM (associated with bureaucratic principles) towards 
HRM (associated with post-bureaucratic ideas and an emphasis on flexible 
performance-driven policies) and how this has influenced the way in which 
performance is defined and developed. Associated with the debate about the decline 
of bureaucracy has been the rise of HRM in place of ‘traditional personnel 
management/administration’. The latter has been perceived as associated with
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bureaucratic organisation, involving a rule-based approach to employment practices 
reflecting the needs of the organisation for stability and control rather than those of 
customers or service users. With the rise of competition from Japan and the Pacific 
Rim, this approach came under threat from the need for companies to respond flexibly 
and innovatively to these challenges and to become more customer-focused. This also 
affected the public sector as governments found their revenues under pressure and as 
service users became used to receiving higher levels of customer service from private 
companies and expected similar standards from public service providers. In this way 
there was a central emphasis on performance and performance management of staff 
rather than simply following established routines. As Farnham (2004, p.284) has 
pointed out:
Public management reform, in turn, has resulted in people management 
reforms and people management change. These reforms have affected the 
ways that work and employment are organized in public service 
organizations, how people are managed within them, and how the labor 
union functions in public services. As in the private sector, the term HRM 
is increasingly being used to describe how personnel management 
activities are organized and structured in public organizations (Farnham 
and Horton, 1996; Farnham, Hoiton, Hondeghem, and Barlow, 1996). The 
practical implications of these changes have included the development of 
human HR strategies in public service organizations (and linking these to 
organizational strategies), decentralization of HR activities to line 
managers, and the introduction of individualized communication and 
information processes within them, either in parallel to or to replace 
collective labor relations institutions. There has also been greater concern 
shown by public managers with organisational performance.
In many respects these can be seen as similar issues to those faced by the private 
sector in the previous two decades as in the West it sought to come to terms with the 
competitive performance of Pacific Rim economies. It was these conditions that are 
claimed to have given rise to HRM (Goss, 1995) and, in particular, to the emergence
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of PMM as a central part of this approach to managing people. Thus, due to the origin 
of PMM in the private sector settings, it is necessary to discuss this original context.
The term ‘HRM’ originated in the USA as an approach to managing people 
(Houldsworth and Jirasinghe, 2006; Pilbeam and Corbridge, 2006) and was imported 
and developed in the UK in the late 1980s (Marchington and Wilkinson, 2008; 
Hendry and Pettigrew, 1990, p. 19). British academics subsequently distinguished 
between developmental-humanism (known as ‘soft’ HRM) and utilitarian- 
instrumental ism (known as ‘hard’ HRM; Hendry and Pettigrew, 1990, p. 17), each of 
which can be regarded as one extreme position of the continuum of conceptions of 
HRM (Goss, 1997; Truss et al., 1997, p.53). At one end, the soft approach emphasises 
the ‘human’ side of HRM (Goss, 1997; Storey, 1992) and is based on control through 
commitment and Theory Y  assumptions: human resources are an organisation’s 
unique assets, unlike any ‘non-human’ resource. It assumes that increased motivation 
of employees leads to higher commitment and improved performance, focusing on 
communication and people development activities that encourage employees to self- 
regulate their behaviour. Thus human resource (HR) policies are focused on 
generating commitment towards the achievement o f ‘resourceful humans’ through job 
satisfaction at work (Legge, 2005).
The hard approach, at the other end, focuses on the ‘resource’ side of HRM and 
embraces notions of tight strategic control, arguing that human resources are to be 
treated like any other organisational resource under the principles of profit 
maximisation and cost minimisation (Goss, 1997). In other words, human resources, 
as passive process inputs, are to be deployed in pursuit of business objectives. Both
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models focus on the links between business and HR strategies but whereas the hard 
approach tends to be reactive to the market demands of the external markets (‘external 
fit’), the soft approach tends to focus on how internal human resources can be utilised 
and developed to create unique competitive advantage (‘internal fit’ or ‘the resource 
based view of the firm’ [RBV] -  see below). Thus, as with the notion of the 
bureaucratic/post-bureaucratic distinction, there appear to be variants of HR practices 
(rather than simple alternatives between an ‘old’ and ‘new’ form) ranging from a 
synonym for traditional personnel management to a focus on ‘internal integration’ and 
the role of ‘business partner’ (Lawler, 2005, p. 165; Ulrich, 1997). However, in the 
same way that there appears to be a move away from rigid bureaucracy in terms of 
structure, so there appears to be a common concern with strategic integration within 
the HRM debate, although with similar approaches to variation (i.e., with no single 
‘end point’ of an agreed model).
The need for strategic integration addresses the degree to which human resources 
issues are part of organisational long-term strategy and the degree to which they are 
linked to business strategy, making a clear difference from the operational focus of 
traditional personnel management. Thus the role of the HR function has been claimed 
to range from ‘administrative services’, ‘business partner services’, to ‘strategic 
partner’. The administrative services provider concentrates on ‘administrative and 
legally mandated tasks’ (Lawler, 2005, pp. 165-166); i.e., fundamental people 
management activities such as recruitment and selection, performance appraisal, 
training, and compensation and rewards (Huselid et al., 1997, p. 172). HR staff deal 
with operational problems; there are no clear connections between HR systems and 
business plans or strategies. The ‘business partner’ emphasises how the development
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of effective HR systems contributes to the implementation of business plans by 
ensuring the needed competencies and behaviours are in place (Lawler, 2005, pp. 
166-168). Finally, the strategic partner sets out the need for the HR function to look at 
the overall picture of the organisation and at how HR department can contribute to the 
initiation of successful strategies (Boxail and Purcell, 2003). It focuses on human 
capital, organisational capabilities, readiness, and developing HR practices as 
strategic differentiators (Lawler, 2005, p. 166).
However, despite strategic HRM advocates’ claim that HRM should be integrated 
with business strategy, there seems to be no consensus on how that can be done. This 
is reflected in the longstanding ‘best fit’/’best practice’ debate. The latter, based on 
universalism, argues that firm performance can be improved by identifying and 
adopting specific ‘bundles’ of HR practices that are claimed to drive high 
performance. This approach has been criticised for assuming that there is an optimum 
combination of policies that will ensure ‘high performance’ and ignoring the effects 
on contingent factors. The former, however, is based on contingency theory, and puts 
emphasis on the fit between HR strategy and an organisation’s broader environmental 
context (external fit). This too has been subject to criticism for tending to assume a 
reactive position that views HR strategy as merely derivative from business needs. 
This has encouraged an alternative view, RBV (or sometimes ‘internal fit’) which 
focuses on the analysis of internal strengths and weaknesses and seeks to create 
competitive edge through the development of scarce, valuable (human) resources and 
building barriers to imitation (Boxall and Purcell, 2003). Here HR strategy focuses on 
the development of the existing human resources and the use of these to inform and 
develop strategy in new direction.
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Within both the internal and external fit approaches a central feature has been on the 
delivery of employee performance, with the focus of the latter tending to focus on 
‘needed behaviours’ and the former focusing more on the generating of innovation 
and creativity. However, in both cases there has been a tendency to think in terms of 
‘performance management’ systems, one such is represented in general terms by Hale 
and Whitlam (1998), see Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: A Model of Performance Management
Recruit
Reward and
Source: Hale and Whitlam (1998, p.29)
The process is generally self-explanatory but its success is determined by effective 
practices in all stages of the cycle and the provision of necessary support and 
information -  and as will be seen below, whilst the principle is clear and generally 
accepted, its application in practice as a unified system appears more difficult to 
achieve. In addition, the underpinning of such performance management approaches 
is one of individualism, which requires employees to be addressed as individuals 
(rather than as members of a collective) such that all aspects of the cycle need to be 
focused on specific individual needs rather than delivered in an ‘off-of-the-shelf 
form. This requires a shift from broadly universalistic practices and appears to have 
increased the heterogeneity of employment practices, widening terms and conditions 
of employment and introducing flexibility in approaches to managing employment
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relations (Bach and Winchester, 2003; Crouch, 2003; Kessler and Purcell, 2003; 
Farnham, 1999; 1990).
In the context of public sector reforms, public sector HR managers have been 
increasingly expected to move towards the latter role (initiating performance and 
change management, coaching, and transformational leadership) to help establish the 
more effective delivery of services (CIPD, 2009; Vigoda-Gadot and Meiri, 2008, pp. 
127-129). This can be seen as associated with the move towards the adoption of NPM 
which reflects a similar move from ‘administration’ to ‘management’ (Farnham, 
1993a; 1990). Both NPM and HRM operate on the same basis of performance 
outcomes rather than the adherence to rules and procedures (Brown, 2008; Farnham 
and Horton, 1996; OECD, 1996). Along with the overall objective of NPM reforms 
(i.e., to improve efficiency, effectiveness, and flexibility of delivery), many public 
sector employers in different countries have expressed a desire to be ‘an employer of 
choice’ (Aijala, 2001). In response, considerable attention has been given to 
improving public sector HR capacity by developing a wide range of tools covering all 
aspects of employment focused on service delivery performance (PUMA, 2002, p.8; 
Farnham and Horton, 2000; OECD, 1996) and becoming more competitive in the 
labour market (Shim, 2001, p.341), not least through the recruitment of top managers 
from the external, private sector markets rather than the traditional practice of relying 
on the internal labour market (OECD, 2004, p.3). This has not however, been without 
complications due to the distinctiveness of the public sector with a general emphasis 
on public interest outcomes (Brown, 2008) and traditional values like fairness, equity, 
justice, and social cohesion (OECD, 2004, p.2). However, overall it has been noted 
that:
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Modernising human resource management has been at the heart of public 
sector reform in OECD Member countries for the past two decades, not 
only because HRM is a basic constituent of public management, but also 
because civil servants are the main actors in bringing about reforms. HRM 
is seen as a cornerstone for achieving “enabling” and “empowering” 
government. (PUMA, 2002, p.8).
As was noted above, at the heart of these changes away from classic bureaucratic 
organisation and traditional personnel administration (regardless of how far public 
sector organisations have moved towards complete post-bureaucratic structures and 
strong HRM), performance management issues have been a central concern and 
therefore, it is necessary to consider this issue in detail, having now provided the 
wider context for its development.
The Process o f P M M
Not surprisingly, following from the variations in organisational forms and 
employment practices identified above, related to contingent factors in specific 
organisational environments, PMM practices have also shown similar variation. There 
seems no one best way of implementing PMM in the public sector where context 
plays a major role in shaping its practices. The findings from the OECD’s (1997) 
comparative study of performance management within government organisations in 
ten member countries provides evidence on objectives, approaches, institutional 
arrangements, and performance information systems, and provides the basis for a 
general assessment of PMM. According to the OECD there are three common 
objectives of PMM: management and improvement; accountability and control; and 
budgetary savings. This is claimed to result in three major forms of PMM. First, there 
is PMM that emphasises continuous improvement driven by a desire for improvement 
in internal functioning (improving operations and service delivery through
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performance oriented information systems and flexible management tools and 
techniques). Secondly, there is PMM that focuses on accountability and control 
derived from new ways of interacting with partners in delivery and procurement 
networks. This is associated with less hierarchical organisation and increased 
boundary activity with new actors requiring improved mechanisms to clarify 
responsibilities and controls. Thirdly, there is PMM that concentrates on budgetary 
savings as a result o f the desire for fiscal restraint, focusing on shrinking budgets and 
increasing efficiency gains.
Ail ten OECD member countries in this study appear to have evidence of all three 
types of performance management within the public sectors to different degrees, again 
confirming the view of organisational development as, in practice, evolving through 
the development of contingent hybrid forms of practices. There is therefore, no 
consensus on the best approach to implementing performance management and the 
study identified issues such as variations in top-bottom versus bottom-up, 
comprehensive versus incremental, and systematic versus ad hoc forms of 
implementation.
The experience of the OECD (1997) showed that top-down and bottom up approaches 
each lead to different levels of outcomes in terms of legitimacy and effectiveness of 
PMM implementation. A top down approach appeared to be easier and was followed 
where the goal of PMM implementation was to have a wide, deep, and quick impact 
on all aspects of the organisations, often followed in an ad hoc manner. However, 
there appeared a risk that excessive focus on a top down approach could undermine 
legitimacy of performance management reforms. On the other hand, a bottom-up
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approach seemed to correspond more to a more incremental and systematic approach, 
which allowed for more commonality of implementation to develop across the 
organisation and fostering greater buy-in and increased effectiveness of 
implementation. Other commentators have also distinguished between 
‘organisational’ and ‘individual and team’ focuses for the adoption of PMM (Mackie, 
2008; IDeA, 2006a; OPM, 2001). However, it is claimed that although organisational 
PMM focuses on service planning, measurement and evaluation, and individual and 
team, PMM emphasises review, appraisal and personal development, both involve the 
same basic principles. Mackie (2008) asserts that there are twelve fundamental 
principles involved: high level public policy aspirations expressed as outcomes; 
strategic business plan; performance measurement tools and techniques; targets; 
implementation; monitoring; measuring results; verification; communication; review 
and evaluation; continuous environmental sensitivity; and ongoing commitment at all 
levels. He argues that these pervasive characteristics serve as a model for sustainable 
performance management in the public sector but recognises that putting them into 
practice may depend on less easily manageable factors: “One of the most difficult 
issues with regard to performance measurement and management is developing a 
culture that accepts performance measurement as a tool to help the organisation 
improve” (p. 26). This has also been recognised by IDeaA (2006b) who claim that 
every change in the organisation structure, systems and processes that constitute 
PMM always has impacts on organisational culture: “Performance management is 
only meaningful when it is a means to achieving improvement. For performance 
management to be effective, it needs to operate within and be supported by the right 
organisational culture” (IDeA, 2006b, p. 12). They suggest a wide range of cultural
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values that may be needed to support PMM at different stages in performance 
management cycle (see Figure 3.4).
Figure 3.4: Aspects of Culture Have aii Impact on All Stages of 
the Performance Management Cycle
Source: IDeA (2006b, p.4)
This suggests that aspects of organisational culture have effects on all stages of the 
performance management cycle. However, Williams (2002) maintains that the 
definition of performance culture has still been far from clear and warns that the over­
emphasis on performance, in particular results and the bottom-line, may have negative 
consequences for employee health and well-being. Thus, it has been claimed that in 
successful PMM initiatives it is necessary to maintain balance between organisational 
goals and individual’s personal goals. Failure to do so can result in resistance to 
change and persistence of old ways of working (Vigoda-Gadot and Meiri, 2008,
p.128).
One reason for such resistance and the failure of attempts to establish performance- 
driven cultures has been the difficulty often encountered, especially in hierarchical
5 9
CHAPTER THREE LITERATURE REVIEW
organisations, in setting goals at different levels and cascading these down in way that 
demonstrates consistency with overall organisational direction rather than isolated 
managerial preferences (Williams, 2002). In this respect goal-setting can be regarded 
as critical part of performance management processes in linking individual targets to 
those of organisation as a whole (Hale and Whitlam, 1998).
The role of goal-setting in performance management systems can be seen to need to 
span organisational and individual levels. The intention is to allow individual 
employees to understand organisational goals and what is expected of them in 
contributing to these, and possibly to allow them to participate in determining how the 
targets of their job should align with organisational goals. This can be seen as not 
merely an instrumental focus but also contributing to training and development, 
motivation and commitment (Hale and Whitlam, 1998).
In theory, goal setting has been structured in terms of macro and micro levels (Haas et 
al., 2000, p. 581) with macro goal-setting associated with organisational goals, in 
particular in the strategic planning process (Chakravarthy and Lorange, 1991, p. 11). 
Historically ‘management by objectives’ (MBO) is an early example of this macro 
goal setting process. MBO puts an emphasis on result-orientation, relying on 
numerical goal setting (Passl, 1993, p. 136) and with the process of breaking 
organisational goals into a number of lower-level goals (Odiorne, 1977). This 
underlying principle has also been common to many subsequent systems. In principle, 
the cascading process makes it possible for individual goals and objectives to be 
aligned with organisational goals (Williams, 2002; Etzel and Ivancevich, 1974, p. 51) 
(See below).
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(i)
Figure 3.5: The Generalised MBO Process
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Organisational
Organisational objectives Superior- Intermediate
objectives translated -► subordinate at -> progress ► Evaluation
set into group 
or division 
objectives
each level set 
objectives
review process
Source: Elzel and Ivancevicli (1974, p.SO)
As can be seen, the MBO process is composed of three key activities (goal-setting, 
participation in decision making, and objective feedback; Carson and Carson, 1992, 
p. 147) which depends on a hierarchical organisation structure and a financially 
oriented culture (as one of MBO’s key activities, performance appraisal, focuses on 
linking individual effort to pecuniary rewards; Passl, 1993, p. 136).
However, MBO has long been criticised on a number of levels: for its focus on 
quantity rather than quality; short-term success rather than long-term success; control 
rather than continuous improvements; results rather than processes; individual 
accountability rather than a holistic view; individual rather than team performance; 
and inward-orientation rather than customer orientation (Passl, 1993, p. 135). In 
particular, Deming (1986), one of the founders of TQM, has been widely known as 
one of MBO’s opponents. However, despite criticisms a number of empirical studies 
of MBO have shown positive results although it seemed that this appeared to be 
influenced by the circumstances of its application as much as its inherent features 
(Kondrasuk, 1981).
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Rodgers and Hunter (1992, p.27) used evidence based on a meta-analysis of thirty 
studies of MBO in the public sector to suggest that it had a positive impact on 
productivity in all the cases studied, and that the higher the top management 
commitment, the more effective MBO became. Poister and Streib (1995) also studied 
MBO in local government in the USA and found that it was widely used, but varied 
according to the size of the jurisdiction and form of government. They also found that 
the approach appeared to have evolved from its original narrow form to cover a range 
from quality enhancement to cost control, productivity improvement, special problem 
solving, and the implementation of new projects (p.55). Chakravarthy and Lorange 
(1991, p. 11) argue that the nature of goal-setting at the macro level in practice varies 
according to the orientation of planning system of the organisation. In particular, they 
distinguish between top-down and participative approaches to goal-setting. The 
former reflects an integrative orientation, and the latter emphasises an adaptive 
planning orientation. The top-down approach was seen to work well with a stable 
environment in which major changes were normally regarded as unnecessary. This 
was used to communicate organisational goals to business unit managers with limited 
space for discussion of goals that were imposed from top management (basing their 
judgement on past performance data). On the other hand, the participative and 
iterative approach worked well with rapidly changing environments as it allowed for 
extensive discussion of goals between top management and business unit managers to 
seek for new opportunities. Flynn (1995, p.64) found evidence to suggest that the 
practice of macro goal setting varied among European countries and that the degree of 
goal setting reflected the degree of centralisation (see also Trosa, 1997). Kotter (2001) 
also observed that macro goal setting in practice would normally be associated either 
with planning or change. The former aimed at producing consistent results, the latter
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to provide the organisation with a new direction. To further emphasise the complexity 
of this process, Trosa (1997) identified five key issues that arose within the target- 
setting process based on UK government experience, see Table 3.2 below.
Table 3.2: Five Key Issues that Arise within the Target-setting Process in the UK
1) The balance between different types of targets
• The established targets can have unpredicted negative side-effects (e.g., the targets have 
been reached by decreasing quality).
• The activities which are hard to measure (e.g., policy advice) were left without indicators 
and targets. Thus performance measurement was developed mostly from the measurement 
possibility and limitations.
• There was the lack of clarity of the target priorities, in particular between efficiency and 
quality.
2) The right level of targets
• There is a need for targets to be set at a demanding level. It was reported that there often is 
a discrepancy between government agencies in terms of experience with performance 
measurement, capable information systems, and qualified staff.
3) The targets and aims of government agencies
• There m a y  be a conflict between activities of an organisation as a result of its organisational 
stakeholders with conflicting interests.
4) Are performance measures only output measures?
• There are three major reasons w h y  the U K  government has emphasised output targets;
1. output targets can be more readily measured than outcome targets,
2. accountability for output targets can be more easily held by government agencies than 
that for outcome, and
3. the outcome results can be affected by several factors over time.
5) The publicity of targets
• O n  the one hand, if targets are made public, this will result in a strong incentive for the 
reform. O n  the other hand, agencies may be encouraged to set easy targets in which they are 
confident to achieve, while ministers m a y  set the demanding targets which agencies are not 
able to achieve for political reasons. This is also the case for the British child support 
agency in which the minister still kept assigning some financial targets that were not 
possible to achieve for political reasons.
Source: Adapted from text in Trosa (1997)
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It can be seen from the issues raised above that although the targets were framed in 
terms of their macro-level relevance, their delivery and achievement would require 
them to be translated into the micro-level behaviours of individual employees. The 
theory of micro goal-setting is focused on individual motivational effects of goals and 
feedback (Locke and Latham, 2002, p. 705; Haas et a l ,  2000, p. 579). Goal-setting 
theory is usually seen as developed from Ryan’s (1970) argument that conscious goals 
affect human action and has been strongly underpinned by many empirical studies for 
about forty years (Locke and Latham, 2002, p. 705; Williams, 2002). The evidence 
from laboratory, simulation, and field settings in at least eight countries has confirmed 
that ‘specific and difficult’ goals lead higher task performance than vague ‘do your 
best’. Locke and Latham (2002, pp.706-707) identify four mechanisms of how goals 
affect performance: a directive function (i.e., goals direct attention and effort towards 
goals related activities); an energising/effort function (i.e., high goals lead to greater 
effort than low goals); goals affecting persistence (i.e., hard goals prolong effort); and 
goals governing action related to the use of knowledge relevant to goal attainment. 
They summarise the relationship between the essential elements of goal-setting theory 
and the high performance cycle below, see Figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.6: Essential Elements of Goal-Setting Theory and the High Performance Cycle
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Source: Locke and Latham (2002, p.714)
Locke and Latham (2002) conclude that goal-setting theory has now been shown to be 
applicable to performance improvements at all levels of an organisation, whether 
goals are imposed, self-set, or mutually set (p. 714). However, Ordonez et a l  (2009, 
p.6) argue that “beneficial effects of goal setting have been overstated and that 
systematic harm caused by goal setting has been largely ignored”. They criticise goal- 
setting theory for producing specific side-effects such as: an encouragement to 
overlook non-goal areas; a focus on only the more achievable goals; excessive focus 
on short-term success at the expense of long-term success; too challenging goals 
resulting in distorted risk preferences and a rise in unethical behaviour; inhibited 
learning (unwillingness to try alternative methods); corrosion of organisational culture 
as a result of excessive competition; an increase in extrinsic motivation at the expense 
of intrinsic motivation (pp.6-11). These arguments have been largely rejected by 
Locke and Latham (2009, p. 17) who argue that they are based on anecdotal evidence
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or overstate the issues involved. In fact, it seems that goal-setting in the context of 
performance management remains a widely-used approach for individual performance 
management (Houldworth and Jirasinghe, 2006). However, as Haas et a l  (2000) have 
argued both micro and macro approaches can ignore the nature of the complicated 
relationship between goals at different organisational levels, in particular the ways in 
which power of politics may bring about conflicts between individual, group and 
organisational goals.
Robey and Sales (1994) point to a tension between the so-called rational and political 
models of organisation. Rational models assume that organisational members will 
work towards a common goal whereas political models view organisations as political 
arenas. They point out that both forms are often at work together: in some 
circumstances, politics will be needed to achieve goals, particularly ones that involve 
change and uncertainty, that might be blocked by a purely rational decision processes. 
Thus they argue that power enhances individuals’ capacity to influence others to 
achieve (or resist) established goals and that it is therefore necessary to look at how 
power is acquired through the exercise of political skills. Hersey et a l  (2001), for 
example, identify seven bases of power (coercive power, connection power, reward 
power, legitimate power, referent power, information power, and expert power) based 
on the work of French and Raven (1959; see also Hersey and Goldsmith, 1980; Raven 
and Kruglanski, 1975). Coercive power involves “the perceived ability to provide 
sanctions, punishment, or consequences for not performing”; Connection power: “the 
perceived association of the leader with influential persons of organisations”; Expert 
power: “the perception that the leader has relevant education, experience, and 
expertise”; Information power: “the perceived access to, or possession of, useful
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information”; Legitimate power: “the perception that it is appropriate for the leader to 
make decisions because of title, role, or position in the organisation”; Referent power: 
“the perceived attractiveness of interacting with the leader”; and Reward power: “the 
perceived ability to provide things that people would want to have” (Hersey et a l ., 
2001, pp.210-212). However, Hersey et al. (2001) maintain that these seven bases of 
power can be reduced to into two major categories, personal and position power. The 
former is derived from individuals themselves (associated with expert, information, 
and referent power), whereas the latter is associated the control that comes from an 
individual’s position in the organisation (coercive, connection, legitimate, and reward 
power). This corresponds with Robey and Sales’s (1994) process model of power 
which organises sources of power into individual and organisational forms such that it 
is always being exercised through such political actions as awareness, investing 
energy, controlling information, and building coalitions to influence other people. A 
key issue in this context is the issue of legitimacy. According to Courpasson (2000, 
p. 143), legitimacy is:
the recognition of the right to govern ... legitimacy is the capacity to 
justify that some individuals hold the power to govern and that other 
individuals give their consent and submit to authority. Acceptance by the 
latter is the essential condition of the right to govern ... Legitimacy, then, 
implies action on the part of individuals: ‘to consent is to accept a 
situation including some renouncement, which is shown through a duty of 
obedience.
Thus it may seem that legitimacy may also be associated with the two forms of power 
identified above, organisational and individual. Under the latter, legitimacy will arise 
from the leadership ability of the person or group exercising power and the extent to 
which followers accept their personal abilities as deserving their obedience. Here 
legitimacy may be lost if the leader fails to exercise those abilities appropriately or is
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seen no longer to possess those abilities, in which their continued power may rest 
upon their ability to coerce obedience, which may be a very unstable condition. In the 
case of organisational power, legitimacy is likely to arise from the mutual 
expectations of organisation members and the extent to which they accept that certain 
organisational positions (e.g., management) give an entitlement to exercise control. 
Here also, legitimacy may be lost if those exercising power fail to conform to either 
the formal rules of the organisation or to the informal expectations that have emerged 
around these formal processes. Because of this basis of legitimacy in expectations it 
can be argued that what is different about bureaucratic and post-bureaucratic 
organisations in terms of the use of power is not that the latter is based on legitimate 
power and the other not (as is sometime suggested, see above), but that they draw on 
different forms of legitimacy. In the case of the bureaucracy, legitimacy may be 
shaped mostly by adherence to rules and procedures (within in this context a dynamic 
charismatic leader might be perceived as lacking legitimacy), whereas in the post­
bureaucracy, legitimacy would be based on the more personal actions of leaders in 
responding to the entrepreneurial challenges of the turbulent environment.
Thus in terms of the introduction of PMM, a key issue may be the issue of whether 
the system is perceived by organisation members as consistent with existing standard 
of legitimacy. Where a system is perceived as not consistent with that standard, this 
may lead to a loss of legitimacy on the part of those trying to introduce it and then to 
conflicts and resistance over how it is used, ultimately having to be imposed against 
the desires of organisation members and therefore lacking support for its use. In 
contrast, where the system is consistent with expectations about the organisation, it 
may improve the legitimacy of those introducing it and therefore their power to make
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the system work effectively. Therefore, it may be crucial to the introduction and 
acceptance of PMM that there is a matching between power, legitimacy and the 
expectations of organisation members. At the individual level this sort of matching is 
often referred to as the ‘psychological contract’.
This may be particularly relevant because Aijala (2001) has reported the widespread 
individualisation of employment in the public sector (as discussed as a result of the 
tendencies identified above). The moves towards forms of NPM (including the 
introduction of PMM) appeal' to bring about a considerable change in public sector 
employment relations, which is likely to have a direct consequence on the 
psychological contracts of the public sector’s employees. The concept of the 
psychological contract can be dated back to the work of Argyris in 1960 and that of 
Schein in 1980 (McDonald and Makin, 2000, p. 84; Millward and Hopkins, 1998, p. 
1531). Since then, the concept has been refined by Rousseau (1995). Rousseau (1995, 
p. 9) defines the psychological contract as “Individual beliefs, shaped by the 
organisation, regarding terms of an exchange agreement between individuals and their 
organisation”. This exchange agreement differs from a legal contract (which is 
composed of a formal offer and acceptance stated in unequivocal terms) because what 
is ‘promised’ from the exchange arises through the belief and perception of the 
employee (Suazo et al., 2009, p. 157) and may be based on unstated expectations or 
interpretations of statements or actions made by other organisation members that, 
whilst believed to be promised or expected, are not formally stipulated.
The changes identified above in the chapter reported the shift away from the 
traditional bureaucratic form of organisation in the public sector. Rousseau (1995)
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reflects this by arguing that the development of employment relations can be 
categorised into three major phrases: emergent, bureaucratic, and adhocratic or post- 
bureaucratic (see below), each of which results in the development of new forms of 
psychological contract.
Table 3.3: History and Attachment
Phase Contract
Emergent Transactional
Bureaucratic Relational
Adhocratic Varies with type of relationship
Source: Rousseau (1995, p. 95)
The Emergent phase represents the late eighteenth century in which modem industrial 
production began and predictability was a major driver. During this era, transactional 
contracts had been developed in centralised workplace for those employees who had 
few options. The Bureaucratic phase is associated with the rise of internal labour 
markets that foster long term relationships between an organisation and employees 
encouraging the development of relational contracts. Organisation members develop 
organisation-speciflc-skills and remain with the organisation for indefinite periods of 
time. The Adhocratic or post-bureaucratic era is seen to emerge out of the 
bureaucratic phase as a result of the need for flexibility. This new era means that 
psychological contracts become more varied depending on the employment 
relationships involved (Rousseau, 1995). The point, therefore, is not that employees 
cannot accept different forms of psychological contract but rather the extent to which 
there is a match between that and the organisational form. Thus the problems that may 
arise in terms of psychological contracts will occur when organisations change their
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form and relationships in a way that is not recognised as legitimate by employees. 
This may often be associated with poor communication of change from employers 
resulting in mixed messages and damage to psychological contracts. For example, the 
findings of the study by Trass et a l  (1997) on three British organisations moving 
away from a relational based contract of job security and clear career path to new 
performance management systems showed that the presence of mixed messages from 
employers undermined the employment relationship and led to scepticism among 
employees towards the change programmes. This form of psychological contract 
‘breach’ can influence employees’ behaviour towards customers (Blancero and 
Johnson, 1997; Blancero et a l , 1996) and fellow employees (Jensen et a l ., 2009; 
Kickul et al., 2002), and also affect their commitment to the organisation (Zhao et a l ,  
2007; Knights and Kennedy, 2005; Lester et al., 2002; Turnley and Feldman, 1999; 
Robinson, 1996). The types of effect of such breaches are shown by Rousseau (1995), 
below.
Table 3.4: The results of Violated Contracts
Constructive Destructive
Active Voice N eglect/D es tru ction
Passive Loyalty/Silence Exit
Source: Rousseau (1995, p. 135)
Therefore in importing private sector management tools and techniques such as PMM 
into the public sector, the potential differences between the private and public sector 
psychological contracts may need to be recognised as a potential source of the 
limitation (Adcroft and Willis, 2005, p. 397; Talbot, 2005; 1999, p.22). Whereas, as 
the discussion of HRM above has shown, PMM has been associated with a dynamic
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and flexible approach to employment, there may be a lag between the extent to which 
this has been accepted within the private sector (under the force of competition) and 
the public sector, either insulated from this or shaped by political forces which tend to 
be slower to react. In addition, even if such acceptance is gained, the nature of the 
implementation, in terms of communication and explanation, together with the nature 
of the PMM methods themselves, may need to be handled carefully to avoid the 
potential of breach. This may be particularly difficult as many public sector 
organisations may find it difficult to fit into models originally designed for the private 
sector organisations, and that may not cover all aspects of performance that need to be 
addressed in the public sector organisations (Talbot, 1999, p.22).
A final issue to be considered in relation to the application of PMM is the role of 
information technology (IT). Change in technology has a considerable impact not 
only on management in general but also on the management of government in 
particular (Hughes, 2003; Isaac-Hendry, 1997). The rise of information and 
communications technologies (ICTs) has allowed for the increased capacity to 
manipulate information and facilitates the emergence of new forms of work process, 
in particular the possibility for employee performance to be electronically monitored. 
Employee performance data can be collected, stored, analysed, and reported 
electronically by means of computer technology (Kolb and Aiello, 1997, p. 190; Aiello 
and Shao, 1993). This makes it possible for managers to monitor employee 
performance on a real-time basis, gather employees’ continuous performance over 
time, and make comparisons of a group of employees’ performance (Fenner et ah, 
1993, p. 574). It has been claimed that computer-based performance measurement 
(CPM) helps with goal setting, provides timely feedback for performance evaluations
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and results in higher productivity, identifies training needs for employees, and reduces 
supervisors’ biases in performance appraisal processes which in turn increases the 
accuracy of performance appraisals (Aiello, 1993, p.501; Fenner et a l ., 1993, p. 574). 
However, in doing so, CPM also comes with criticisms from academics and 
practitioners e.g., loss of privacy, increased stress and diminishing job satisfaction, 
low levels of morale and teamwork and may be seen as an excessive management 
control tool (Ariss, 2002, p.557; Aiello and Shao, 1993). Moreover, it has also been 
claimed that CPM may not really remove supervisors’ biases and may have a negative 
impact on employees’ human contact with supervisors and peers. As a result, some 
firms monitor individual employee performance, while others prefer to monitor group 
performance to avoid stress and intrusiveness that may be perceived by individual 
employees; many countries (e.g., Norway and Sweden) have enacted laws to deal 
with the degree to which individual performance can be monitored (Aiello and Kolb, 
1995, p.339). In these respects, ICTs and CPM may not fundamentally change the 
nature of what is being assessed, but they may give the PMM system an appearance of 
coherence and appear to hold the possibility of both enhancing or degrading the 
experience of PMM depending on how such systems are designed and implemented 
(as will be seen in the following chapters).
Conclusion
The literature review chapter set out to answer the question of how PMM have been 
implemented and practised in public sector reforms. Two levels of analysis were 
reviewed: 1) national and organisational context including theories of NPM, 
bureaucracy and post-bureaucracy, and HRM; and 2) the process of PMM including 
PMM systems, goal setting, organisational power, psychological contract, and ICTs.
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Although there appears no consensus on the variations in the degree to which 
different countries have adopted NPM, it is clear that NPM has had a significant 
impact, albeit in ways that often reflect national cultures and practices rather than as 
the application of a uniform system. As has been seen, the rise of NPM has resulted in 
a movement towards stronger focus on performance by governments around the 
world. Governments have generally been enthusiastic about using performance 
management systems as a key tool to achieve this. NPM has shown itself to be 
capable of adaptation to the context of implementation, although there is debate as to 
how much this dilutes performance gains.
This variability in the use of PMM as part of NPM has significant implications for the 
Thai public sector. In particular, it seems crucial to understand both the aspirations 
towards NPM/PMM and the historical and cultural context against which this is taken 
place. This will allow the identification of the ways in which PMM is being adopted 
and the nature of the values and beliefs of employees that it is having to confront in 
this context. However, it has been shown that although NPM makes PMM a core 
feature of its practice, it did not originate here. As such it is also necessary to examine 
the organisational context and the functional context that have shaped its development 
both before and alongside the NPM application.
The literature on bureaucracy and post-bureaucracy focuses on this aspect. There was 
no consensus on the fall of bureaucracy and even the emergence of post-bureaucracy 
as a new form of organisation structure. In the public sector, many governments have 
employed structural change strategy to achieve better performance. Many attempts 
then were made to ‘modify’ public sector structure. Different governments employed
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structural change in different ways (e.g., merging, decentralisation) to suit their 
specific situations. Although the literature failed to specify clear characteristics of a 
new from of government, a trend away from the pure bureaucratic model has been 
recognised along with the high variation in the form of bureaucracies found in many 
countries (e.g., corporate bureaucracy, market bureaucracy, or a mixed form of 
bureaucracy), rather than the adoption of a unified post-bureaucratic form. The 
findings from many empirical studies have shown that public reform initiatives (e.g., 
contracting out of public services) were likely to result in cultural tensions, often with 
the public sector operational culture appearing to remain intact and continuing to 
influence attitudes and behaviours. Thus if the implementation of PMM in the Thai 
government is to be successful, it is necessary to examine the impact of the apparent 
global trend away from traditional bureaucracy in the Thai context. There emerge two 
key questions as follows:
i) Is there a shift away from the bureaucratic model towards a post
bureaucratic model in the case organisations?
ii) To what extent have the case organisations undergone structural and cultural
changes to accompany the introduction of PMM?
Furthermore, the literature on HRM suggested that the shift from TPM towards HRM 
was associated with the increased growth of PMM, reflecting a desire for improved 
performance via the human resource dimension. The literature showed high variation 
in the role of the HR function in different organisations but within the context of 
modernisation, many governments put emphasis on the development of people along 
with structural reforms and many tools and techniques (e.g., performance related pay, 
human resource development) were imported from the private sector. As a result, the
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literature suggested HR policy provides the context for the practices of PMM through 
strategic integration. A third question therefore needs to be addressed as follows:
iii) To what extent have the case organisations adopted HR initiatives to provide 
the strategic and operational contexts for the introduction of PMM?
In addition to the key theories above that provide the context for PMM at the national 
and organisational levels, the literature on the processes of PMM was also reviewed. 
There was high variation in PMM processes in government: different countries not 
only had different forms of PMM, but also employed different strategies to implement 
it. Within an organisation, effective PMM was shown to need to align at 
organisational and individual levels. Hence there emerges a fourth question:
iv) How effectively have the case organisations integrated their PMM system 
with other organisational and individual activities?
Finally, the literature on PMM processes and techniques, suggested that goal 
alignment was also important for individual trust in the techniques used and for the 
effect on motivation and commitment to the process, particularly in the terms of the 
perceived integrity of the system and the clarity with which its goals were 
communicated. Therefore there is the final research question to be addressed:
v) How have the case organisations formulated and communicated the use of 
PMM system and how has this affected individual responses to it?
By answering these questions, the study will help to clarify the ways in which the 
Thai government is approaching the important process of PMM as part of its 
modernisation actions. It will also contribute to the understanding of the theory of
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PMM by examining its application in relation to wider organisational processes rather 
than just as one aspect of HR activities. In particular, it will contribute by providing 
an investigation that addresses a gap in the literature that is implicit rather than 
explicit, specifically the need to provide in-depth qualitative understandings of the 
experiences of those employees involved in PMM activity. Most of the studies in this 
field tend to adopt largely quantitative approaches and focus on measurement of the 
presence of PMM practices. However, what the foregoing chapter has also shown is 
that the adoption of PMM is a highly complex and variable process and that, to fully 
understand it, especially in a context such as the Kingdom of Thailand, that has not 
been widely examined, a qualitative analysis can provide potential insights not 
available to analyses that focus on only the formal dimensions of PMM practices.
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C H A P T E R  F O U R  
R E S E A R C H  M E T H O D O L O G Y
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the research design and methodology and 
the rationale for this choice.
The aim  of this study is, on the basis of comparisons with other 
organisations/departments, to explore the nature and effectiveness of PMM within the 
Thai public sector, focusing on the Revenue Cluster within the Thai Finance Ministry.
Performance management and measurement (PMM) is a relatively new management 
practice for Thai government organisations. As such, it is appropriate to investigate 
how the processes are being implemented and how they are performing. The Finance 
Ministry is a key part of the public sector and is regarded as being more advanced in 
these matters than other ministries. It is therefore appropriate to study this ministry as 
a ‘critical case’; i.e., if PMM is causing problems here then it is also likely to do so 
for other less developed ministries. The Revenue Cluster was also selected because of 
the researcher’s own knowledge of this section and the consequent opportunities for 
access.
This study comprises four main objectives intended to support the overall aim above.
1. To understand and compare the nature of PMM practices in the public and 
private sectors in the Kingdom of Thailand.
2. To specify factors that appear to influence the success of PMM in both sectors.
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3. To use existing theories of PMM to explain how PMM is being implemented 
but also to consider what other theories/concepts can be used on the basis of 
an inductive assessment of the emerging data.
4. To provide a rich source of qualitative data that provides insights into the 
complexity of PMM as it is experienced by employees and managers from 
different organisational standpoints.
In order to succeed in these objectives, it was considered necessary to purposively
select a private sector company as a basis for comparison. Due to commercial
confidentiality, it was not possible to publish the company name. In this study, it, 
thus, was referred to as ‘the Bank’. As one of the leading private sector companies in 
the Kingdom of Thailand, the Bank has financial activities (e.g., sales and services), 
which are rather similar to those government organisations in the Revenue Cluster. 
Moreover, the Bank is regarded as one of Thailand’s leading private sector companies 
in which effective PMM has been well established for several years. In this respect it 
can be seen as a useful comparator for the effectiveness of PMM in the public sector 
and for the challenges that the latter may face. By using a private sector comparator, it 
will also be possible to examine whether there are any distinctive ‘national’ factors 
that transcend the private/public distinction.
On the basis of the literature review, these aims and objectives were converted into 
five research questions:
i) Is there a shift away from the bureaucratic model towards a post
bureaucratic model in the case organisations?
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ii) To what extent have the case organisations undergone structural and cultural 
changes to accompany the introduction of PMM?
iii) To what extent have the case organisations adopted HR initiatives to provide 
the strategic and operational context for the introduction of PMM?
iv) How effectively have the case organisations integrated their PMM system 
with other organisational and individual activities?
v) How have the case organisations formulated and communicated the use of 
PMM system and how has this affected individual responses to it?
Before considering how these questions are to be investigated it is first necessary to 
provide an overview of the selection and justification of the philosophical position 
that underlines the research design in this study.
The relationship between data and theory is an issue that has been hotly 
debated by philosophers for many centuries. Failure to think through 
philosophical issues such as this, while not necessarily fatal, can seriously 
affect the quality of research, and they are central to the notion of research 
design. (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002, p.27).
Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) propose three benefits from the acknowledgement of 
philosophical issues as follows:
• to help to clarify research design e.g., needed data, data collection, data 
analysis;
• to help evaluate the appropriateness of designs; and
• to help identify and create designs that may be outside researchers’ past 
experience and suggest how to adapt them according to the constraints of 
different subject.
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To ensure the quality of research design, a research paradigm must be in line with 
researcher’s beliefs about the nature of reality. This ontological position will clarify 
the epistemological and methodological choices available (Mills et a l., 2006, p.3). 
Guba and Lincoln (1994) summarise basic beliefs in response to these three 
fundamental and interconnected questions as follows;
Table 4.1: Basic Beliefs in Response to Three Fundamental and Interconnected Questions
Assumptions Questions
The Ontological Question What is the form and nature of reality? 
What can therefore be known about it?
The Epistemological Question What is the nature of the relationship between the knower and the 
would be knower and what can be known?
The Methodological Question How can the inquirer (would be knower) go about finding out 
whatever he or she believes can be known?
Source: Adapted from texts in Guba and Lincoln (1994, p. 108)
The literature on various aspects of PMM suggests that its implementation is not 
merely a matter of a rational decision-making response to the availability o f ‘factual’ 
data about performance, although this has been a dominant interpretation particularly 
from those writers who have followed a positivist philosophy (see below). Rather it 
has been shown that the PMM process is influenced not only by the limitations of 
individuals’ information-processing capacities (Herbert, 1979) but also by subjective 
factors (e.g., psychological contract, previous experiences and expectations) and by 
more structural factors that are shaped by contingent forces (e.g., organisational 
structures and cultures, policies and practices). This evidence suggests, therefore, that 
PMM requires to be seen as part of a reality that is socially constructed by human 
actors operating within a social context (Berger and Luckmann, 1991), rather than as 
a set of objective ‘facts’ that have an unchanging form. The ontological assumption is 
therefore made that it will be most appropriate to approach the investigation of PMM
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from a perspective that recognises the social organisation of society (as oppose to the 
physical world) as constructed by social actors. This social reality is not wholly 
subjective but is produced by individuals acting together over periods of time and 
often appears to individuals as having an objective existence that is independent of 
each individual. However, such appearances can change over time and also are 
perceived differently depending on an individual’s place in this social order. Thus it is 
necessary to recognise the possibility of multiple ‘realities’ linked to particular 
organisational and individual contexts (Berger and Luckmann, 1991). As such this 
study will focus on different responses of managers and employees to PMM practices 
in their organisations.
It follows from this assumption that in order to ‘know’ about these realities it is 
necessary to adopt an epistemological position that gives the priority to interpretation. 
The interpretivist epistemology requires the understanding of different view points 
between social actors (Saunders et a l ., 2007) and seeks to comprehend how 
individuals come to this position; i.e., what factors they take into account when 
‘making sense’ of the activities in which they participate. Thus, only through gaining 
‘accounts’ o f their activities (actions and thoughts) from participants can the 
researcher come to understand the reality that they have created and reproduced 
(Denzin, 2001). In addition, this means that the researcher is not present in the 
research activity as an external ‘neutral’ observer, but has to engage with respondents 
in order to comprehend from their position (rather than from that of the ‘detached’ 
scientist informed only by a body of ‘independent’ knowledge), and the ‘meanings’ 
they attach to their situations.
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As such it is a contrasting epistemology to positivism (Burke, 2007, p.479) which 
emphasises the external ‘objective5 measurement of phenomena (Bryman and Bell, 
2007). Positivism is referred to as a logical, rational approach which is associated 
with the pure sciences in which facts are clearly defined and results can be measured 
and monitored (Burke, 2007, p.479). The positivist approach can be found in those 
procedures associated with inferential statistics, hypothesis testing, mathematical 
analysis, and experimental and quasi-experimental design (Lee, 1991, p.342). In 
addition, the distinctions between positivism and interpretivism can be made by the 
table below.
Table 4.2: Positivist Approach versus Interpretive Approach
Meta-theoretical 
Assumptions about
Positivism Interpretivism
Ontology Person (researcher) and reality are separate Person (researcher) and reality are inseparable 
(life-world)
Epistemology Objective reality exists beyond the human 
mind
Knowledge of the world is intentionally 
constituted through a person’s lived 
experience
Research object Research object has inherent qualities that 
exist independently of the researcher
Research object is interpreted in light of 
meaning structure of person’s (researcher’s) 
lived experience
Method Statistics, content analysis Hermeneutics, phenomenology, etc.
Theory of truth Correspondence theory of truth: one to one 
mapping between research statements and 
reality
Truth is intentional fulfilment: interpretations 
of research object matched live experience of 
object
Validity Certainty: data truly measures reality Defensible knowledge claims
Reliability Replicability: research results can be 
reproduced
Interpretative awareness: researchers recognise 
and address implications of their subjectivity
Source: Ccpeda and Martin {2005, p. 856)
As has been seen, this study which recognises the possibility of realities related to 
certain contexts tends to be more associated with interpretivism rather than 
positivism. In discussing research paradigms, Burke (2007, p.480) makes the point 
that:
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Adopting this perspective [positivism] in people- and information-based 
research would not allow context- which can be critical to a study- to be 
taken into account. While this perspective [positivism] which searches for 
explanations for social phenomenon could have allowed for standard, 
structured, ‘reasonable’ conclusions about behaviour, it could have 
missed, for example, a rich array o f history, a range o f social conventions, 
and the reasons behind the different types of behaviour.
As it has already been shown that the meanings associated with PMM are highly 
variable and contested, it is appropriate to adopt a position that follows the ideas of 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) towards constructing an understanding o f the phenomenon 
in terms that are ‘grounded’ in the conditions of its actual experience. This will be 
discussed more fully below.
Following from this epistemological assumption, the methodology adopted will 
concentrate on the production o f detailed textual accounts derived from those who 
have participated in the PMM processes. These accounts will explore the meanings 
that respondents attach to the process and the ways in which they make sense o f PMM 
within the context o f their wider organisational experiences. For this purpose the key 
data collection method used was the semi-structured interviews (described more fully 
below). As mentioned above, data collected in this way can be used as material for 
theory-building or inductive explanation using a form of analysis influenced by 
‘grounded theory’. It is often claimed that scientific studies fall into one o f two 
extreme categories:
• deductive proof which “begins with a universal view o f a situation and works 
back to the particulars”; or
• inductive discovery which “moves from fragmentary details to a connected 
view of situation” (Dewey, 1933 cited in Gray, 2004, p. 6).
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Each o f these has its own drawbacks. Perry (1998) argues that “pure induction might 
prevent the researcher from benefiting from the existing theory, just as pure deduction 
might prevent the development o f new and useful theory” (p. 789). In the deductive 
approach, a hypothesis needs to be established prior to the data collection by 
establishing initially known causal relationships between variables from which novel 
‘hypothetical’ outcomes can be predicted (e.g., by varying conditions or adding new 
variables). Here it is the prior theory, and in particular ‘theoretical laws’ established 
by prior research that provide the starting position for investigation. The novel 
hypotheses that are to be tested by the research involve a predicted outcome or 
outcomes and it is the task o f the researcher to determine whether these outcomes do 
occur as predicted.
By contrast, the inductive approach attempts to generate theoretical understanding by 
drawing inferences from empirical observation; i.e., starting with data rather than 
theory. Whereas deductive approaches start from abstract hypotheses logically 
derived from an existing body of ‘law-like’ theories, inductive approaches start from 
the data itself and attempt to build explanations that closely reflect what is observed. 
This approach, because it is less structured by prior theory, permits alternative 
explanations (rather than only allowed by the logic o f the prior hypotheses) and is 
often adopted in cases where the context in which the events under investigations take 
place is regarded as a major concern (Saunders et al., 2007). Existing theories and 
concepts can be drawn upon to help shape such emerging explanations but they are 
not the necessary starting point as in deductive approaches.
85
CHAPTER FOUR RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Thus, the participants in this study were treated as actors whose reaction to PMM 
practices is “a consequence o f the way in which they perceive their work experience, 
rather than as if  they were unthinking research objects who respond in a mechanistic 
way to certain circumstances” (Saunders et al., 2007, p. 119). Given these ontological 
and epistemological considerations, a qualitative methodology was considered 
appropriate for the study. This would allow an exploration o f the response of the 
participants to PMM in considerable detail and depth, capturing the different ways in 
which it is understood and identifying any unanticipated responses as well as 
confirming those that would be consistent with other studies.
This type o f approach has often been associated with the important works on 
Grounded Theory o f Glaser and Strauss (1967; see also Rodon and Pastor, 2007, p. 
71; Charmaz, 2006; Hunter et al., 2005, p. 58; Heath and Cowley, 2004, p .141) and 
although this study will not use a strict grounded theory approach it is important to 
recognise the general influence o f this approach on most qualitative methodologies 
(Creswell, 2007; Douglas, 2003, p. 47; Locke, 2001). It was originated as an 
alternative to the deductive approach which emphasised testing hypothesis from 
existing theories (Charmaz, 2006) and since its introduction in 1967, has been adapted 
into a number o f studies in a wide range o f disciplines (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007; 
Creswell, 2007; Cutcliffe, 2005, p. 421; Douglas, 2004, p. 59; Easterby-Smith et al., 
2002; Locke, 2001) and has been further extended by its founders, their students, and 
other methodologists (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; Locke, 2001).
The evolution o f grounded theory has seen a divergence of approaches (Charmaz, 
2006; Hunter et al., 2005, p. 60; Fernandez, 2004, p.84; Heath and Cowley, 2004,
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p. 142). Heath and Cowley (2004, p. 142) cite adaptations o f grounded theory by 
different authors (e.g., Keddy et a l )s [1996] extension o f macro-analysis, 
Schatzman’s [1991] dimensional analysis, and Chenitz and Swanson’s [1986] 
surfacing the nursing process) and La Rossa (2005, p. 839) describes this phenomena 
as “a cottage industry, with various individuals choosing sides or advancing their own 
similar-but-not-identical-GTM [Grounded Theory Method] methodologies”. A 
significant difference in opinion between founders, Glaser and Strauss, emerged after 
Strauss and Corbin’s publication o f Basics o f  Qualitative Research in 1990 (Kendall, 
1999, p.745). In 1992 Glaser published his book of The Basics o f  Grounded Theoiy: 
Emerging versus Forcing  in response to that by Strauss and Corbin and described 
their work as conceptual description rather than emergent theory (Creswell, 2007; 
Cutcliffe, 2005, 426; Kendall, 1999, p.745). Glaser’s strict adherence to the 
emergence of theory from data continues to be distinct feature that differentiates his 
approach from other research contemporaries (Boychuk and Morgan, 2004, p.606). 
Bryant and Charmaz (2007, pp. 4-5) make the point that:
Thus many researchers who claimed use o f the method in the early 1990s 
often did so with near exclusive reference to Strauss and Corbin’s work, 
assuming it to be a seamless development from the Discovery o f 
Grounded Theory. By the late 1990s, however, only those researchers who 
had not come across Glaser’s (Glaser, 1992) arguments would have been 
unaware o f the distinct differences between Glaser’s and Strauss’ writings 
about Grounded Theory Method.
This leads to the emergence o f two distinct approaches to grounded theory (Cutcliffe, 
2005, p. 421). On the one hand, the Glaserian approach was likely to put more 
emphasis on creativity, but less on process in methodology (Douglas, 2003, p. 47). 
The Straussian approach, on the other hand, suggested a more linear approach to the
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methodology that emphasised rigid patterns o f coding and associating ideas within the 
data (Rodon and Pastor, 2007, p. 72; Douglas, 2003, p. 47).
In this respect the current research takes more sympathy towards the Glaser’s position 
as this allows greater flexibility in dealing with the analysis o f the data, and this was a 
quality that was considered important when dealing with research data that would 
often be collected in a non-English language and context and would need to be 
translated. This was considered to be an important consideration both for the 
exploratory nature o f the approach to PMM and because o f the research context itself, 
allowing the researcher maximum flexibility to cope with unexpected issues. The 
detailed approach to analysing the data will be discussed more fully below.
The study has therefore adopted an inductive approach to developing explanations 
from case study research as an appropriate way o f responding to a lack of empirical 
research in area as outlined above. It was considered that case studies would give the 
depth o f understanding necessary to explore the issues involved and to give a strong 
sensitivity to context; i.e., Thai organisations, where there is little previous qualitative 
research o f any kind. Yin (2003) suggests this is an appropriate approach where the 
boundaries between the research object, PMM practice, as a phenomenon, and 
organisational context are not clear and “little is known about a phenomenon, current 
perspectives seem inadequate because they have little substantiation” (Eisenhardt, 
1989, p.547). Thus in this respect a theory-building process becomes more 
appropriate than “traditional research designs [which] usually rely on a literature 
review leading to the formation of a hypothesis...[which]...is then put to the test”
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(Allan, 2003, p .l). Laws and McLeod (2004, p. 17) advocate the use o f case studies 
and grounded theory:
The combined case study/grounded theory approach allowed flexibility 
within the research site and produced a rich harvest o f fine grained 
research data, that illuminated an important research topic.
This study has adopted three case organisations which were purposefully selected to 
allow for the use of cross case analysis for richer theory building (Perry, 1998, p.792). 
This research design therefore uses a multiple-case study in which two government 
organisations and one private sector organisation are compared. Since both public 
sector and private sector organisations all had adopted and implemented PMM 
systems for more than three years, it was possible to find respondents with experience 
o f working in a PMM environment. This allows respondents’ real-life experiences to 
be captured and supported by documentary evidence detailing the formal policies 
involved.
The case study method was chosen on the basis of criteria provided by Yin (2003) 
who distinguishes five major research strategies in the social sciences, namely, case 
study, experiments, surveys, histories, and the archival analysis. These five strategies 
are distinguished by three conditions: the type o f research question; the extent of 
control over behavioural events; and degree o f focus on contemporary as opposed to 
historical events (see table below).
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Table 4 .3 : Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies
Strategy Form of 
Research Question
Requires Control of 
Behavioural Event?
Focused on 
Contemporary Events?
Experiment how, why Yes Yes
Survey who, what, where, 
how many, 
how much
No Yes
Archival analysis who, what, where, 
how many, 
how much
No Yes/No
History how, why No No
Case study how, why No Yes
Source: COSMOS Corporation cited in Yin (2003, p. 5)
This study adopts a case study strategy because o f the nature o f its research questions, 
the inability o f the researcher to control events, and the focus on contemporary 
phenomenon (Gray, 2004; Yin, 2003). Gray (2004) also points out some additional 
advantages o f the case study: compared with surveys which have a focus On limited 
range o f topics, case studies can explore more themes and subjects from a much more 
focused range of people, organisations or contexts.
The two major types o f case study design, single case or multiple case study, may 
each be either ‘holistic’ or ‘embedded’: the holistic design focuses on the nature of 
phenomenon as a whole, while the embedded design comprises more than one unit of 
analysis (Yin, 2003) (See Figure below).
90
CHAPTER FOUR RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Figure 4 .1 : Basic Types of Designs for Case Studies 
Single-case designs Multiple-case designs
Holistic 
(Single unit of 
Analysis)
Embedded 
(Multiple units 
of analysis)
Source: Adapted from COSMOS Corporation cited in Yin (2003, p. 40)
The design o f this study falls into ‘category 4’, a multiple embedded case design. Yin 
(2003) suggests using multiple case studies to overcome the difficulty with 
generalisation from one particular case and when comparison between either similar 
or different cases is likely to be instructive. For example, this study was originally to 
focus on one government department of the Thai public sector, but it was decided that 
this would risk investigating a unit that could be atypical so it was decided to include 
another government department for comparison. Also it was felt that if  there were to 
be lessons that went beyond the public sector, then a private sector case should also be 
added as a comparator. In addition, by comparing both the public and private sectors 
it would be possible to identify if there were similarities with all three cases that 
might be suggested as related to Thai culture more generally. The embedded approach 
allows for contingencies to be taken into account and for a range o f factors to emerge 
as potentially relevant to the investigation, not all o f which may be apparent from 
previous knowledge or research. Thus the multiple units o f analysis can be seen as 
including the different positions o f respondents (managers and operatives) and the 
structural and subjective processes involved. It thus reflects the complex and multi­
level nature o f the PMM process, established in the previous chapter, that requires
TYPE 1 TYPE 3
TYPE 2 TYPE 4
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flexibility in terms o f which units o f analysis will be addressed as part o f a complete 
understanding o f this process.
This design poses three sets o f questions that will be addressed below:
1 . the construction o f the sample of multiple cases and the respondents within 
these;
2 . the nature o f the data collection methods and instruments; and
3. the analysis o f the resulting data.
To justify the choice of cases, particularly those associated with the public sector, it is 
first necessary to understand the structure o f Government Agencies and their roles. 
The structure o f the Thai government after the 2002 Restructuring o f Government 
Agencies Act comprises twenty ministries (see below).
Table 4 .4 : The List of All Ministries in the Thai public sector
Miuistry-level Organisations In the Thai public sector
1 Prime Minister’s Office
2 Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives
3 Ministry of Commerce
4 Ministry of Culture
5 Ministry of Defence
6 Ministry of Education
7 Ministry of Energy
8 Ministry of Finance
9 Ministry of Foreign Affairs
10 Ministry of Industry
11 Ministry of Information and Communication Technology
12 Ministry of Interior
13 Ministry of Justice
14 Ministry of Labour
15 Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment
16 Ministry of Social Development and Human Security
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Ministry-level Organisations in the Thai public sector
17 Ministry of Science and Technology
18 Ministry of Transport
19 Ministry of Tourism and Sports
20 Ministry of Public Health
However, as a result o f Thai political instability, it was decided to select two 
departments within the same ministry, due to the fact that during 2005-2006, there 
were several major restructurings o f ministries and a second round due during the 
planned fieldwork. It seemed that the Finance Ministry would be relatively stable, 
being one o f the best established and most central and therefore not likely to be 
restructured. As a result, within the timeframe o f this study, it was decided to focus on 
two different departments within this ministry. Moreover, the role and responsibilities 
of the Finance Ministry (overseeing public finance, taxation, treasury, providing loan 
guarantees; G 8), are more similar to those o f private sector for-profit organisations 
(e.g., in the financial sector) than most other parts o f government. As a result, the use 
of the Finance Ministry as a comparative case is useful in reducing the task 
differences when compared to a private sector company.
From within this ministry, the Excise Department and the Revenue Department were 
selected from the Revenue Cluster (one o f three main clusters, the others being 
Property, and Debt and Expenses). These were chosen partly on the grounds of access 
(i.e., the researcher being known to the managers involved) and because, although 
they were known to involve different operational processes, differences in their use of 
PMM could not be claimed to be the effect of factors associated with ministry 
structure.
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Along with the two government departments, a private sector organisation was needed 
as a comparison in order to determine whether any patterns discovered were specific 
to the public sector or, potentially shared with private sector companies, thereby 
suggesting that national culture/practices could be involved rather than 
sectoral/organisational ones. As a result, the Bank, the fourth largest Thai commercial 
bank in 2006, was singled out. It had been widely known in the country as a pioneer 
in the introduction o f new banking services and new management concepts and tools 
e.g., re-engineering. In particular, PMM as a crucial part o f the Bank’s strategic 
programmes had been adopted and implemented successfully. The selection of the 
Bank was intended to make comprehensive comparison between the two sectors in 
terms o f implementation mechanism, rather than the outputs o f PMM. It was assumed 
that the lessons learned from the Bank would help with understanding PMM practices 
in a different setting.
This choice o f case organisations will not allow robust statistical generalisations to be 
made about the findings but it does allow what Yin (2003) calls ‘theoretical/analytical 
generalisation’ by the replication logic; i.e., the process of choosing the cases in order 
to keep certain factors controlled so that emerging differences can be regarded as 
explained by differences within the cases. He argues that in dealing with case studies, 
it is often mistaken to conceive of statistical generalisation as a method of 
generalising. By contrast, in the context o f case study based research, theoretical 
generalisation is sought and focused on how far the findings o f the case study can be 
generalisable to broader theory. In other words, do the findings confirm or challenge 
existing explanations in terms o f their explanatory logic and consistency? Following 
Yin (2003), theoretical generalisation allows the researcher to generalise about factors
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that affect PMM practices, rather than attempting to generalise the findings to the 
population o f Thai public and private sector organisations. Snow and Trom (2002) 
also assert that multiple-case studies are likely to produce better results in terms of 
theoretical development and robustness. In this study, theoretical generalisation was 
sought through two forms o f theoretical development: theoretical extension; and 
theoretical refinement. Theoretical extension allows existing theoretical formulations 
to extend to new or different contexts, and theoretical refinement is associated with 
the modification o f an existing theoretical perspective with new case material (Snow 
and Trom, 2002).
The major units o f analysis in this study are the organisation/department and the 
individual, although the responses sought from the interviewees were intended to 
address organisational issues rather than those o f a purely subjective nature. At the 
organisation level, interview data is supplemented by internal official documents and 
reports.
At the individual level, sixty-six respondents were selected: forty-five government 
officers from the two departments and twenty-one staff members from the Bank. The 
details o f all interviewees are shown below.
Table 4 .5 : The Details of All Interviewees
Case Organisations Informants No.
The Department of Top Management Level
Excise • Director General 1
• Deputy Directors General 3
Managerial Level
• Director of Bangkok Regional Excise Office 1
• Director o f Tax Policy and Planning Bureau 1
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Case Organisations Inform ants No.
• Director o f Tax Collection Administration Bureau
• Head of Technical Investigation and Development Group
• Head o f Public Sector Development Group
• Head o f  Buri-Rum Area Excise Office
• Head o f Satun Area Excise Office
I
1
1
1
Operational Level
• Excise technical staff at the head office
• Excise technical staff in Area Excise Offices
Total
6
6
23
The Department of 
Revenue
Top Management Level
• Director General
• Deputy Directors General
1
3
Managerial Level
• Director of Regional Revenue Office 1
• Director of the Bureau o f Tax Supervision and Audit Standards
• Director of the Bureau o f Tax Policy and Planning
• Line manager in the Bureau of Tax Policy and Planning
• Head of Buri-Rum Area Revenue Office
1
1
1
1
1
• Head o f Satun Area Revenue Office
• Line manager in Satun Area Revenue Office
1
1
Operational Level
• Revenue technical staff at the head office
• Revenue technical staff in Area Revenue Offices
Total
3
8
22
The Bank Top Management Level 
• Senior management at the head office 4
Managerial Level
• Team leaders at the head office
• Branch managers
2
2
Operational Level
• Staff at the head office
• Staff in bank branches
Total
5
8
21
The sixty-six respondents were directly and indirectly involved in PMM mechanisms. 
This provides a rare insight into how the processes are experienced across the
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organisational hierarchy, rather than concentrating on a single group such as 
managers.
The data gathering method in this study was largely driven by the concept o f “making 
comparisons” and aimed to achieve a ‘maximum variation sample’ (Marshall, 1996, 
p.523); i.e., maximised opportunities to discover variations among participants’ 
reactions to the PMM processes. Diverse participants from three levels o f staff (e.g., 
the top, middle, and operative levels) were sought to obtain representation o f multiple 
perspectives. A combination o f snowball and theoretical sampling was used together 
to derive the most productive sample; each of sampling techniques was applied as 
required and when appropriate.
After justifying the selection o f qualitative research, it is necessary to consider the 
justification o f semi-structured interviews, and an overview of the research process 
and research ethics involved in this study. Semi-structured interviews were considered 
to be in line with the research questions and objectives by allowing the exploratory 
and explanatory nature o f the case study to be developed. In particular, their more 
open structure towards questioning was considered as important in order to allow the 
full detail o f complex and subtle issues to be explored when making cross case 
comparisons (Bryman and Bell, 2007).
The development o f the questions is described below. The order o f questions in the 
interview was varied according to the flow o f the talk in a given organisational 
context. All interviews were conducted by face-to-face meeting between the 
researcher and a single participant. This form of interview made it possible for the
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researcher to investigate participants’ understandings and feelings about PMM in their 
organisations and, at the same time, to explore the reasons for their attitudes and 
opinions. Moreover, as this issue could be regarded as potentially sensitive, 
establishing personal contact helped in giving respondents assurances about the use of 
interview information and confidentiality.
The interview questions were developed both to explore the detailed responses of 
employees in a way that would allow grounded explanations o f their reactions to 
PMM to be developed but they were also informed by issues that were relevantly 
exposed in the literature review. This latter was to allow, in addition to inductive 
production, the evaluation o f existing notions and a comparison between these and the 
current situation involved in this study. The latter questions were not intended to test 
the existing theories in the hypothetico-deductive form but to identify points of 
difference and further debate and investigation. Four sets o f interview questions were 
developed, one for each o f the different groups o f respondents: public sector senior 
managers; public sector middle managers and operative staff; private sector senior 
managers; and private sector middle managers and operative staff. The use o f four 
sets of questions was an acknowledgment of differences in organisational context and 
priorities for these different groups. However, in practice the differences were 
relatively small and reflected organisational contextual issues rather than the specific 
focus on PMM issues. The majority o f interview questions were open ended. The 
interviews were designed to last about an hour. The researcher was prepared to allow 
respondents to follow their own directions where necessary and to elaborate and 
reinterpret the questions in the ways that they wished without trying to restrict their
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answers, except where this started to threaten the continuation o f the whole interview 
(e.g., in terms o f time constraints).
Because the use o f personal interviews is not a common research technique in Thai 
businesses and organisations, the researcher decided to give participants a list of 
outline interview topics in advance. This was done to allay fears that respondents 
might have about being interviewed (perhaps associating it with a disciplinary 
process) and to make them more comfortable with an unfamiliar process.
The interviews were designed to determine the ways in which respondents understood 
the operation o f their PMM system, in particular to find out whether they perceived a 
gap between what should be done and what was done and, as equally importantly, to 
understand how they responded to this system and the extent to which they believed 
that they did improve their performance. In all case organisations, ‘request for 
interview’ letters that outlined the nature and purpose of the research and its potential 
benefits were sent to senior managers. When agreement had been reached, a follow- 
up telephone call was made by the researcher to make appointment to discuss who he 
would like to participate and how they should be contacted. All interviews were 
requested in writing and followed by a confirming telephone call.
Sixty-six semi-structured interviews were conducted in the three organisations 
(twenty one from one private sector organisation and forty-five from two public sector 
organisations) within six months from December 2006 to May 2007. Most of the 
interviews were conducted within the organisation premises where the participants 
were given release time for taking part. A minority o f interviews (mostly in the
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private bank) were conducted after working hours. All interviews were recorded by 
two digital audio recorders as a safeguard against hardware malfunction. The actual 
interviews ranged from forty-five minutes to one and a half hours. Following each 
interview, the recording was transferred from the recorders to a computer and stored 
as wave sound files to be transcribed and checked for accuracy (Bryman and Bell, 
2007).
It was notable that the researcher was able to overcome three possible problems in 
qualitative interviews: ‘hardware malfunction’, ‘refusal to be recorded’ (Bryman and 
Bell, 2007), and refusal to participate in the interviews. In particular, the last two 
problems were cited by Perry (1998) as that the use of tape recorder “is rarely 
approved during interviews in Asia” (p. 798), respectively; and “that more than one 
interview...in any Asian organisation is difficult...” (p. 794). As can be seen from the 
table below, examples o f case studies conducted in Asian countries in the last five 
years are limited (these are not claimed to be an exhaustive list, but were all that could 
be identified by the researcher at the time o f writing). Although interviews have been 
used, the number o f respondents is often quite low.
Table 4 .6 : The Sum m ary of the Details of Case Studies Conduced in Asian Countries
in the Last Five Y ears
Author (Year) Research Topic Number of 
Interviewees
Sector Data
Analysis
Country
Shih et a/. (2005) Expatriate 
performance 
management from 
MNEs of 
different national 
origins
36 (IT) industry n/a Taiwan
Thia at a/. (2005) An exploratory 
study of the use of 
quality tools and 
techniques in
10 Industrial and 
academic
n/a Singapore
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Author (Year) Research Topic Number of 
Interviewees
Sector Data
Analysis
Country
product
development
Sriussadapom
(2006)
Managing 
international 
business 
communication 
problems at work: a 
pilot study in 
foreign companies 
in Thailand.
14 Multinational
companies
n/a Thailand
Lau and Moon 
(2008)
Adoption of 
strategic networks: 
evidence from 
the Hong Kong 
clothing industiy
5 Clothing industry Content
Analysis
Hong Kong
Li et al. (2008) Improving service 
quality and 
organisation 
performance 
through human 
resource practices; 
A case study
7 Hair salon industry An in-depth 
analysis
Taiwan
Pang and Toh 
(2008)
Hawker food 
industry: food 
safety/public health 
strategies in 
Malaysia
4 Food industry Thematic
analysis
Malaysia
Vathanophas et al. 
(2008)
Technology 
acceptance toward 
e-govemment 
initiative in Royal 
Thai Navy.
24 Naval finance 
officers
n/a Thailand
Choo and Jamal 
(2009)
Tourism on organic 
farms in South 
Korea: a new form 
of eco-tourism?
9 Tourism In-depth 
interviews 
and content 
analysis
South Korea
Eng (2009) Manufacture 
upgrade and inter­
firm relationship 
development: 
the case of 
electronics Firms in 
the Pearl River 
Delta.
18 Electronic
industries
Pattern
matching
technique
China
101
CHAPTER FOUR RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
As the main interest o f the study was associated with individuals and their 
understandings and attitudes towards PMM, all processes in conducting the research 
from research planning to seeking access, collecting data, data analysis, and writing 
up research findings were kept in line with ethical principles (Saunders et al., 2007). 
Prior to the commencing o f every interview, participants were informed of the 
research purpose and his/her right to withdraw partially or fully from the study 
throughout the process at any time. Moreover, all informants were asked to give their 
consents for the talk to be recorded (first asked if they agree recorded at the start of 
the interview), guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality, and allowed to ask any 
questions. Anonymity was particularly important as the interviews could give rise to 
opinions that were critical o f individuals or organisations. Respondents were asked 
not to mention individuals by name and where this did occur references were removed 
from the transcripts. In addition respondents were assured that nothing they said in the 
interview would be reported to senior managers or colleagues or reproduced in a form 
that would identify them individually. All interview data was kept only by the 
researcher in secure conditions (transcripts in a locked drawer and digital material 
protected by password). In the analysis o f individual interview transcripts, any 
identifying statements were removed.
Due to the fact that all interviews were conducted in Thai settings where the primary 
language o f those interviewed is not English, the back translation o f the interviews to 
English, a communication language used throughout the thesis, was needed, in 
particular for provisional data analysis and the final report o f the findings (Javanovic, 
1991, p.83). The interview data were first transcribed in Thai and examined 
provisionally for coherence and then carefully translated into English. To ensure
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reliability and to maintain the original meanings o f the interviews as much as 
possible, the English transcripts were back translated into Thai and then checked with 
the original version. In the following chapters, verbatim extracts from the English 
translations are used. In order to keep them as close as possible to the authentic 
speech o f the respondents, no attempt has been made to put the quotations into 
‘correct’ English, as this was felt to give a sense o f being contrived and adding an 
additional level o f ‘translation’ which would have lost the ‘voice’ o f the respondent. 
The reader is therefore asked to accept that the quotations will sometimes seem 
ungrammatical and clumsy but it is hoped that they will get a strong sense o f how the 
respondents were really speaking about the issues of concern.
The secondary data was drawn from the printed and electronic documents available 
both publicly and privately, such as organisation websites, internal letters, annual 
reports, PMM manuals, and PowerPoint presentations.
Data analysis for this study began with “within-case analysis” and was followed by 
“cross-case search for patterns” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 540). Within-case analysis is 
intended to “allow the unique patterns o f each case to emerge” and “give investigators 
a rich familiarity with each case” (p.540). The approach adopted was that of 
‘comprehensive data treatment’ or ‘pattern matching’ (Yin 2003) and involved 
examination o f the interview transcripts to identify emerging themes or patterns or 
differences between respondents within the same organisation and between 
organisations. The transcripts o f individual respondents were also examined for the 
consistency o f their accounts and to identify any contradictions in their answers. 
Possible concepts and relationships were coded and shown on a matrix so that each
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interview could be seen as a summary pattern for comparison. In addition at this stage 
memos were also added regarding possible similarities with established theories and 
concepts covered in the literature review and any that emerged that had not been 
anticipated in the latter. For the relevance of ideas that had not been considered in the 
literature review, searches were undertaken on the described issue and where relevant 
discussion of a related established theory was integrated into the discussion chapters 
o f the empirical results, this being an approach that can be considered as consistent 
with the acceptance o f inductive analysis as discussed above.
In the process o f interpreting this interview data it became clear that respondents in 
the different cases appeared to perceive the PMM process in quite different ways that 
seemed to reflect not only relatively small differences in the actual practices of their 
respective systems but rather reflected their broader understanding o f the purpose of 
the process and its relationships to other organisational processes. In order to try to 
capture these differences in a systematical form, it was decided to use the tool of 
‘frame analysis’ suggested by Goss (1996) based on the work of Goffman (1974). The 
notion of ‘frame’ refers to the way in which an individual defines a given discrete 
issue or set o f issues (being similar to the notion o f ‘frame o f reference’ [Fox, 1974] 
but more specific in terms o f its individual use rather than referring to a broader 
ideology). Thus for this study the analysis examined the ways in which individuals 
referred to the PMM system in terms of: a) how they described the system and its 
operation (positive, negative, indifferent; well informed or lacking knowledge); b) 
how they made connections with other organisational processes (e.g., was PMM seen 
as a derivative o f strategy or standing alone? How was it related to other HR policies 
such as reward and Human Resource Development [HRD]?); and c) what reasons
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were given for supporting and challenging the system (e.g., linked to personal goals or 
because o f obedience to authority). This allowed that, following Goss (1996) a 
distinction could be made between ‘primary frames’ and ‘secondary frames’. For the 
former, this was a framing where the PMM system was identified as an important 
policy in relation to other organisational policies and that these other policies were 
seen as supporting the PMM system, meaning that the accounts o f these other policies 
could be regarded as secondary framings in relation to the primary PMM frame. It 
would also be possible for a PMM to be considered as a ‘secondary’ frame if it was 
seen as being less important or following from another type o f policy (e.g., such as 
reward) so that it was understood in terms o f that policy rather than as being dominant 
in its own form.
In addition the language o f Frame Analysis makes reference to the notion o f ‘keying’ 
which refers to the way in which primary and secondary frames are linked by an 
individual so that a dominant and less dominant theme are connected in a way that is 
informed by the underpinning logic o f the primary frame and thereby reinforces the 
latter. In contrast, there is also the notion of a ‘fabrication’ where an issue is presented 
in a way that conceals its real character or as a ‘disguise’ for its real purposes (e.g., 
where senior managers claim that PMM is intended to develop individuals but use it 
in practice increase work rates and punish poor performance). By examining the 
accounts o f the respondents’ interviews it was hoped to be able to identify the ways in 
which they gave their framings o f the PMM system and by looking for connections 
with other frames, to provide a view of how the process was understood in its wider 
context. By examining the primary/secondary and keying/fabrication distinctions it 
was also hoped that this would give greater real depth to the ways in which the
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process was experienced by employees than referring only to single direct questions 
and answers (as has been shown by the work o f Goss [1996] and Goss and Adam- 
Smith [1995]). The work o f Goffman (1974) and o f Goss (1996) does not give 
definite techniques for the identification o f frames and therefore a pragmatic approach 
has been adopted. This involved identifying sections o f the interview transcripts that 
were focused on PMM (either as a result o f the interviewer’s questions or the 
respondents’ replies) and examining how the respondent referred to the system in 
terms o f the dimensions outlined above. On this basis a decision was made about 
whether this should be regarded as a primary frame or a secondary frame and related 
to other frames as a keying or a fabrication. This process involves a judgment on the 
part of the interviewer although the basis for this will be explained in the relevant 
sections and by providing detailed quotations of the relevant accounts, it is hoped that 
the reader can form an informed judgment o f the validity o f this judgment. It could be 
argued that, with hindsight, this process could have been checked by an independent 
assessor to determine if  they came to the same decision as the researcher and, if the 
study were to be repeated this would be adopted. However it is hoped that by making 
the process as transparent as possible in the following chapters, this will allow for a 
reasonable assessment o f validity to be made.
Indeed, validity is viewed as a strength o f qualitative research and can be in terms 
such as ‘trustworthiness’, ‘authenticity’, and ‘credibility’ (Creswell, 2003) and, in 
addition, the following additional points can be noticed. The main validity o f this 
study is concerned with the ‘truth’ o f what is being said by the participants. This can 
be understood in two ways. First is the notion o f ‘absolute truth’: does what is said by 
the interviewees reflect what actually happens in practice? (i.e., is there a difference
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between what they say and what they or others actually do?). Without a longitudinal 
participant observation study, it is impossible to guarantee the absolute truth o f a 
respondent’s reply. However as the study did allow for comparisons to be made 
between employees o f the same case organisation, this did allow for the consistency 
of accounts to be examined. Also because o f the semi-structured nature o f the 
interviews, respondents could be asked to clarify or confirm issues that seemed 
ambiguous, and also the length o f the interviews meant that respondents would often 
qualify and clarify points they made themselves. From these comparisons the 
researcher did not get a sense that interviewees were being untruthful in this way or 
that there were significant inaccuracies in what they reported. In addition, responses 
from the interviewees could also be checked against secondary data which offered 
details o f formal PMM practices. The second aspect o f ‘truth’ is the extent to which 
the statements o f the interviewees reflect genuinely held subjective opinions and 
values or whether they were produced in a ‘socially acceptable’ form because o f the 
artificial nature o f the interview situation (Gray, 2004). To reduce this problem the 
researcher spent time with the respondents establishing rapport and making sure that 
they understood that he was interested in their views and opinions and not in the 
‘official’ view of how things were supposed to be. It was also found that by adopting 
a position o f ‘active listening’ (i.e., encouraging respondents to speak and being 
interested in their replies without interrupting or prompting them quickly for answers) 
that most respondents did appear to soon start to ‘speak freely’ and in a conversational 
way rather than giving the impression o f responding only to direct questions. It was 
felt that this was helped because the researcher presented himself as a student and was 
clear that he was not acting as an official of the organisation. For example, it was not 
uncommon for respondents to be initially quite formal and official in their replies at
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the start o f the interview but in nearly all cases as the interview progressed they 
became more willing to express what seemed to be much more their own views. This 
can be confirmed, as will be shown in the following chapters, by the fact that 
respondents were prepared to be quite openly critical o f their organisations^ PMM 
approaches which suggests that they were not merely adopting a ‘safe’ position 
because they felt threatened by the interview situation.
To support the assessment o f validity, the researcher adopted a tabular approach to 
monitor the analysis. The themes that emerged out o f the data were cross-tabulated 
with each respondent and the distribution o f themes per respondent calculated. In 
addition the number o f quotations used in the analysis chapters was also mapped in 
this way in order to show the consistency of themes and to avoid the charge that the 
researcher had been ‘cherry picking’ from only the interviews that supported his 
interpretation. This approach also allowed the researcher to more clearly investigate 
how participants in a given organisation responded to PMM practices through the 
number o f particular themes mentioned by participants e.g., the theme about PMM 
taking people away from other activities. This helped to suggest and identity, based 
on the level of validity across the whole organisation, which theme was likely to be 
associated with one particular respondent or a particular group or type of respondents, 
or which themes were likely to be organisational issues. Thus, rather than attempting 
to establish a domain where findings are generalisable like deductive, hypothesis- 
based research (Marshall, 1996, p.522), this study was focused on generalisability 
from the interpretive perspective or ‘transferability and fit’ (Gasson, 2003). As 
Gasson (2003, p.98) puts it:
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...claims for generalisability cannot be made using the same constructs as 
those used for positivist research, as dissimilar techniques to ensure 
application between contexts and different criteria for assessment are 
applied.
In this respect ‘transferability and fit’ were sought by comparing whether a particular 
theme observed in one case was also present in other cases (Dooley, 2002, p.342) and 
how the context in which the new interview data was collected was similar 
to/different from those in which previous data were gathered. This also made it 
possible to identify contextual factors (Gasson, 2003).
The issue of reliability can be seen as relating to the extent to which the results of a 
study can be reproduced by other researchers (Gray, 2004). For quantitative studies 
that use standardised methods this can be undertaken in terms of internal reliability to 
assess to stability o f structured items such as questionnaire scales, or general 
reliability to assess whether the same result is obtained when the research is repeated, 
either at a different point in time or with a different sample. Flowever for qualitative 
methods the approach to reliability is more difficult. As qualitative methods such as 
interviews require respondents to reflect deeply in order to capture subtle differences 
between respondents, it cannot be expected that the same question would produce 
necessarily similar results from different respondents. In fact the intention might be 
intended to show that different people can answer the same question in different ways 
when they are given the opportunity to discuss the issue in fuller detail. Therefore for 
such research it is more appropriate to consider reliability in terms o f the extent to 
which the design o f a study could be repeated without necessarily expecting to receive 
identical results (Gray, 2004). This means for the researcher that accurate records 
need to be kept of how the research was designed (how the sample was selected), the
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wording o f the questions that were asked and the details o f how the responses were 
analysed. These criteria have been met for this study with design and sampling 
detailed in this chapter and a copy o f the interview guide included in the appendix.
Conclusion
It has been shown in this chapter how a qualitative approach was adopted to address a 
range o f research questions that were intended to clarify and explain the ways in 
which PMM has been adopted and used within the Thai public sector through an 
analysis of the experiences o f managers and employees within that sector and in 
comparison with a sample from a private sector bank. This approach offers new 
insights into the organisational process in the Kingdom o f Thailand where research 
has been dominated by quantitative and positivistic designs. It has been stated that the 
analysis o f the data from the current study will involve the examination o f interview 
transcripts from semi-structured interviews in order to identify dominant themes and 
issues and to build inductive explanations for the discovered patterns from these and 
to relate the results to theories explored in the literature review and to incorporate 
other theories suggested by the data itself. In the following chapters, therefore the data 
will be presented in three chapters (one for each case organisation) and analysed. In 
particular, the quotations from respondents will be used in their actual words in order 
to convey to the reader the sense o f the experiences o f these employees and to expose 
the complex issues that underpin the adoption of a policy such as PMM.
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C H A P T E R  FIV E  
TH E B A N K
This chapter gives the details o f the PMM of the private sector company involved in 
this study. Due to commercial confidentiality, it was not possible to publish the 
company name and is referred to as “the Bank”.
The Bank is one o f the first financial companies in the Kingdom o f Thailand, which 
was established in 1945. In 2006, it had total assets of 936.7 billion baht, total 
deposits o f 752.1 billion baht, and total loans o f 673.9 billion baht. As measured by 
total assets, it ranked the fourth largest commercial bank in the Kingdom of Thailand 
with 11,219 employees, 568 branches, and 3,130 automated teller machines 
throughout the country. Apart from being the first financial company, it is widely 
known as a pioneer in the introduction o f new banking services in the country, and 
new management concepts and tools (e.g., re-engineering). In particular, PMM as a 
crucial part o f the Bank’s strategic programmes has been adopted and implemented 
successfully.
The Bank has constantly gone through many restructuring programmes over the past 
ten years along with the continuous improvement o f its PMM system. To give an 
overall view of the Bank’s organisation structure, its organisation chart at the time of 
the study is presented below.
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Figure 5 .1 : The Bank’s Organisation Structure
As can be seen from the chart above, the Bank comprised ten divisions (including 
fifty-three departments and four networks, all o f which were not shown in the chart). 
Each division had a distinctive focus on a different group o f customers. However, due 
to the limitation to access to the divisional level, this study was focused mainly on the 
PMM process and its impact at the departmental level and the lower levels. Thus this 
case study was mainly associated with In-branch Service and Sales Networks 
(including a number o f bank branches) and the Department o f Business Channel 
Management both under the Retail Business Division. The former was organised into 
four major networks and at the time was responsible for overseeing all bank branches 
across the country. The latter was in charge o f coordinating with the former in
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providing support in terms o f sales and service performance measurement 
development for branches.
The Bank’s organisation structure appears to have been dominated by a mixture of the 
corporate model via an emphasis on goal-oriented planning system and achievement 
orientation, and the market model via a focus on internal competition among staff. 
Under such hybrid form, staffs  expected behaviour and performance were guided by 
goals and targets set by managers, while salary increases, rewards, and promotions 
were determined by individual performance results and reinforced by the Bank’s 
internal competition policy. Thus the role of the HR function seems to have been fully 
integrated with the PMM system and recognised as key part o f business strategy in the 
area o f people management and development with a clear focus on individualisation 
o f employment relations.
The Bank’s overall management style seemed to reflect a combination o f Likert and 
Likert’s (1976) consultative and participative-group models. Employees were 
organised into teams and allowed to participate in group problem solving. As will be 
seen below, individual employees felt free to discuss task related matters with their 
managers, reflecting a relatively flat and team-based form of organisation, with 
certain parallels to the post-bureaucratic model rather than the mechanistic 
bureaucracy (see Chapter 3 above).
According to respondents, the Bank’s PMM system was first developed by its top 
executive about a decade ago. One o f the senior managers o f the department studied 
explained:
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It was kicked off by CEO. It was like the Bank’s agenda. But I don’t know 
all details because at that time. I think this was as a result o f the 
recommendations from every consulting house. It was like a fashion. This 
was the start o f our idea. After that our bank fully took it and sent its 
executives to take relevant courses or whatever. It was a good idea. After 
Mr. X [the Bank’s vice president] started, he’s been attempting to achieve 
it. I think, our bank’s success was contributed to his effort. Because he 
was always following up on progress ... (R7).
At that time, the Bank started establishing its vision, mission, and core values, along 
with reorganising its organisation structure and reviewing its business strategies to 
create competitive advantages under rapidly changing environments. It also put more 
emphasis on performance measurement, reflected by many o f its strategic 
programmes. In this regard the Bank adopted the balanced scorecard concept to 
integrate all strategic perspectives and to enhance profitability at division, department, 
product, and customer levels. Since then, the balanced scorecard as well as a 
performance monitoring system has been implemented into all organisational levels to 
ensure all operations (i.e., business unit and individual goals) are in compliance with 
the Bank’s overall business direction. In line with established good practice, the 
Bank’s systems have continuously undergone modification almost every year in line 
with changes in the Bank’s strategy (Krause, 2003, p. 12; Kennerley and Neely, 2002, 
p. 1235; Bititci et al.t 1997, p. 533).
The design o f a PMM system in general involves the translation of organisational 
stakeholder needs into business objectives and proper performance measures (Bourne 
et a l,  2000, p.767). The Bank’s PMM system put clear emphasis on its staffs 
wellbeing alongside the achievement o f long term sustainable profitability. Its process 
was designed to meet a set o f objectives as follows:
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• To encourage discussion and feedback between managers and employees 
about the process,
• To align employees’ goals with the organisational goals,
• To provide employees with clear understanding o f expectations , and
• To determine employee salary increases and career opportunities.
The PMM process was used to align staff performance with the Bank’s vision, 
mission and goals expressed in its balanced scorecards. After the annual business plan 
was developed, staff at all levels were required to set individual performance plan 
goals that were aligned with team goals, department goals, division goals, and the 
Bank’s annual business plan goals, respectively. Thus under this system, any 
individual could see how his/her contribution and achievement impacted the goal 
achievement at the upper levels.
This approach can be seen to be consistent with the so-called ‘external fit’ model of 
strategic HRM advocated by Schuler and Jackson (1987) which emphasises the 
driving role o f organisational strategy that is used to set targets at successive levels of 
the organisation. The role o f the HR function is to determine how these targets can be 
translated into individual and team ‘needed behaviours’ that are necessary for the 
objectives to be met and to design policies that will allow such behaviours to be 
encouraged and rewarded from employees. In this respect HRM is regarded as a 
‘down-stream’ activity (Purcell, 1989) that is intended to support higher level 
upstream business strategies rather than to operate as a functional area driven by its 
own strategic objectives. Being consistent with this approach the Bank’s PMM 
process involved managers and employees in mutually setting up individual
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performance plan goals, reviewing performance, coaching and so on, in order to 
ensure that all staff performance contribute to the organisational goal achievement. As 
experienced by individual employees and managers, the Bank’s PMM process can be 
divided into four stages (see diagram below).
Figure 5.2 The Bank’s PM M  cycle
1) One-To-One Perform ance Planning stage
2) Coaching, Feedback &  
Progress Review stage
4) Perform ance Review stage
< & .______________________________
3) Opportunities and Rewards stage
This process appeared to be understood by employees and to take place in practice 
(rather than merely being a formal policy that had limited application in day-to-day 
activity). For example:
... The details of my performance plan goals are as a result o f the one-to- 
one performance agreement between my team leader and me ... (R3).
Well! Before my performance score is finalised, it will be ... It is about 
the annual performance score. At the mid o f the year, there must be a 
process, which is called ‘coaching’. This allows team leaders to invite 
their team members to have a chat on a one to one basis. They will tell you 
that based on your current performance and behaviour, your performance 
score at the end will be how many. They will assess and rate your 
performance score. They will tell you how they assess your performance. 
If  you disagree with them, you are allowed to clarify and argue against. 
This is the way the Bank’s measuring our performance. (R2).
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The One-To-One Performance Planning stage appeared to allow individual employees 
and their managers to mutually set individual performance goals for the year, and 
seemed to help with building common understanding and clear expectations (this 
being consistent with findings from Martin and Bartol [2003, pp. 125-126] which 
reported that clarification o f performance expectations was found to have a positive 
impact on the success o f PMM). For example, one senior manager explained how the 
structuring o f performance objectives reinforced the Bank’s performance culture and 
its reward and promotion processes. In this respect the process appears to be central to 
the Bank’s approach to the management of people:
There are no differences in the way we’re treating new or old employees.
In setting PRO or individual performance plan goals, a new staff member 
who has less work experience and low salary will be given less assigned 
target than those staff members who receive higher salary. PRO will be set 
based on position and salary base. For those staff who are in the same 
position, who get higher salary will be given higher target. The staff who 
occupy higher ranking positions will be given bigger figure than those in 
the lower ranking positions. It must be fair. Who receive higher salary will 
receive higher target. Who have higher ranking positions will receive 
more targets. So this sort of condition can be considered fair enough. (R9).
This centrality was reinforced by the way in which this stage was associated with 
individual competency requirements and individual performance plan goals, each of 
which was part o f the Performance, Rewards and Opportunities (PRO) planning 
system; i.e., an in-house computer application developed to support the planning 
stage. The former was related to individual s ta ffs  role profile, which was used as a 
guide to enable them to see their jobs and the Bank’s business direction as a whole. 
This also involved a goal setting activity in which the SMART performance goals 
concept was used to ensure specificity, measurability, attainability, relevance, and 
time limitation and trackability, respectively, o f the goals. Thus the setting of
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individual performance plan goals in the Bank varied on an individual basis with 
assigned targets based on individual salary base, position, and staff competency rather 
than only on staff competency alone. As such this can be seen as an ‘inclusive’ system 
in which PMM is at the core as a driver o f other HR practices rather than simply one 
o f a number o f practices. I f  another look is taken at the quotations above, it can now 
be seen that they could be described as drawing on a ‘primary frame’ of 
‘performance’ by which is meant that respondents define the PMM system itself and 
their relationship to it in terms of a dominant logic of performance: the need to deliver 
high performance at individual and organisational levels appears to be taken as given, 
and other aspects o f organisation are seen to derive from this (secondary frames). In 
the terms suggested by Goss (1996) using the terminology o f Goffman (1974) this can 
be regarded as a ‘keying’ (linked secondary frames that connect dominant and less 
dominant themes in a consistent way that is informed by the underpinning logic o f the 
primary frame; this being a metaphor based on the musical notion o f changing keys. 
As will be seen in the following chapters, in the public sector departments, this 
framing priority appears to be reversed and ‘performance’ was usually treated as 
deriving from principles o f wider organisation; i.e., hierarchical authority; in the 
terminology used by Goss (1996) this latter use appeared to be more o f a ‘fabrication’ 
as the accounts o f the PMM system operation suggested that it had only limited actual 
reality and was really a ‘disguise’ for underpinning hierarchical power relations rather 
than being understood as a genuine related practice, as with keyings).
However, although as will be seen below, there was primarily an acceptance of the 
logic and legitimacy o f the PMM system, and a tendency for the majority of 
respondents to use ‘performance’ as the dominant frame to explain the activities, it
118
CHAPTER FIVE THE BANK
also emerged that the strength o f this framing, and the extent to which secondary 
frames were used to qualify the logic o f performance, did vary to some extent 
between levels but primarily in relation to differences between the Bank’s head office 
and its branch outlets.
For the head office staff, the setting o f individual performance goals was normally 
done by managers or team leaders turning assigned goals at the department level into 
action plans at the team and individual levels. The goals and targets were set by 
mutual agreement made by managers and employees on a one to one basis. All 
respondents admitted that most o f tasks within the head office could not be easily 
quantified in terms o f outputs, being concerned with supporting activities (e.g., 
strategic planning processes), such that the emphasis tended to be on task completion 
and aspects o f input performance (e.g., individual effort/commitment). The 
assessment o f performance was undertaken by the employees’ manager or team 
leader. Respondents at the head office had a clear understanding o f the process of 
performance goal setting and appeared to have confidence and trust in the PMM 
system and to be satisfied with the way in which they were treated by the system (see 
further below).
For the Bank branch staff, the setting o f individual performance goals also relied on 
branch managers’ judgement. The main focus of the branch performance 
measurement was on sales activities in relation to the branch profit. However, it 
emerged from the interviews that, despite the theoretically more quantifiable and 
objective goals, the respondents in the branches, except branch managers, appeared to 
have a more limited understanding of the individual performance goal setting process.
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There appeared to be less emphasis on mutual agreement between managers and 
subordinates, and respondents tended to follow what was required by their managers. 
One branch manager claimed that mutual agreement on individual sales goals and 
targets, although accepted in principle, was not being easily reached in reality and that 
the process was often rather informal rather than completely unified:
... Before we start tracking their performances formally in every quarter 
by keying in individual performance data into the system, we will invite 
our subordinates to individually discuss work progress, goal achievement, 
challenges, needs, and whatever ... (Rl 1).
However as will be seen further below, these differences in the level o f application of 
the processes did not seem to significantly undermine employees’ trust in the PMM 
system, even in the branches where the approach appeared to be less developed.
The second stage of the process, Coaching, Feedback and Progress Review, appeared 
to be more uniform in its application. This was intended to enable the Bank’s 
employees whether in branches or at the head office, to keep track o f their 
achievements and challenges all year round as well as to formally and informally 
meet with their managers to discuss and monitor progress before the Performance 
Review stage. All employees were encouraged to seek coaching and frequent 
feedback on their performances and to review their progress on goals at given 
milestones. Planning for improvement was a major concern o f this stage and appeared 
to be welcomed by staff. For example the following was a typical response from the 
respondents:
We [A female respondent and her intermediate manager] always have a 
talk. Some time I have a problem, I must seek advice from the manager ... 
(R30).
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The coaching and feedback process was normally done formally and informally as 
part o f PMM process with the official intention of: giving employees a good 
understanding o f performance results and expectations; motivating employees to work 
more efficiently and achieve continuous development; and to build up supportive 
relationships between managers and employees. The coaching process appeared to 
provide direction, encouragement, and follow up based on continuous feedback. The 
following quotations capture the view taken by respondents:
Yes, I have. Before the final performance rating which is normally done at 
the end o f the year, all team members are undergoing coaching process at 
the mid o f the year. W e’ll meet with our team leaders individually. The 
team leaders will inform us o f the estimated performance scores which are 
based on their perception o f our current performance as well as their 
reasons. If  we don’t agree with their perception of our performance and 
their reasons, w e’re always given a chance to clarify and something like 
that. (R2).
They’re always listening to our opinion. We must let them know about 
any impediments. As our coaches, they’re training us, and always help us 
with problem solving. (R4).
The third Performance Review stage was a formal year end process, which let the 
Bank’s employees meet with their managers to discuss individual past performances 
and achievements against expectations, strengths and weaknesses, competencies 
development needs, opportunities, and the next year goals. As one employee 
expressed it:
... It seems like a mirror. He [Senior Vice President] must tell me about 
my performance over the past 6 months and what I need to improve. (R4).
These three stages above involved not only immediate managers in carrying out all 
relevant tasks, but also next level (above) managers who were involved in auditing
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individual performance plan goals and reviewing the results o f performance review in 
order to diminish issues o f prejudice and unfairness.
The final Opportunities and Rewards stage was associated with pay increases, 
individual recognition, and promotion decisions. After assigned performance rating, 
employees’ performances were ranked relative to those of their colleagues and finally 
assigned to performance band. Here the HR Division played a major part in hosting 
PMM related activities mainly at the individual level (e.g., mentoring and buddy 
programmes, compensation practices, assessor training programme), determining 
training needs based on the Bank’s current business strategy, and providing staff, 
mostly in bank branches with support in terms o f training sessions (e.g., sales 
techniques, updated knowledge on current products and services or on new 
performance measurement). All staff throughout the country were given the same 
opportunity to attend the training sessions on a rotating basis. Again this confirms the 
‘fit’ approach adopted to HR strategy in which considerable effort was taken to ensure 
integration o f practices driven by strategic goals with the latter being the clear driver 
o f most core HR practices.
Often PMM and the associated practices of goal setting (Allcorn, 2005; Taylor, 2000), 
measuring individual performance (Green, 2001; Magee, 1998), the link to pay and 
rewards (Wragg et a l,  2004; Danford et a l, 2003), have been reported as leading to 
negative feelings among employees, especially in public sector organisations (see 
Brown and Benson, 2005; Daley, 1992) (and as will be shown in the following 
chapters). However in the Bank there appeared to be widespread acceptance o f the
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principle o f PMM with only comparatively minor reservations about some aspects of 
the practice.
The level o f acceptance o f PMM principles has been regarded as a crucial 
requirement for its effective development (Smith and Smith, 2007, p. 405; Kennerley 
and Neely, 2002, p. 1236). From the perspective of the respondents as a whole, the 
Bank’s PMM appeared to be broadly acceptable in principle and to most in practice. 
There were no major contradictions or differences across different levels of 
employees. Most respondents seemed to suggest that their acceptance was related to 
the Bank maintaining a supportive approach to the system (see further discussion 
below) and most had witnessed the continuous improvement o f the system and what 
appeared to be its beneficial impact on the Bank’s performance. This would seem as 
to be consistent with the view o f Conway and Briner (2005) which argues that 
psychological contracts are fulfilled when there are strong human resource policies 
and these are experienced as delivering results that are consistent with their intentions. 
As will be seen in the following chapters, PMM systems in the public sector appeared 
not to work in this way and appeared to lead to breaches o f psychological contract.
The more senior managers interviewed all worked at the head office and were dealing 
with work that generally had to be assessed in terms o f inputs. For example, as one 
respondent described the situation:
... I f  our job is related to sales activity, individual performance is easy to 
be assessed. If  you’ve made a lower level o f sales or what, you would see 
your sales performance very clearly. For example, among 10 employees, 
the tenth employee makes sales revenue o f 1,000 baht and you make sales 
revenue o f 900 or 100 baht so that individual performances can be seen 
clearly in this situation. But individual contributions in this team seem
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unclear enough, but w e’ve attempted to make it objective as much as 
possible. (R9).
What I’m trying to tell you is that our performance indicators now can 
partly answer ‘the question’. But in fact, we still cannot say that they’re 
able to 100% respond to ‘the question’. The PMM system must be fair. It 
will help us a lot. For those who are innovative or those who are working 
hard, they can now be rewarded. I believe in ‘human’. And the most 
important thing for me is management understanding. For those in 
management position, they must understand what they’re doing, they must 
communicate, they must speak out, they must emphasise, they must check.
They cannot escape from these tasks. (R8).
All four o f more senior managerial respondents saw only minor PMM problems. This 
may have been because o f their location at the heart o f the Bank’s activities and their 
direct involvement with policy-making, meaning that they had a vested interest in 
ensuring that the system was effective. However, from the perspective o f the middle 
managers questioned, almost all also accepted the PMM system, although they tended 
to regard it as a work-in-progress and recognised that it still had some failings. But 
this did not lead to a questioning o f the fundamental legitimacy o f the system. For 
example:
It’s not like 100% completion. There’re some tasks that cannot be 
measured quantitatively. We now cannot specify who is working harder, 
who is doing less, who is doing well or who is doing badly. The perfect 
indicators haven’t been found yet. The existing indicators meet our 
expectations to a certain extent. (R l).
For the principle o f the Bank’s KPIs, it looks good. But if  asked if  w e’ve 
achieved according to the principle, I don’t think we’re reached to that 
point yet. The Bank’s KPIs has been developed for 4-5 years. I can see 
just continuous improvements. But we haven’t achieved all o f what we 
wanted to achieve. (R13).
The only significant problem identified referenced the Bank’s IT system and even
here there was recognition that this was in the process of being improved.
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From the perspective o f operational staff there seemed to be a sharing o f this general 
agreement about the legitimacy o f the PMM system. It is interesting to note that even 
when head office staff talked about the system (which, as outlined above, was less 
prescriptive for them than for branch workers) they framed their accounts primarily in 
terms of the ‘performance’ as a necessary and inevitable part o f bank work. The 
following was typical:
... The way the Bank is measuring branch staff performance can be seen 
objectively. It’s about how much sales revenue from deposit, from credit 
card or from housing loan or from whatever that you’ve achieved. On the 
other hand, because w e’re at the head office and don’t have that sort of 
sales targets, w e’ve got to use the other type o f measures. (R4).
Also o f interest was that employees at the branch level also appeared to use the 
performance frame by emphasising the centrality o f performance to a bank job -  even 
when they recognised that this meant that they had to work harder than might be the 
case in some other sorts o f organisation. For example:
It [PMMj’s the right solution. It’s okay, I think. It’s a right solution. It’s 
understandable. I can feel a positive outcome. There are more advantages 
than disadvantages, although we may get more tired. From the employees’ 
perspective, we may feel more tired and even more stressed. But after all 
considerations, I do agree with the way the Bank operates. If  the Bank 
won’t do it, we cannot survive then. (R33).
Performance therefore assumed a primary role in framing how respondents defined 
their jobs and their own responses to this. However, as suggested by the above 
respondent, they did also recognise that the demands o f the PMM system were also a 
cause o f pressure and stress.
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To understand this further it is possible to examine the idea suggested by Krause 
(2003, p. 12) that the perceived positive impacts o f PMM are related to the extent to 
which individuals see PMM advantageous to their work life. The higher level of 
benefits they perceive, the more they are committed to the PMM policy (see also 
Cavalluzzo and Ittner, 2004, p.264). Interestingly, the senior staff interviewed 
appeared to see the advantages o f the PMM system in terms o f a general principle of 
fairness rather than as an individual reward to them. Although it could be suggested 
that as senior staff they were likely to be less subject to the demands o f the system 
than those at lower levels, it seems significant in terms o f signalling a deep 
commitment to the system that they should decide to speak o f it in these terms (rather 
than as, for example, a necessary policy that had to be followed because it was 
mandated from above -  as was the case with several public sector senior managers -  
see following chapters). The following illustrates this view:
... When I was an operational staff, I found the goal setting standard for 
employees quite different. Many were given challenging goals, while 
some were assigned easy ones. Sometimes it depended on a manager’s 
personal judgement. Do you think that’s fair enough? The more competent 
those employees were, the more challenging goals they were given. On the 
other hand, those who were judged as less competent staff were given only 
ordinary goals. W hat’s wrong with those employees who were born to be 
smart? In measuring individual staff performance against established 
goals, those staff who were stupid and given easy goals usually reached 
their goals. Do you think we’ve got to promote those staff? Finally w e’ve 
got to establish the effective performance framework to deliver fairness to 
those employees in goal setting process ... (R8).
... In branches, there are about 4,000-5,000 employees. The difficulty over 
there is that in the past each branch had 10-20 employees. In rating 
individual performances from the first to the twentieth, managers were 
always rated better than their subordinates. Seniors usually were ranked 
higher than juniors. So those juniors were supposed to be the ground for 
those seniors. It was that until we’ve got new performance management in 
which w e’re now rating individual performance based on similarity of 
positions. W e’re now rating staff performance between branches. A bank
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teller’s being ranked within the bank teller category. A manager must be 
compared to those in the manager league. A manager is no longer the no. 1 
o f his branch and those bank tellers must not be the base for their 
managers an y m o re ... (R7).
All respondents at this level viewed the PMM system positively and shared a strong 
belief that the Bank as an organisation benefited from the practice o f PMM. From the 
interviews, the following perceived benefits were identified by the more senior 
managers and, for the purposes o f brevity, are summarised in outline below.
Table 5.1: Perceived Benefits of PMM from Senior Managers’ Perspective
Areas of benefit Details
Communication - identifying problems and making senior managers aware
- communicating expectations with staff
Organisational perform ance - boosting sales revenue on target bank products
Strategy - ability to change indicators according to strategy
- guiding operations in line with strategy
- performance data to feed in to strategy
- help implement strategy
- coordinate relations between branches and the head office
Staff management and 
development
- aligning individual staff goals with the Bank’s overall goal
- meeting staff expectations
- providing clear performance goals for staff
- supporting actions to achieve established goals
- fairly rating staff performance
- provide clear feedback for staff
- encouraging staff to think and plan ahead
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All of these issues suggest and support the idea o f a dominant ‘performance’ frame in 
which other aspects o f the organisation are interpreted and related to the goal of 
improved performance. As the respondent above continued:
It improves all the time. A manager in the past sometimes had no time to 
communicate with their subordinates. Those employees then didn’t know 
what they would do. So they just kept doing business as usual. They just 
did what they got used to for over the past years, for example. Once the 
key performance indicators are introduced, employees think ahead 1 year 
or 6 months in advance or whatever ... (R8).
Interestingly these more senior managers tended to point not to pressure from above 
as the driver o f improvements in the PMM system but to potential pressure from 
below. In fact, it was seen to impact most on managers who had an increased 
responsibility to maintain fairness in order to retain the best employees:
... If  those managers are not fair enough, competent employees cannot 
stay longer in the organisation ... (R7).
... You’ve done better, so you would be better rewarded. Salary increase 
or even career advancement is now according to individual performance 
result. You do less, so you get less. If  you do less, but want more, you’ve 
got to be able to provide a good reason why you’re entitled to better pay, 
for example. Because the performance score’s quite clear now, so there 
are nearly no criticisms ... (R9).
To some extent the view of the first respondent above may be open to question given 
the response from the earlier employee indicating greater pressure and stress as a 
result o f PMM pressure, but even if it does not literally represent the actual feelings of 
employees, it can be seen that it indicates how well embedded the performance frame 
is with this more senior managerial group, that it becomes an account that implies the 
approval o f all organisation members. This can be seen as close to the unitary
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discourse o f HRM (Legge, 2005; Fox, 1974) which frames organisational interests as 
homogeneous across the organisation (it will be significant to see in the subsequent 
chapters that in the public sector, more senior managers appeared to be less 
committed to such a framing, but saw PMM more in terms o f the control of 
employees who would otherwise look to their own interests rather than those of the 
organisation -  in Theory X style).
From the perspective o f middle managers, almost all respondents regarded the PMM 
system as advantageous for the Bank and staff. Similarly, the system was framed in 
terms o f fairness and its unitary potential -  again its primacy can be seen in the way in 
which other HR practices such as reward and promotion were defined in terms of 
being driven by PMM and that this provides the necessary fairness and unification. 
For example:
Because we want to know who are working more effectively. We want to 
reward the units that work effectively. We would like to provide fairness 
for all staff. Well, those who work hard are supposed to get better 
rewarded and promoted. Under PMM system, the performance result will 
determine salary increase. And it is the salary increase that determines 
chances for getting promoted in the next 3 years. The PMM is as a driver.
You work harder, you get higher reward. (Rl).
Respondents perceived a range o f benefits for both the Bank and employees, 
including the following: clear performance goals for staff; motivation for staff to 
achieve goals and provide better service for customers; more objective monitoring of 
individual performance; better monitoring of work/sales; improved sales revenue; 
consistent criteria for managing performance; and effective support through coaching.
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There was also broad agreement from operational staff that the PMM system was 
beneficial for both individuals and the organisation. For example:
Well, if  we don’t have KPIs, those branches would work without clear 
direction. KPIs is like a compass to guide the Bank’s employees to work 
towards the direction which the Bank wants to go, to achieve maximum 
benefit for everyone. If  the Bank makes huge profits, so do all staff. If we 
don’t have an effective tool to generate clear performance results, the 
reward or whatever would give rise to the Bank lacking in the standard in 
which those staff can trust. (R12).
The quotation above is o f interest as it shows the extent to which employees had 
absorbed the language o f PMM and were able to frame their account o f the benefits in 
terms o f an interesting metaphor, the compass, which can be seen as emphasising the 
unitary values associated with the system and the dominance o f the performance 
frame, that is, regarding it as the necessary instrument to guide the Bank and its 
employees towards the desired goal -  all being members of the same ship’s crew. In 
this respect it seems that, even when there were misgivings about some aspects of the 
system, the general legitimacy o f the PMM approach was well embedded. In fact, 
most o f the respondents made positive comparisons with the benefits the new PMM 
system had brought them compared to less rigorous approaches of the past. In the 
quote below it even seems that the respondent has reassessed their own approach to 
motivation and commitment, associating this with greater perceived clarity regarding 
expectations:
Many years ago, I really didn’t know how a branch manager assessed my 
performance. I only accepted all o f the performance results he gave me. I 
had never agreed with those results. But I was not willing to take action 
against the results. The way the Bank measured staff performance was not 
clear enough. It was not clear. In particular the performance results were 
not clear. The way the Bank is doing it at present is a lot better than in the
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past. I quite like it. At least, we can see clearer performance data, better 
performance data. (R33).
This perception that the new PMM system provided greater understanding and 
allowed staff to have greater control over their effort was echoed by other respondents 
who seemed to regard this apparently tighter monitoring as benefit in return for the 
better awareness that individual effort was rewarded:
In the past, we just carried out our jobs. We really knew nothing. We 
always accepted whatever they gave us; i.e., rate o f salary increase. But at 
present, the Bank’s implemented KPIs and keeps telling us that it’s the 
better way to measure our performance. Well! They now can track our 
performance individually. Our performance can be tracked from slips, 
from transactions, and things like that. Selling insurance, for example, also 
has sales performance score too. I think it’s getting better. (R30).
The Bank’s now able to prove why w e’re qualified for what w e’ve 
received. (R4).
Although most o f the respondents appeared to talk about the PMM, using a primary 
‘performance frame’ (from which other HR policies were derived as secondary 
frames) and to regard this as a beneficial and legitimate way to manage bank work, it 
has already been indicated that although appearing to be firmly embedded, within this 
attitude o f broad approval there also appeared to be some critical views o f the PMM 
system. However these criticisms tended in most cases to be associated with 
perceived ‘inefficiencies’ in the system or with elements that had not been fully yet 
developed, rather than with the principle o f the system. In fact, in general, 
respondents appeared to wish for the system to be more inclusive and rigorous, and 
this was what their concerns were mainly about, rather than feeling alienated from the 
system (as will be seen to be the contrasting responses in the following chapters). 
Thus bank staff generally recognised many areas o f the PMM that still needed to be
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amended and improved, and shared a strong belief that there was more room for 
PMM improvement in the future. In this respect it almost appears that the criticisms 
o f the PMM system actually reinforce the sense that the system had strongly 
embedded legitimacy.
Thus, looking at how staff perceived the limitations o f the PMM system, it was 
possible to identify different concerns between staff at the head office and those in 
bank branch (back office and front office). This in part reflects the different operation 
of the PMM system in these two areas (as outlined above) with the former group 
measured on a competency framework and the latter assessed mainly by quantifiable 
performance measurement; i.e., sales and service performance indicators. From the 
perspective o f senior managers, the main concern was about extending the system and 
making it fully operational. For example:
... If  asked whether I ’m satisfied with the way w e’re measuring individual
staff performance, I would say 50% of satisfaction. (R8).
Other respondents in this group raised numerous specific issues under this broad 
theme of improvement which included the following: difficulty in quantifying many 
back office tasks; the need for a stronger link to pay (currently felt to be restricted by 
the Bank’s trade union which was seen to be generally supporting PMM but was also 
keen to ensure that changes to pay were always carefully negotiated); the ideal of 
basing all indicators on measurable output rather than current mix o f output and input 
measures; and the need to refine team-based measures. The achievement o f the link 
between staff performance results and salary increases was generally regarded as the 
most difficult objective for the Bank to improve, but this was regarded as a sector
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issue rather than restricted to the specific organisation. The following was a typical 
assessment:
I felt all banks [in Thailand] have started doing this sort o f thing [the 
adoption o f PMM], but degrees o f difficulty do not depend on the way we 
measure actual performance. The difficulty lies on the way we link 
performance result with rewards and salary increases. Those who’ve 
reached to that stage are regarded as very advanced, I think. Our PMM 
system can be linked to rewards and salary increases to a certain extent but 
we’ve got a restriction in the Bank’s trade union. They keep questioning 
about warrantee o f bonuses. It’s a limitation but we still keep going 
forward, though we’ve not yet reached to it. We’re gradually moving 
towards that point. (R8).
From the perspective o f middle managers there were varied perceived weaknesses, 
most o f which were regarded as minor problems. These included vagueness in some 
performance indicators which did not link completely to individual staff effort; some 
tasks remained unquantifiable; and discrepancies in the way some sales performance 
targets were allocated. Common weaknesses or drawbacks identified by the 
respondents in front office branches tended to fall mainly into the area o f the Bank’s 
IT system. It was seen as not able to fully support the branches’ operations in relation 
to PMM related activities such as individual sales performance, data collection and 
reporting. This resulted in mistaken individual performance results on some occasions 
which could cause tensions. For example:
This is what I’m going to tell you, our performance data collection system 
is not yet 100% effective. There are only 50%-60% of the system, I think, 
which are okay. But For 40% the rest, there may have been some errors 
which is caused by manual data collection methods. The current system is 
good, but it would be better if  we could have had more reliable data. There 
are still some kinds o f performance reports which still call for paperwork. 
Instead o f having some more time to do our business, we’ve to prepare 
these performance reports. This makes us upset sometimes. (R13).
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The respondents at the operational level showed two broad patterns reflecting back- 
office and front-office positions. The former broadly shared the views o f the middle 
managers, reflecting their exposure to similar performance standards 
(competence/input based), but those in the front office branches showed a somewhat 
different pattern. In particular they appeared to be more concerned with the changes 
that were happening to their jobs rather than with the system of PMM as such. In 
particular they were experiencing a shift in their role from previously being service 
providers to now increasingly being sales representatives. The main concern here was 
not that sales activity was measured by the PMM system but more with the perception 
that there were not always equal opportunities for all staff to make sales which was 
seen to contribute to unfair competition between staff.
The performance score rating system is now okay, I think. But the 
problem is the existence o f the discrepancy between different positions in 
the same branch. Someone may argue that even bank branches in the same 
district may have different potential... (R18).
... As a result o f the Bank’s policy regarding the use o f sales targets and 
performance-related pay, it has been recognised that on the one hand a 
certain position which is seen as able to generate a certain level o f income 
is likely to receive a certain level o f compensation. On the other hand, 
another position which is seen as having more potential to make more 
income for the Bank is thus likely to be granted a higher level of 
compensation. As a result, those who occupy the former position are likely 
to have less opportunity to make sales and hence to be given less 
compensation (e.g., less salary increase and even no bonus). Taking all 
into account, the Bank then launches job rotation policy as equal 
opportunity for all bank staff. The Bank really wants its staff to rotate their 
roles actually. (RIO).
Here it is interesting to make a comparison with the work o f Korczynski and Ott
(2005) of bank working in Australia and their account of a similar shift in the front
office staff activity towards a sales orientation. Here it seemed that this had proceeded
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much further than was the case in the present bank and performance was driven 
almost all on sales delivery which had created what they refer to as an ‘ugly’ 
environment based 011 a distinction between low-trust front office relations and high- 
trust relations among staff in more back-office positions. Relating to the former they 
report:
The bare cash nexus dominated the social relations of the larger group of 
sales workers. Ugly words were used to describe ugly relationships. 
People were characterized as ‘dogs’, as ‘mercenaries’, as ‘greedy 
bastards’, as ‘rats’, as ‘cowboys’, ‘as ‘scumbags’, as ‘the enemy’, as 
‘scum’, as ‘revolting’. Relationships were described as ‘us and them’, in 
which it was common to ‘get treated like shit’, be ‘talked down to’, 
‘insulted’ and ‘squeezed’ and then ‘to cop the flak’. It was work in which 
‘you trust nobody’. As befitting social relations primarily underpinned by 
the cash nexus, social relations were competitive and instrumental, with 
calculations o f immediate short-term cash payback informing behaviour. 
The data also showed that many of the social relations were conflict- 
ridden. (Korczynski and Ott, 2005, p. 723).
None o f the respondents in the current case expressed views that were in any way 
close to these expressions and it seemed that employees, although finding themselves 
having to adapt to a different way of working, retained a sense of trust in the Bank 
and its management that was closer to the ‘high trust economy’ found by Korczynski 
and Ott (2005) in the more back office operations. However, this study does point to a 
warning about how such relationships can be transformed if the basis of the 
employment relationship is shifted too radically towards monetarily driven 
individualistic performance. One reason why trust among staff appeared to remain 
relatively strong in spite o f concerns about performance-driven job changes may be 
associated with the level o f participation in the PMM system that the Bank 
encouraged.
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Research has shown that users’ input and participation is vital to the success o f PMM 
implementation (Krause, 2003, p . l l ;  Martin and Bartol, 2003, p. 120). At the Bank, 
participation in the PMM process was open to managers and employees, broken down 
into tasks and role responsibilities o f units, teams, and individuals. This was intended 
to facilitate staff buy-in, trust, understanding, and ownership o f performance 
measures. From the perspective of the more senior managers this was how they did 
perceive the process. This is not surprising as these managers had a closer 
involvement with the design o f the PMM system and could be therefore considered to 
be involved by definition. However, it was interesting to note that when they spoke of 
the process o f being involved in the design there was a strong emphasis on group 
decision making. The following was a typical account:
. . . A t  the design stage, there were plenty o f our desires. Sometimes it 
[Performance measurement] was not realistic enough. When we first 
designed it, we consulted those textbooks [on Performance Measurement 
and Management]. And we had to make it clear, we had to have vision 
statement, we had to have those steps. But it was a bit far. There was a gap 
between what we had written and the actuality. We questioned ourselves; 
‘why was it too difficult to achieve?’ Anyway it was that experience that 
helped us make it more realistic ... (R8).
Middle managers had less direct involvement in the direct design o f the PMM system 
and tended rather to see their involvement in terms o f providing support either for the 
bank branches (if they were at the head office) or for their subordinates. In particular, 
they emphasised their ability to be ‘problem solvers’ by identifying problems and 
feeding those into the regular review process. For example:
We review our performance measurement every year. We usually reuse 
the indicators that are regarded as fair enough for the users. I f  they are 
accepted by the users, we definitely keep them. If any o f them are 
disagreed, we have to remove or modify them. (Rl).
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The tasks identified by most respondents included turning strategy into action plans, 
communicating the Bank’s policy with their subordinates, sales and service 
performance targets allocation, monitoring performance, collecting performance data 
at the unit level, and reporting performance to the head office. As such they played a 
vital part in the implementation o f the PMM system to the extent that it could be 
claimed that the success 01* failure o f the PMM appeared to mainly depend on these 
managers. In this respect the findings give a partial confirmation o f the results 
reported by Hales (2005) in relation to the roles o f line managers in the UK. His 
findings found that:
Rather the role exhibits remarkable stability over time and consistency 
across organisations. Performance-oriented supervision is at the core, 
surrounded by a penumbra o f additional managerial responsibilities 
relating to stewardship, translating strategy into operations, unit 
management and, exceptionally, business management. Most FLMs [The 
role o f first-line managers] remain part o f a hierarchical system of direct 
supervision, individual managerial responsibility and vertical 
accountability. Their authority is usually confined to operating routines, 
sometimes extends to resourcing and only exceptionally to HR matters and 
they are more likely to be consulted on routine operational matters than 
strategy. Yet they are personally accountable for day-to-day operational 
fluidity and, in some cases, broader performance metrics. Where 
responsibilities, authority and accountability are shared, it is upwards with 
more senior managers or specialists not downwards with members o f the 
work team. (Hales, 2005, p. 501).
This latter point was somewhat confirmed when the views o f operational staff were 
considered in relation to involvement in the PMM system. Almost all respondents 
viewed themselves as receivers o f performance targets who although they were 
communicated with by their managers, did not feel that this extended to involvement 
in the actual development rather than the delivery o f the system. However despite this 
relatively limited form of involvement this seemed to meet with employees’ 
expectations o f what was appropriate for their role. For example:
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. . . S o  far, I ’ve been fully involved with this system. I acknowledge what 
are to be improved in order to achieve assigned goals. (R2).
From my point o f view, Pm working on KPIs which is the way to assess 
sales forces’ performance; to specify who will get what performance 
score; good or bad, something like that. The term of KPIs is a means to 
achieve what w e’ve set according to the Bank’s policy. (R12).
All respondents stated that they were allowed to take part in the PMM process, in 
particular, through the setting of individual performance agreements, reporting, and 
coaching and feedback. As has been seen, this reinforces the idea that the Bank had 
succeeded in positioning PMM as a primary frame that employees would draw on to 
explain their activities.
This can be further seen by examining the extent to which the Bank appeared to have 
succeeded in aligning its business goals with individuals’ personal goals (as a broad 
indication of the extent to which they were committed to the PMM system; Williams, 
2002). It is interesting that the more senior managers expressed their commitment in 
terms o f going ‘beyond contract’ (Fox, 1974). In the quotation below for example, the 
respondent strongly implies that this is a commitment that is shared by most other 
staff and involves a personal commitment to performance standards that often have to 
take precedence over desires outside the workplace:
I think the discipline o f employees is quite significant. Responsibility and 
efforts are elements o f discipline. W e’ve got discipline. Another thing is 
that we’ve tried hard and have got strong commitment to the 
accomplishment of our established goals. These are all what we’ve got. I 
believe everyone doesn’t depend on only working hours or responsible 
tasks. We do more than that. That is our bank’s employees. We won’t 
work until 4:30 pm then we go home. We may stay here late until 7 pm, 8 
pm, or 9 pm or even overnight, if it’s a task we must carry out. We must 
pay attention to it because this is our job. (R6).
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Most respondents appeared to support similar goals. In particular, they emphasised 
their personal commitment to notions of fairness, individual development and to 
excellence o f service to customers. It is clearly difficult to be sure o f the extent to 
which such statements o f personal commitment are translated into actions, that is to 
determine the extent to which they may be only rhetorical statements. However the 
views o f other respondents lower in the organisation did not challenge the personal 
commitment o f senior managers and, in addition, the consistency with which such 
views were expressed over some lengthy interviews suggests that, as a minimum, 
these were views that were genuinely held. Clearly only an observational study over a 
lengthy period could establish the practice, but these individual commitments do 
confirm at least the extent to which the performance frame had been adopted as a 
primary source o f meaning and interpretation. As such, it is difficult to think that this 
consistency o f commitment and belief would not have some impact on the practice of 
management on a day-to-day basis (and in fact, it will be seen in contrast to the public 
sector organisations, there was less strong personal commitment and this was 
reflected in the views o f lower level employees). This was also reflected in an 
emphasis on personal responsibility towards the system. For example:
... Finally, whether w e’re successful or not, we must be responsible for
the overall performance result of in-branch sales and service network ...
(R7).
This sense o f personal responsibility was also found among the middle management 
respondents who gave accounts o f their individual commitment to the process also, as 
above, framed in terms o f maintaining the integrity o f the system which they regarded 
as a personal duty. For example:
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As I’ve told you, we really don’t know whether the assigned goals are 
easy or hard to achieve. But it is up to us at the start to be able to make 
sure that all can achieve those goals in the end. The questions like; ‘in 
what way to achieve the goals?’ or ‘how much effort we’re going to put 
in?’, are considered important for us to determine at our level. (R5).
. . . I f  the performance management system operates unfairly, this would 
look bad for me and lead to de-motivating circumstances. Once the 
unfairness is perceived under the situation, for example, that free riders 
luckily get rewarded; this may result in many other employees feeling de­
motivated. For this reason it must be fair enough. (Rl).
Interestingly this sense o f individual commitment to the PMM was also found among 
the operational staff. One respondent put this clearly as an issue o f individual honour 
and respect:
... All staff members must be committed to their own words. Everyone is 
to be measured against their commitments ... (R3).
The respondents at this level all seemed to have a high level o f goal orientation 
towards the performance goals of their unit or o f the team. Individual goals at this 
level seemed to reflect not only how much they felt they belonged to the team but also 
seemed to be framed as an indication o f how professional they were or how seriously 
they took their job. The following was an illustration of respondents’ views:
The success o f PMM, from my perspective, is that it must be able to 
generate performance results which are accepted by everyone. The degree 
of acceptance by those staff that there are no any arguments on activity 
coverage by performance indicators is our success. But these days w e’ve 
achieved that at a certain extent. (RIO).
The important thing is that if we didn’t have KPIs, I think, our branches 
would have been working without direction. KPIs is guiding our staff to 
work towards the direction the Bank wants to go. This aims at maximum 
profits for all parties. If  we didn’t have KPIs, if we didn’t have such 
effective tool to measure staff performance, this would become that our 
reward system is not creditable or unjustified ... (R15).
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Mainly, we must use all o f what we have to help those branches or bank 
networks to reach established goals. That’s our performance indicator, 
which means, in turn, that if those branches fail to accomplish the goal, so 
do we. (R12).
One respondent gave a detailed account o f how the PMM requirement became a key 
defining feature of their ‘presentation o f se lf  (Goffman, 1969) within the workplace 
in relation to customers. Here it seemed that the requirements o f the performance 
frame had been internalised as a part o f the working individual identity:
In terms o f established goals, we must achieve those goals that the head 
office’s set for us. So we must do it, we must do what are set for us, in 
particular selling a variety of bank products, and services. At the moment, 
we focus on services very seriously. The services become central to our 
concern. The way we’re speaking to customers, the way we’re greeting 
them, smiling, our dresses all become significant. Also individual 
personalities! We must ensure those customers are satisfied with our 
services and then we expect they talk to other people about our products 
and services, for example, that they’re pleased with our bank. In addition 
to impression ...Well, they normally won’t say that they’re impressed with 
individual staff, but they’re likely to say that they’re pleased with the 
Bank’s services. They always say so. Well, that is the image o f our 
organisation, the fame o f the organisation in which we must achieve and 
maintain it, we must adjust to the situation. (R19).
This would appear to reflect the effectiveness o f the Bank’s PMM policy in becoming 
established as a primary frame for defining work activities and individual roles, and 
the operational level respondents appeared mostly motivated and willing to follow 
this policy (as the quote above suggests) to experience a sense o f personal pride in 
being associated with a successful organisation. For example the quote below again 
indicates how closely the adoption o f the policy was felt in terms o f personal feelings 
and reactions o f responsibility:
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... In terms o f sales activities, we’re assigned sales targets. We have to 
work towards our established goals. If  we’re successful, so is the 
organisation, and so is the branch. Everyone becomes happy then. If  we’re 
failed, so are other people. (R16).
This level o f individual commitment to the goals o f the PMM system at the Bank 
suggests that it is based on high levels o f trust. Trust has been regarded as one of the 
soft factors which could lead to more effective PMM so that when it has gone 
missing, PMM can become control-oriented and bureaucratic (Greiling, 2007, p.3). 
Trust in PMM is likely to reflect the extent to which managers and employees have 
learned from the experience o f using PMM. However, there did appear to be 
differences in levels o f trust expressed, with senior managers showing the highest 
levels and those at the head office expressing more than their colleagues in branches. 
This would seem to support the view, reflecting as discussed above, the senior 
managers’ greater involvement in the system’s development and the branch worker’s 
exposure to more rigorous targets. However, in none o f the cases could it be argued 
that trust was lacking, rather it tended to reflect levels o f commitment. For example, 
o f the senior managers, most respondents saw PMM as the best way to achieve both 
organisational and individual objectives:
I really don’t know how much it’s been now done in other banks. But I do 
believe w e’re on the right track if  we still rely on this sort o f thing ... We 
just follow this route. Once the Bank becomes successful, so do you. (R8).
All senior managers supported the Bank’s PMM system and stated that they believed 
that if the PMM system was supported it would result in success for all, in other 
words, that the system should be trusted to deliver on the promise o f fairness and 
individual benefit in return for dedicated attention to the core objectives.
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Middle managers also provided evidence o f trust in the way in which they spoke 
about their own ability to choose and control the ways in which targets were used 
with the implication that they were themselves to be trusted to make the right 
decisions. For example, the following was typical:
... It sounds not too difficult for us now. In particular, w e’re given new 
performance measures in the form of point score. So we feel happier 
because we don’t need to make sales on certain products that we don’t 
want to sell. We can make choices by our own. We become happy than 
ever ... (Rl 1).
The same respondent also attributed a similar form of trust to subordinates, reflecting 
their self-directing choices to do the right thing based on the sharing o f information 
and discussion rather than the giving of orders:
... At the same time, if  we talk to those staff in branches. We talk to those 
sales representatives. In their mind, they keep thinking about performance 
indicators all the time. It’s quite clear and we don’t have to communicate 
with them too much. They know what they should do. They know what 
the Bank’s expecting. Our duty is to align those indicators with their 
expectations. This sort o f thing has now been in their blood ... (Rl 1).
From the perspective o f operational staff, all respondents showed evidence of feeling 
trust in the PMM system but, as stated above, with different degrees reflecting their 
different experiences, particularly between front-office and back-office. The latter 
respondents tended to show stronger support for PMM and were hopeful that their 
support for the system would benefit their future career with the Bank. For example:
... When compared to the past, yes, the new PMM system’s working quite 
well. It seems like if  you don’t do it, you won’t get any reward! In the 
past, if  you didn’t do anything, you still got rewarded! You certainly got 
it! But under the new condition you won’t get rewarded, unless you do it. 
(R4).
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... Our KPIs is very clear. You do more so that you get more. If  you won’t 
do it, what sort o f compensation could you expect to receive? If  you don’t 
help, both o f your performance score and the branch performance score 
would get terrible. But if  you help the branch, you and the branch would 
get successful together. (R19).
These responses in relation to trust are interesting as they appear to support the view 
originally put forward by Fox (1974) that there is a relationship between trust and 
discretion. Fox describes low-discretion and high-discretion syndromes. The former 
occurs where:
1) “The role occupant perceives superodinates as behaving as if  they believe 
he cannot be trusted, o f his own volition, to deliver a work performance 
which fully accords with the goals they wish to see pursued or the values 
they wish to see observed” (p. 26);
2) job activities are tightly defined and the incumbent is subjected to close 
supervision;
3) close coordination is imposed on one role in relation to interdependent 
other roles governed by rules and routines;
4) “the official response to failures or inadequacies of performance ... is that 
they result from careless indifference to job rules and organizational goals, 
calling for punishment and an intensification of supervision” (p. 28);
5) conflict between superordinates and subordinates is handled on a group 
basis through bargaining processes, where differences o f interests are 
assumed as given.
In contrasting ways the high-discretion syndrome involves:
1) “occupants o f these roles are deemed to have commitment to, and moral 
involvement in, a calling and/or organizational goals or values (p.30);
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2) occupants are expected to make decisions based on this commitment as 
against conforming to prescriptive rules” (p.30) and close supervision and 
detailed regulation by specific impersonal rules are deemed inappropriate;
3) coordination between roles is on the basis of problem-solving 
relationships rather than standardised imposed coordination;
4) inadequacies of performance are “regarded as due not to wilful deviance, 
dereliction, or neglect, but to substandard exercise o f discretion ... if  the 
superior assumes the subordinate is doing his best then punishment will 
seem futile” (p.35);
5) conflict is treated as needing ‘problem solving’ or persuasion since 
differences o f interests are not assumed to be present.
Fox (1974) claims that the way in which roles are structured in terms o f discretion 
also has implications for the way in which trust is perceived and he refers to this as 
‘institutionalised trust’ as it is associated with the structure o f organisational roles 
rather than being a matter o f purely personal feelings between individuals, such that 
the low discretion syndrome produces a sense of low trust and vice versa. However, 
he also makes the distinction between the different ways in which authority can be 
exercised within organisations which can vary between ‘discretionary trust’ and 
‘prescriptive trust’. The former involves limited supervision and the expectation that 
the subordinate can be expected to undertake what is required in their role in a self­
directed way and with limited checking on whether this has been done. The latter 
involves limited direct supervision but with more frequent methods and opportunities 
to subsequently check that the role was performed effectively. These forms o f control 
may therefore influence the ways in which institutionalised trust is experienced. It
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could be suggested that at the extremes, the low discretion syndrome would have little 
trust of any sort but that in a less extreme form it would be possible for there to be 
some ‘prescriptive trust’ that would reduce the experience o f institutionalised low 
trust but within clear limits. On the other hand, in the extreme high discretion 
syndrome it would be likely that there would be discretionary trust. But it could also 
be seen that in many forms o f work with relatively high discretion, it could also be 
possible to have prescriptive trust as performance would need to be monitored in 
some way. In this respect it can be seen that there may be a wide ‘middle ground’ in 
terms of the nature of trust and discretion where combinations of high and low 
discretion are moderated by prescriptive levels of trust. It can be suggested that this 
would provide some explanation of the nature of trust in the Bank in relation to the 
PMM system, ranging from the higher discretion roles o f the more senior managers 
with relatively less prescriptive trust from superiors, through to the lower discretion 
roles of the branch operatives whose work was still relatively high discretion 
(compared to the notion of the extreme low discretion syndrome) but with a much 
higher level of prescriptive trust, that is, staff were trusted, and experienced being 
trusted to act in their roles appropriately, but know that the monitoring system of the 
PMM system meant that they were individually dependent on meeting their 
performance targets as a condition o f continuing to receive these levels o f trust and 
discretion. This issue will be returned to in the concluding chapter discussion.
Some more considerations on the notion of institutionalised trust and discretion can be 
found in a consideration of the organisational processes used by the Bank in relation 
to PMM. Organisational processes have been argued to considerably strengthen the 
environment of PMM and contribute to mangers’ and employees’ acceptance of
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PMM, they will also reflect the trust and discretion issues identified above. For 
example, IT has played a key role in facilitating performance data collection, and 
performance reporting systems (Tze and Boon, 2008; Cavalluzzo and Ittner, 2004; 
Kennerley and Neely, 2002, p. 1236; Bititci et a l, 2000, p. 695).
Although the Bank had attempted to advance its IT system to support the PMM 
system, this was the area where the most criticisms were made by managers and 
employees, especially from bank branches. None of the senior managers raised the 
issue o f IT during the interviews but middle managers and employees both at the head 
office and in branches reported inadequacies. However, these concerns focused on the 
perceived ‘ inefficiencies’ of the system rather than a concern about the system 
providing over-regulation and a reduction of individual discretion and hence low trust 
(Fox, 1974). However, work by Krause (2003) shows that performance data collection 
can be time-consuming and turn out to be “very frustrating” (p. 12; see also Bourne et 
a l 2000, p.767). This frustration was experienced at middle manager levels, for 
example:
Some individual staff performance data are still being collected manually.
In producing individual performance reports for any staff members, we 
still cannot make use 100% o f the Bank’s IT system. In many cases, we 
have to rely on paperwork. This is because the IT system is not 100%  
ready [for PMM system] yet. (R13).
Individual employees had to jot down their daily sales and service records during 
working hours and to enter the data into the Bank’s database later. This resulted in 
unnecessary paperwork, increased job complexity, and some dissatisfaction within the 
branch.
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From the perspective of operational staff there also appeared to be support for a more 
efficient and extensive system:
There’re not any problems at the head office. It’s quite okay, I think. But 
the supportive system for measuring bank branches’ performance is not 
good enough at the moment. W e’re seeking a better system that is able to 
track staff performance individually. (R2).
In fact, it still changes over the time. At the moment, the IT system is still 
being developed. It’s such endless development. I’ve heard that this is the 
sixth development; the sixth version so far. It’s for performance data 
collection. (R18).
These results are interesting because they give some support to the research 
conducted by Smith (2009) into sales work in the UK which found that many 
employees viewed increased IT support for performance related activities in a mostly 
positive way. This is interesting because, as Smith suggests, this causes a question 
over earlier theories that view IT as a form o f surveillance that employees resist. For 
example, he refers to how Sewell (1998) and others (e.g., Hodgeson, 2003 ; Bain and 
Taylor, 2000) have pointed out that such electronic surveillance is not a matter of 
simple or unproblematic control. Sewell (1998) for example, distinguished between 
two forms of surveillance:
1) general but unsystematic surveillance aimed at accumulating data in 
all its diversity, undertaken in the hope that by increasing the sheer 
quantity of information, better decisions might be made or 
previously unknown facts revealed; and
2) highly focused surveillance undertaken with the express purpose of 
direct supervision and monitoring o f employee performance, (p. 
407).
Smith found that the comments o f the managers he studied appeared to be closer to 
Sewell’s ‘type 1’ form o f surveillance and could be seen as compatible with the
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optimism expressed by Zuboff (1988) whose message was “essentially optimistic in 
the sense that the informated workplace is a re-skilled workplace in which individuals 
can exercise a newfound degree o f autonomy and discretion” (Sewell, 1998, p. 407).
He states that the lower level managers seemed to regard the control potential of the 
technology benignly and as something that helped everyone do a better job. This 
seems a similar response to the managers and employees in the present study who 
were concerned more with the efficiency of the technology than with its power for 
control. However this is interesting as the descriptions given of the aims of the PMM 
system, particularly for those operatives in the branches, suggest that in its structure it 
is closer to Sewell’s ‘type 2 ’ with a high focus on the close surveillance of 
performance. This would seem to be consistent with the notion o f the high discretion 
combined with prescriptive trust outlined above.
One way in which this form of acceptance may have been helped to be secured is 
through organisational communication processes that can be seen as providing the 
formal basis for ensuring that there is an understanding of what the PMM system 
involves (Greiling, 2007, pp. 14-17). The Bank employed extensive communication 
techniques to underpin key operations of management (e.g., performance appraisals) 
and significant changes in business direction or performance measurement. These 
included training sessions, coaching and feedback, site visits by a ‘Change Team’, site 
visits by senior managers, telephone calls, internal television (TV) programmes, 
manager meetings, and staff meetings.
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In relation to PMM, staff training along with frequent performance feedback and 
coaching by managers seemed to play a significant role in communicating expected 
performance and behaviours (Martin and Bartol, 2003, p. 128). In particular, most 
managers appeared very aware that communication had to be frequent and reinforced 
by personal contact. For example:
. . .  In the communication process between the Bank and its employees, the 
messages can be distorted on the way. We then have a site visit plan. Site 
visits mean that after our team has finished strategic plan, we will go out 
to train those operative staff in bank branches and talk to them directly.
Also we’re open to their feedback all year round. We have responsible 
people. (R l).
In addition the Bank’s Change Team made up of volunteer employees from across the 
country who are interested in training and interacting with other people as a key 
communication channel. This is seen to add credibility to any changes being 
implemented as these appear to be led by staff members rather than merely imposed 
by a distant hierarchical management. As will be seen in subsequent chapters, this is a 
marked difference from the way the public organisations handled changes in their 
PMM systems (Kotter, 1995). In addition, the Sales and Service Performance 
Strategic Management Team answered bank branch employees’ PMM-related 
enquires directly on the phone and via emails.
Senior managers put communication as a top priority. They acknowledged that their 
massages needed to be sent to employees throughout the country as soon as possible. 
For example:
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W e’re using site-visits and other channels. For example, the Bank’s TV 
which is providing internal TV programmes that are being broadcasted by 
means of a satellite for all branches has been finished recently. Site visits 
by top executives that allow those executives to meet with branch 
managers have been now carried out. At present I myself have many 
planned visits on schedule to meet operational staff at branches in order to 
give them a presentation about new performance measurement for this 
year. W e’re also producing VCDs [Video Compact Discs] or whatever to 
distribute to branches across the country. W e’ve used all means in 
delivering messages to those receivers as soon as possible. (R8).
In this respect it appears that senior managers were active not only in developing a 
‘performance frame’ that structured their own understandings of the PMM process but 
were also committed to transmitting this to others and therefore providing them with a 
vocabulary and set of meanings that they could also use themselves to provide an 
explanation for their work activities. This appears to have been particularly powerful 
because these managers appeared to all have a clear understanding of wider 
organisational issues (e.g., the Bank’s business direction) which they drew upon in 
developing the performance frame, showing how the performance emphasis was 
central to these other activities.
From the perspective o f middle managers there was a similar view:
. . .  For our team leader, he, today, has got to go out to communicate with 
bank branches’ representatives about the next year performance 
measurement, what bank branches need to do with the new performance 
measurement, what the Bank wants to achieve in the next year, and what 
to be done to achieve the Bank’s business direction, for example. (R5).
Middle managers played an important role as an intermediary in connecting senior 
managers and operational employees. Along with coaching and feedback process, 
managers employed meetings as key communication strategy. There were two levels 
of meetings: manager meetings and staff meetings. The manager meetings were
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normally held at regional and district offices. Branch managers were involved in the 
meetings at the bank district offices which were typically held for branch managers 
who are in the same bank district. Communication o f the Bank’s policy and business 
direction, the allocation of sales performance goals and targets, and negotiation of 
performance target distribution were key activities at the meetings. For example:
To help us with understanding and adaptability, they’re providing training 
programmes regarding bank product knowledge. Our branch manager 
always briefs us on what she’s learned from training programmes or 
meetings. She normally communicates with us to help us to understand 
and be able to turn those things into practice. The Bank’s looking after us.
(R19).
In terms of staff meetings within a bank branch, a branch manager was in charge of 
communicating the Bank’s policy and any changes in the Bank’s operations with their 
subordinates. Informal chats between managers and their subordinates were normally 
held. Moreover, in some bank branches, more formal meetings like morning talks 
were held by a bank manager on a daily basis:
We have a series of training sessions and communications. Nowadays 
we’re using morning talks. If we cannot hold morning talk in the morning, 
we must have a chat after work then. Though we’ve a little time, we must 
have a chat. (R l 1).
Operational staff confirmed this approach and emphasised how they now better 
understood what the Bank was attempting to do. For example:
. . .  Because the Bank now changes a lot, it has put its emphasis on service 
quality. We cannot survive the market competition by reliance only on 
good quality products. The senior management team now puts the quality 
of service the first. (R3).
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Employees both at the head office and in bank branches demonstrated clear 
understanding of the Bank’s current business direction and policy as well as the 
Bank’s PMM and were aware o f the efforts to ensure all were aware of the processes:
They’re trying to communicate with us. They have the internal TV
programme. I still want to stay with it. So I occasionally watch it. (R19).
In the general terms the approach o f communication adopted by the Bank appears to 
reflect what has been regarded as good practice in the communication of change 
(although it is not clear from the data whether this was deliberately researched or only 
as a result of coincidence). For example, according to Liu and Perrewe (2005), the 
communication of change can create different emotional responses to those affected 
which can have negative results if not handled appropriately. They argue that planned 
changes (which would be o f the sort experienced in relation to changes in the Bank’s 
PMM system) should be transmitted in stages: the initial change should be 
communicated in broad terms by senior managers (this stage often creates mixed 
emotions of excitement and anxiety, but giving information that is too detailed or 
specific tends to create negative emotions); only after this has been absorbed should 
more detailed and specific information be communicated about the effects at the local 
level and this should be communicated by those who are trusted and known at the 
local level (this tends to convert mixed emotions into a positive form, or to reduce 
negative emotions if the decision has adverse effects). This approach can be seen to 
be roughly approximate to the Bank’s method of using senior managers to 
communicate the broad nature o f changes and then using teams of volunteer 
employees (known and trusted) and middle managers to communicate the specific 
effects at the level of the job activity.
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A final issue to be considered in relation to the Bank’s organisational processes is the 
organisation o f work and the use of team working. A common criticism of 
individualised PMM systems is that they can lead to fragmentation between 
employees and to an undermining o f team working (Gliddon, 2004, p. 29). However, 
in the data from the bank interviews it became clear that considerable effort was put 
in to making sure that there was coordination between different units and between 
individuals. The use o f shared goals clearly cascaded through the organisation (in line 
with the ‘fit’ model o f HRM) and the apparently prevalent primary performance 
frame as a means of understanding work activities among staff at all levels and the 
high levels o f communication appeared to mean that the PMM system reinforced 
team-working rather than undermined it. As two respondents explained:
I think because we all have got shared goals, we’ve got shared strategy to 
carry out with the heads of other units in the same direction, we work as 
one team, we share responsibility, we all are moving forward together 
then. W e not only want everyone to focus on their duty, but also want 
them to have colleagues or other related units working together. We 
cannot focus only our task completion, but we must consider the others as 
well. Our unit has shared goals that encourage all staff to work 
collectively. (R6).
There may be some differences between old and new branch staff. From 
my view, it might be difference in personal attitude, for example. But 
we’ve already communicated the Bank’s emphasis on team-working with 
those staff. Finally, they become more harmonious, I think. (RIO).
Based on the overall picture from the interviews, team working was one of the 
significant characteristics o f the Bank’s organisational culture. This seems to have 
been supported by the nature o f trust discussed above, supporting Erdem and Ozen’s 
(2003, pp. 134-135) view that a climate o f trust is a key factor for effective team
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working and a positive impact on organisational performance. Team-working in the 
Bank was described by two senior managers based on their experience as follows:
I think it’s like an organisational culture which has been established by 
everyone in the team. Whether it is a team leader or a team member, 
everyone’s got self discipline. When new team members come in, we 
become as their good role model. They will follow what we are. (R6).
. . .  It is not such a competition between you and me. W e’re competing 
with those established goals . . .  W e’ve attempted to delegate more power 
to working in a team for those staff rather than to tell them that your 
colleagues are as your competitors. (R7).
The role above appears to correspond to Graen’s (1976) interpersonal role making 
model which emphasises the role which supervisors play in the socialisation process 
of newcomers. This process has proved to have long term impacts on those 
newcomers’ attitude and behaviours (Jokisaari and Nurmi, 2009, p. 527). All 
respondents at this level saw that the success o f the Bank’s overall goals appeared to 
rely on balancing between team-working and individuals’ contribution, as expressed 
in the quotation above.
From the perspective o f middle managers there was also an emphasis on how teams 
operated to assist individuals achieve their goals:
...  If there is someone in our team that is not able to handle his/her 
workload, he/she won’t be left to face it alone. Our team members always 
help each o th er. . .  (R l).
Because most o f my team members are new graduates from university, 
they definitely don’t have previous work experience. Therefore, it takes 
time for them to learn and adjust themselves to the Bank’s working 
system. I, as their team leader, have to guide them to the right direction. 
I’m encouraging them to learn by trial and error. I mean, I'm attempting to 
let them learn by themselves. If they’ve made any mistakes and cannot go
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on, they have to come to see me. Because in our team, there are several 
team members who have stayed here for more than 10 years. They can 
find advice from them at any time. They can talk to them like, ‘I’m having 
such problem, who should I speak to? or ‘Who could help me with this?’ 
(R5).
This view was also reflected at the operative level and in one case this was mentioned 
explicitly in relation to the tension possible between competition and cooperation:
Our branch is quite excellent! I admit it’s a desirable place to work in 
which none of staff members would take advantage of the other. Here, 
we’re working together like relatives. All staff members are local people.
We know and help one another. While someone’s leaving the counter, 
there is always another staff member coming to help take on the 
responsibility. It’s the strength of our branch. (R19).
W e’ve got a good team leader so that everyone is happy so far. (R3).
Almost all participants both from the head office and bank branches expressed high 
levels o f confidence in team-working and felt like part of a team:
We all have branch and individual performance targets. We call branch 
performance targets ‘team performance targets’ or KPIs. While the branch 
performance target is called KPIs, individual performance target is termed 
PRO. The branch performance targets are set for a team. It’s due to the 
fact that the Bank normally puts the success o f the branch the first and 
then individual performance achievement the second. As a result, we must 
work as a team. (R33).
Our individual PRO score includes team score too. Therefore, we must 
work as a team. So it seems to me that not only I’ve achieved established 
sales revenue, but also I have to encourage my colleagues to boost their 
individual sales performance in order to improve our team performance as 
a whole. Once the team performance has improved, so have individual 
performances. (RIO).
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W e’re always a team. There is no one who wants to show off alone. Those 
staff who have higher potential always help their colleagues who cannot 
make sales on some bank products by transferring sales figures to their 
colleagues’ accounts, because the organisation cannot survive by only the 
support of staff. While you’re selling bank products, we’re carrying out 
our routine jobs. So you will have more time to make sales. W e have to 
help one another so that we can go on; otherwise we won’t be successful.
(R-l 9).
As has been seen, the way performance goals were defined facilitated cooperation 
among individuals within the same unit. This reflected the success o f the Bank’s 
PMM system in connecting staff by using related goals. Members of teams trusted 
each other and also exhibited trust in their team leaders and believed that others on the 
team would not take advantage o f them. Interpersonal trust among team members 
appeared to facilitate cooperation. As has been seen, the Bank’s approach to team 
working fitted well with the issues identified in the previous studies. The Bank 
seemed to have succeeded in establishing a team-based culture that retained a focus 
on PMM. In fact, in line with the previous discussion above it seemed that team 
working was also regarded as a secondary framing from the primary performance 
frame -  that is, as in the last quotations, with respondents defining the essences of 
team work in terms o f their impact on performance and justified as contributing to this 
primary objective.
Conclusion
This chapter has identified that the Bank operated an ‘inclusive’ approach to PMM 
which framed the latter as a core driver of other HR practices rather than simply one 
of a number of HR practices. For almost all respondents at all levels, the nature of the 
organisation was defined largely in terms o f ‘performance’ . This was suggested to be 
understood as providing a ‘primary frame’ for respondents as the need to deliver high
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performance at individual and organisational levels appeared to be taken as given, and 
other aspects of organisation are seen to derive from this (linked secondary frames or 
‘keyings’ that connect dominant and less dominant themes in a consistent way that is 
informed by the underpinning logic of the primary frame [Goss 1996; Goffman, 
1974]). Respondents did not fundamentally challenge this performance framing and 
drew upon it to explain most aspects of their work.
For example, the HR Division was portrayed as playing a major part in enabling 
PMM related activities (e.g., mentoring and buddy programmes, compensation 
practices, assessor training programme) rather than as operating as a self-contained 
function. It was shown how, as the maximisation of performance at all levels was a 
strategic priority for the Bank, this approach was consistent with the ‘fit’ approach to 
HR strategy in which the HR Division provided the needed behaviours required to 
meet the strategic performance objectives. Also observed was that this framing 
involved a unitary discourse o f HRM (Legge, 2005; Fox, 1974) which framed 
organisational interests as homogeneous across the organisation but also as integrated 
together through the performance frame. It will be recalled how one respondent who 
described PMM as the compass necessary to guide the Bank and its employees 
towards the desired goal -  all being members o f the same ship’s crew.
In fact, criticisms o f the PMM system tended in most cases to be associated with 
perceived ‘inefficiencies’ in the system rather than with the principle of the system. In 
general, respondents appeared to wish for the system to be more inclusive and 
rigorous. The respondents expressed views that suggested a sense o f trust in the Bank 
and its management (similar to the ‘high trust economy’ of Korczynski and Ott, 2005)
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which seemed to be associated with the level of participation in the PMM system that 
the Bank encouraged.
This was discussed in terms of discretion and trust (Fox, 1974) and it was argued that 
high and low discretion jobs were moderated by prescriptive levels o f trust (trust that 
was given but that could be checked if necessary). Thus even staff in relatively low 
discretion roles were trusted, and experienced being trusted to act in their roles 
appropriately, but were individually dependent on meeting their performance targets 
as a condition of continuing to receive these levels of trust and discretion. Because the 
PMM system was therefore involved in the basic structuring of tasks and relationships 
it can be seen how this became established as a primary performance frame. In fact it 
was shown that senior managers were active in transmitting this to others and 
providing them with a set o f meanings that they could also use to provide an 
explanation for their work activities. This appeared to be particularly powerful 
because managers appeared to all have a clear understanding o f wider organisational 
issues (e.g., the Bank’s business direction), which they drew upon in developing the 
performance frame, showing how the performance emphasis was central to these 
other activities.
This link between trust relations and job discretion also seemed to have reduced the 
tendency for individualised PMM systems to lead to fragmentation between 
employees and to an undermining of team working (Gliddon, 2004, p. 29). The use of 
shared goals clearly cascaded through the organisation within the primary 
performance frame and the high levels o f communication appeared to mean that the 
PMM system reinforced team-working rather than undermined it. As will be seen in
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the following chapters, this was a pattern that was not replicated in the public sector 
organisations, despite the use o f PMM systems that were somewhat similar to those of 
the Bank.
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C H A P T E R  S I X  
T H E  E X C I S E  D E P A R T M E N T
This chapter presents insights into the PMM system of the first o f the public sector 
organisations, the Excise Department. The Excise Department is one of the 
government agencies under the Thai Finance Ministry. It is responsible for excise tax 
collection and suppression activities. It evolved from the merger of two excise tax- 
related departments in 1933; the Opium Department founded in 1906 and the Liquor 
Department founded in 1909. In 2006, The Department o f Excise had 3,438 
permanent civil servants, 10 Regional Excise Offices, 86 Area Excise Offices, and 
178 Area Excise Branch Offices throughout the country. To give an overall view of 
the organisation structure o f the Excise Department, its organisation chart at the time 
of the study is presented below (see Figure 6.1). The Excise Department adopted a 
functional structure, spit into a number o f functional groups for specialisation.
After the introduction of the Department’s PMM system, there seemed no radical 
change in the Department’s organisation structure. The structure at the time of the 
study was characterised by high formality, high power distance (Hofstede and 
Hofstede, 2005), and deference to seniority. This tends to reflect a traditional 
bureaucratic form o f organisation, despite the introduction of PMM. Thus, unlike the 
Bank, the PMM appeared to be an ‘addition’ to an existing structure rather than a core 
driver of other aspects of the organisation. In fact, as will be shown below, the PMM 
system seemed to fail to develop the sort of cultural attachment that characterised the 
Bank in terms of engaging the Department’s employees and eliciting management and 
staff commitment to performance objectives. Rather, the Department’s existing
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organisational culture appeared to impede team-working, ownership of problems, 
participation, and consultation, causing a tension with the PMM system rather than 
developing around it as a primary frame of reference.
Under the Department’s existing organisational culture, the overall management style 
seemed to reflect Likert and Likert’s (1976) Exploitative-Authoritative model. The 
Department’s senior managers did not seem to have trust in their subordinates and 
tended sometimes to view them as incompetent. The head of department seemed to 
hold absolute power in decision making and subordinates at all levels were supposed 
to follow the directive from the top, and were not allowed to participate in decision 
making. As a result, there appeared to be no upward communication other than in 
response to demands for information from above (in the classic bureaucratic style). 
Senior managers admitted that they exercised power based on their position’s 
authority and gave subordinates pressure in terms of warnings and repeated demands 
to get the job done according to orders. In response staff members expressed their fear 
of making mistakes which might result in loss o f chance for promotions, recognition, 
or even pay increases. Individual employees did not find it easy to chat with their 
managers. Although it has been shown that not all employees at the Bank were 
entirely happy with their PMM, there seemed to be wide agreement that it was 
intended to be fair and that management went to some trouble to try as far as possible 
to make the system work fairly. In fact, some of the quotes from bank managers made 
clear that perceived fairness was something that concerned them. This concern was 
not found in the Excise Department other than in terms of obedience rather than 
commitment to the principle.
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CHAPTER SIX THE EXCISE DEPARTMENT
The Department’s PMM process was shared by many other branches of the public 
sector e.g., the Ministry o f Finance, the Fiscal Policy Office, Thai Rating Information 
Service (TRIS), and the OPDC and therefore can be considered as completely 
integrated within the formal bureaucratic structure of the public sector. The OPDC 
appeared to be the most influential to the Department’s process. It was in charge of 
public sector development and provided supports such as training and 
recommendations 011 strategic planning for all government organisations. TRIS, which 
was founded in 1993 in support o f the Ministry of Finance and the Bank o f Thailand 
as a neutral institution to delivery consulting and rating services to government 
agencies and state-owned enterprises, had been working for the OPDC as an expert 
team in providing for advice and evaluating government performance. The role of the 
organisations mentioned above will be described in the Department’s PMM process 
below.
As can be seen from Figure 6.2, above, the Department’s PMM process was made up 
three key stages, Performance Agreement, Monitoring and Assessment, and Rewards. 
However, the process seemed to focus primarily on performance management at the
Figure 6.2: The Public Sector’s PMM Cycle
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organisational level (departmental targets, etc.) without a strong link to performance 
management at the individual level via the performance appraisal system.
The Performance Agreement stage was the most important as all government 
departments were required to draw up a PA. The Department’s PA included a 
strategic plan, strategic initiatives, key performance indicators (KPIs), and 
standards/targets. The preparation o f the PA involved the selection and allocation of 
strategic initiatives, and KPIs within the department. All government departments 
within the same cluster under the same ministry had to choose performance indicators 
from the same performance framework formulated by the OPDC. There were two 
major types of KPIs, compulsory and optional, each of which came with specific 
improvement requirements. In terms of target setting, there were two major types of 
performance targets involved in the process: tax collection revenue targets (the 
Department’s main operations), and non-tax collection revenue targets (linked to 
development). The former were set according to targets at the cluster level which 
were derived from the outcomes of the negotiation between the Revenue Cluster 
(including the Departments of Excise, Revenue, and Customs), the Fiscal Policy 
Office and the Ministry o f Finance.
After the details of the Department’s PA and related targets (e.g., tax collection 
amount, taxpayers’ satisfaction, energy saving) had been examined and approved by 
committees and advisers appointed by the OPDC (including TRIS), the PAs were 
signed by the Director General (as the highest ranking civil servant within 
department), Deputy Directors General, and heads of departmental units. At this 
stage, the Department carried out the results assessment, made a SAR, and submitted
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to the OPDC two times a year. Before every formal assessment, there were also a 
number of internal site visits carried out by the Bureau of Tax Policy and Planning to 
assure target achievement
The reward stage involved the distribution of the Department’s bonus payment as an 
organisational performance-based reward which was derived directly from the 
Ministry’s bonus policy. The Department’ bonus plan was a single lump sum payment 
which was distributed to individual staff within the Department. However, the OPDC 
did not clearly provide the criteria or formula for the awarding of bonuses, but let 
government agencies decide this on their own. Within the Department there was a 
Department Administration Committees (comprising mainly the senior managers) 
which undertook the decision making process. Individuals appeared to receive 
bonuses based on their salary grades, length of service, and positions. In this respect, 
the outcome of the Department’s PMM system appeared to have little connection to 
individuals’ bonus payments, salary increases or career advancement (as will be 
discussed further below).
As shown in the previous chapter, the acceptance of PMM has been regarded as a 
crucial requirement of its development (Smith and Smith, 2007, p. 405 ; Kennerley 
and Neely, 2002, p. 1236). Acceptance has been seen as being enhanced by 
maintaining an effective and efficient PMM system in which benefits derived from 
PMM have to match the effort required by the system (Kennerley and Neely, 2002, p. 
1236). From the perspective o f senior managers in the Department, there was a 
formal acceptance o f PMM in the form that all respondents at this level were required 
to sign performance agreements with their next level (above) managers as well as
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with their subordinates. However, when the way in which these respondents spoke 
about PMM was examined, it became clear that such formal acceptance was more 
complex than the official view might suggest. For example, it is interesting that 
whereas the Bank senior managers framed their discussion of PMM in terms of 
business needs and principles of fairness in a performance-driven culture, the senior 
managers in the Department used a framing that gave greater emphasis to obedience 
to hierarchical authority and to PMM as a ‘duty’ rather than as a valued tool. Thus it 
will be seen that although their accounts appear to be supporting o f PMM, it is a 
support that is conveying of acceptance rather than willing embrace. In particular, 
almost all of the respondents perceived the Department’s PMM system as a ‘test’ set 
by the OPDC which required high compliance in order to ‘pass’ . The quotes below 
show several interesting features such as an element of ‘game playing’ in that each 
side recognised that meeting the other’s expectations appeared more important than 
the actual performance outcome and the presence of fear as a driver o f the system:
The OPDC is aware that government departments would not take it 
seriously, the OPDC then has to set and compromise the standards o f its 
performance measures. At the beginning, some government organisations 
may be concerned if they meet the performance standards set by the 
OPDC. Or even some government departments are afraid o f failing to 
meet the standards, so they’re likely to choose the performance measures 
which are easy to achieve, which they have confidence about. (R29).
Out o f total 5.0, I always get 4.9. Well! We know what the strategic plan 
is all about. W e just follow it then. But it didn’t much benefit the 
Department. No matter what we do, we always achieve it. For the past 2 
years, the organisational units under my supervision got 4.9. (R37).
It is interesting to consider the difference with the Bank reactions. Here there was 
also a concern with not meeting targets, but this was viewed more in terms o f  concern 
that was focused on the effect on the Bank’s reputation and performance and that this
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had a direct effect on employees’ roles as there was an expectation that strong 
performance in relation to targets at the individual level was part o f the expected duty 
of an employee. However as will be seen further below, the concern in the 
Department appeared to be directed more about maintaining the appearance of 
deference towards the hierarchy so that the actual targets were regarded as more 
related to the power structure o f the Department rather than performance itself. For 
example, this was admitted by one manager: “Although we’ve achieved all 
established goals and targets, this cannot indicate 100% of our actual performance” 
(R54), the implication from this being that the result was to cause ‘satisficing’ 
behaviour (Simon, 1947) rather than optimising performance. For example:
[The performance measurement] It’s impractical at all. Some performance 
indicators e.g., IT development that force our staff to achieve are 
acceptable. For other indicators e.g., to improve at least 3 sets of laws, 
they are very easy to achieve. They’re something that we’ve been doing. 
But, I don’t think it [the PMM system] is useful enough . . .  The ways the 
strategic planning is used in the Department, particular the use of KPIs, 
are totally wrong because this department is a tax collecting organisation. 
The strategic plan has been used messily. What I ’ve observed is that those 
staff are only attempting to follow what are required by the strategic plan 
[which was set by the OPDC], to complete the strategic projects and get 
the performance score. (R37).
In this respect it seems that the department managers’ responses were using a framing 
that linked the PMM frame implicitly to the hierarchy frame with the latter appearing 
to operate as the primary frame (compared to the Bank where the senior managers 
used a performance frame as the primary frame to provide a keying to the secondary 
hierarchical frame). In summary the Department gave a rationale for PMM in terms 
of obedience to hierarchical authority, whereas the Bank framed hierarchical 
authority as an outcome of performance. As will be shown below, one outcome of 
this type o f framing was that in the Department, expression o f adherence to the
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principle o f PMM appeared more important than addressing the disadvantages and 
problems that derived from the actual practice within the Department (whereas in the 
Bank, a failure in practice was regarded as important to maintaining the integrity of 
the whole system).
From the perspective o f middle managers, most of the respondents used similar 
framings to the senior managers with an emphasis on the primary frame of 
hierarchical authority as the main rationale for PMM compliance. There was also an 
interesting parallel from one respondent which also echoed the idea o f the ‘game 
playing’ approach identified by a senior manager. Here the emphasis was on the way 
in which resources were used to ensure that trial PMM systems gave the appearance 
of success. For example:
The current performance measurement is being used only for indicating, 
not measuring performance yet. It’s expected to be able to seriously 
measure performance in the next 2-3 years. They [the OPDC] always raise 
1-2 successfiil government organisations as examples for us to learn from.
You will find that within those exemplary organisations, there are a large 
number of mentors. There are lots of people used. In some cases there are 
even more mentors than operators! (R23).
This suspicion towards the validity of the system was framed within the primary 
frame of hierarchical authority with the approach being the result of imposition and 
manipulation from the powerful OPDC. An even more hierarchical framing was 
provided by another respondent who emphasised that regardless of the rhetorical 
commitment to PMM, he ‘knew’ what was ‘really’ required from him, and that this 
was determined by the demands o f his superiors rather than the PMM ‘data’ :
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I hardly make use performance measurement data. Sometimes we really 
don’t know what our department’s strategy is. But we’ve known we must 
carry out our job without mistakes. W e must achieve what’ve been set for 
us. W e’ve to discard what’s not our priority . . .  I’m barely interested in 
performance report. It hasn’t come close enough to us yet. (R36).
I admit that it’s partly because we’re not ready yet. It takes time. Because 
in the setting o f performance indicators or strategic plan, we still rely on a 
top down approach. As a result, I’m not sure if those employees who will 
be in charge or related are willing to perform this sort of task. So far, it 
seems to me that we, all 3 departments, are forced to accept strategy and 
tactics in which there are only a few people understand. (R25).
These framings were also found at the operational level where the framing that 
emphasised hierarchical control became even more explicitly evident. As above there 
was often a distinction that was implied between the rhetoric of PMM and a much 
more unclear practice. For example:
B y the principle, we’re on the right track. In practice, we’re not. I don’t 
know what to say. (R28).
As an operator, w e’re required to be committed to it [the Department’s 
PMM system], but we lack supports. At the same time we have to accept it 
because w e’re forced to do so. I’m using such words because w e’re 
expected to take the order from the managers along the hierarchy; with 
this objective, we must do that, for example. To be honest, we always 
comply, but w e’re not motivated. (R50).
It is interesting to note that as responses were taken from respondents at progressively 
lower levels in the Department, the strength o f the primary hierarchical authority 
frame increased and the performance framing decreased. Thus those at the more 
senior levels explicitly linked the two frames and gave a rationale for the relationship 
between them, whereas at the operative level, the primary hierarchical frame was 
almost totally dominant with an emphasis on control and obedience and with little 
attempt or apparent understanding to elaborate on the performance frame. Within all
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of these framings there were issues that emerged relating to the ‘game-like’ way in 
which PMM was adopted and the distinction between rhetoric and reality of which 
most respondents were clearly aware. The way in which PMM appeared to be 
accepted was in many ways consistent with the bureaucratic nature of the organisation 
and appeared to be regarded as something to be obeyed on account o f the position 
power of senior managers and, related to this, the structuring o f the PMM system 
around legal documents (i.e., performance agreements) which reinforced the 
contractual nature of the agreements. As such PMM could be seen as based on formal 
legal contracts but also on a form of psychological contract that appeared as being 
strongly ‘transactional’ in that compliance was seen as a duty (as opposed to the more 
relational contract exposed in the Bank, where most employees appeared to regard the 
notion of PMM as part o f the organisational culture; Conway and Briner, 2005). This 
was apparent in the extent to which few respondents emphasised benefits to either 
them or the organisation from adopting PMM but instead tended to focus more on the 
difficulties, suggesting that they were psychologically ‘disconnected’ from the system 
(see also Radnor and McGuire, 2004, p.252). The issue o f psychological contracts 
will be discussed more fully in the following chapter, but here a consideration can be 
given to the role of power in maintaining the PMM system.
It can be seen from these initial responses that the exercise o f organisational power 
appears as significant in ensuring the obedience of staff towards the PMM system. 
One way to understand the issue of power in organisations has been suggested by 
Goss et al. (2009; also in Doern and Goss, 2009) in terms of the notion of ‘power 
rituals’ based on the works of Collins (2004) and Summers-Effler (2002). Power 
rituals are defined as situations in which individuals or groups engage with each other
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in some sort of structured activity in the roles of ‘order-givers’ and ‘order-takers’ 
(Goss et a l 2009) and this appears to be the situation in the Department. Within 
power rituals Collins (2004) distinguishes between ‘D’ power and ‘E ’ power. D- 
power stands for “deference-power or order-giving power” (p.284) and is found in 
strong power rituals. E-power stands for “efficacy power” which is based on actually 
making things happen in practice (p.284), in particular in bringing about change. 
Collins’s (2004) assumption is that although D-power is often highly visible 
(especially in organisations), it does not always translate into actions that change 
things or make things happen: “the extent to which orders are actually transmitted, put 
into action, and have results” (p. 288). Collins (2004) uses the notion of ‘ interaction 
rituals’ to describe the ways in which people structure many of their interactions and 
it can be suggested that D-power is often associated with maintaining the status quo. 
Thus although people follow orders, they may simply be reproducing the existing 
behaviours that are expected of them in the context of the interaction ritual. In this 
way the order-givers maintain face by being obeyed and order-takers avoid being 
punished or sanctioned, but little actually changes in terms of behaviour. This was 
explained in the context o f the Department as follows by one employee:
Our department’s performance measurement has been set by the OPDC.
All government departments are expected to be the same. As a result all 
government departments are going to get the same performance results. If 
asked about to what extent it’s been modified so far, we haven’t taken any 
further actions yet. We only attempt to meet performance standards, which 
is only our major concern. We don’t care how our department can get 
improved from it yet. (R20).
Thus as genuine PMM requires constant changes in behaviour (to improve 
performance and ways o f doing things to bring this about) the reliance on D-power 
may mean that the PMM system becomes an ‘empty ritual’ that is merely obeyed in
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principle as a way of confirming the power of those in command. It could be 
suggested that a genuine PMM system should be more based on E-power. This means 
that E-power is more likely to be associated with individual actions that are self­
directed whereas D-power is more likely to be imposed on the individual from 
outside. For example:
If we look at any other department, they are under the same situation. It’s 
a compulsory circumstance. W e’re expected to commit to our duty. We 
must do it. Well, it’s impossible to act against it. Because w e’re working 
for the Government, we must do what we’re expected to do ... (R20).
Under the Department’s PMM, all employees are attempting to achieve 
their established goals, but none of them put 100% of effort. Because 
everyone understands that although they would have achieved their 
assigned goal, they would still get nothing back from their achievement.
(R22).
As has been seen, there appeared to be a higher level of internal individual 
commitment to the practices of PMM in the Bank, whereas in the Department the 
emphasis was more upon obedience to the externally imposed rules and requirements 
of the Government. As noted above, several respondents referred to PMM as a ‘test’ 
that they were required to pass: “How we can benefit from PMM is that we know 
whether we fail or pass the test, so that we would know how to react to it” (R32).
This was interestingly reflected in the views o f some middle managers who expressed 
support in principle for the principle of PMM but were concerned that it was not being 
fully supported. In particular they emphasised how there appeared to be a possible 
lack of understanding of the principles involved and a strong commitment to the real 
need to improve performance rather than to simply conform to the formal process of 
being seen to be having the system in place. Again, this can be seen as an indication
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that PMM in the Department was mainly framed as a hierarchical issue and that it 
suggests that it was associated with D-power, even though there appeared to be a 
desire for an approach the applied E-power; i.e., a commitment to make the system 
really deliver performance improvements. For example:
Yes, w e’ve got to interact with other organisations, all of which are now 
talking about it [PMM]. If  we don’t pay attention to it, we will still do not 
understand it. At present everyone’s talking about strategic planning all 
over the world. As a result, we must pay attention to it. (R45).
In this regard, not all other departmental units understand [the PMM  
system]. First, it’s not what we’re doing everyday. Second, it may be a 
new issue. I really want to ask those responsible departmental units 
whether they really understand it or not, whether they’re capable of 
communicating and helping other people to understand or not. The 
strategic planning with KPIs is a good thing. It helps make things more 
concrete. However, what do we do to make it work, to communicate and 
help people to understand it? Perhaps those people may want to do it. But 
they don’t know it because they don’t understand. (R57).
In this respect it appeared that there was a willingness to accept PMM but that this 
was expected to be properly applied and developed rather than merely imposed. 
However, there was a recognition across the different levels o f staff, with some slight 
variations, that the existing system was an external imposition that was framed 
primarily in terms of the reinforcement of hierarchical power (variously referred to as 
a ‘test’ or a ‘duty’) rather than being seen within a ‘performance’ frame (as was the 
case within the Bank).
Some respondents accepted the need to introduce PMM to meet external expectations 
(similar to Lawton et al., 2000). However, Lawton et al. (2000, p. 15) report that the 
use of top-down processes in professional bureaucracies is “inevitable and appropriate 
especially in the context o f professional defensiveness to external change”. Similarly
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the findings from the study by Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004, p. 258) claimed that the 
mandated requirements o f PMM in the USA resulted in higher level of PMM 
development. The data presented so far suggests that whilst this form of imposition 
can ensure that PMM systems are in place in public sector organisations, even in the 
face of reluctance from some staff, this does not guarantee that the system will 
actually function effectively in accordance with its rationale. As the evidence above 
demonstrates, staff may simply frame the PMM system as an extension o f hierarchical 
power and respond to it in ways that do not challenge that power, rather than 
understanding it through a performance frame and adjusting their behaviour to bring 
about continuous performance improvement through change and adaptation. In this 
respect the use o f qualitative data to reveal how employees perceive PMM systems 
can reveal significant implications for real system effectiveness that exist below the 
appearance of widespread adoption of the formal system. This reality seems to be 
close to the understanding o f PMM as a control tool which as Greiling (2007, p.3) 
points out can result from the limited relations o f trust that can be associated with 
bureaucratic organisation and that may therefore result in the strengthening of 
bureaucratic regulation -  rather than moves towards more flexible and performance- 
driven models such as would be associated with post-bureaucratic and NPM models. 
This is also reflected in the views of many scholars (e.g., Sanderson, 2001 ; McKevitt 
et al., 2000 ; Hoggett, 1996 cited by Sotirakou and Zeppou, 2006, p. 1297) who have 
argued that the implementation of PMM systems often tend to become more focused 
on top-down control rather than empowering those at lower levels to significantly 
change their performance.
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The top down nature of the way the PMM system was being used was very easily 
apparent in the accounts given by some of the more senior managers. At one level this 
was treated as an issue relating to strategic direction that was regarded as an objective 
tool for setting the direction of the organisation:
Nowadays we have clear goals. W e’ve a strategic plan which is telling us 
which direction we’re heading to, how to achieve it, and how to follow up 
progress to gain efficiency. (R54).
However in the accounts o f some other senior managers it was clear that they viewed 
the PMM system also as a mechanism of control over staff. In particular, it was 
interesting to note that there was often a use of language that was similar to the idea of 
McGregor’s (1960) famous notion of ‘Theory X ’, for example, in the following two 
quotations it is apparent that these managers appear to view their staff as being prone 
towards laziness and requiring to be firmly instructed in order to get their compliance. 
In the first quote, for instance, it appears that this respondent associates ‘management’ 
with ‘telling’ and monitoring:
It [the Department’s strategic plan] really helps with motivating staff. If 
we didn’t have it, those staff would remain laid-back, doing business as 
usual. After w e’ve KPIs, we’ve to plan ahead; we’ve to learn to manage. 
I’m telling my subordinates to set a plan and to produce a chart, for 
example, to see how much work has been done this week. Moreover, 
we’ve to have a meeting between managers and staff who are responsible 
for the Department’s website. The meeting has to take place every week to 
report work progress against the schedule. This makes our staff more 
active. (R37).
The following quotes also continue this theme and up further emphasis on the role of 
fear in order to ‘force’ staff to comply and, again, using the notion of a ‘test’ -
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although now this has been translated from an externally imposed test to one that 
must also be applied internally:
That’s why I’m saying those who are still doing business as usual have to 
change their behaviours. If  they don’t, they would be in trouble from now 
on for sure. This is because strategic plan or KPIs or whatever will force 
them to do so. If they won’t improve or develop, but behaving as usual, 
they would fail the test. You know what! The ultimate goal of measuring 
performance is to be able to identify how much and what area o f quality 
individual staff have. (R32).
It makes them more energetic. Then they cannot stay still. This year w e’ve 
achieve this. Next year we must achieve that. It makes them alert all the 
time. W e’ve got a target to achieve. We cannot do business as usual any 
more. (R45).
These accounts are consistent not only with the Theory X  assumptions but are also 
consistent with the notion o f a ‘low discretion syndrome’ (Fox, 1974) which is also 
usually associated with low trust (see the previous chapter). This can be confirmed as 
when these respondents were asked about the advantages of PMM they responded 
mostly in terms o f the staff control issues mentioned above rather than pointing 
towards any direct benefits from having the PMM system in place in relation to the 
Department’s key operations (e.g., to help increase the tax collection revenue). Again 
this confirms the view already identified that within the Department PMM was seen 
through mainly the primary frame of hierarchical authority rather than through the 
performance frame. This was put explicitly by one lower level employee:
In reality, the strategic plan and KPIs cannot help us very much, I think. 
But it just tells us what the goal of our job is, what we’re doing, or how 
much our job has been done. It seems like a performance report to submit 
to the upper levels. (R24).
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As has been seen, the use o f performance data seemed limited; there was no clear 
evidence that it was used significantly to help improve the organisational performance 
but was rather framed in terms of employee control. This appears to correspond to the 
results from previous studies (e.g., Sotirakou and Zeppou, 2006 ; Cavalluzzo and 
Ittner, 2004) which show that the imposition of PMM is likely to lead to high 
compliance in the form of performance reports, but less likely to result in substantive 
improvements beyond marginal levels. This was confirmed by the comments of one 
respondent in a senior position who was candid about the limitations of the system:
The ways the strategic planning, in particular performance indicators, is 
being used within the Department aren’t right at all because our 
department’s a tax collecting organisation. The strategic plan’s been used 
messily. What I’ve observed is that those staff only follow what have been 
written in the strategic plan [that was set by the OPDC], complete action 
plans according to the Department’s strategic plan, and get the expected 
performance score [as an image of the organisation]. For example, 
according to the Department’s strategic plan o f the year, w e’re required to 
achieve three drafts of improved laws, improved official website, IT 
development, launch five new projects, and things like that. You must cut 
back on your expenses. You must have a customer satisfaction suivey in 
place and must achieve more than 85% o f customer satisfaction rating and 
that sort of thing! Sometimes, I think, it doesn’t have any advantages for 
the organisation. Some performance indicators may be practical. But there 
is still a question; do those evaluators really have better understanding 
than our department staff? (R37).
This sort o f scepticism was apparent also among lower level staff at both middle and 
operative levels. In particular there appeared to be a sense that the performance 
metrics and KPIs were a major weakness that reflected the lack o f knowledge of those 
who designed the system of the Department’s real activities, especially at the lower 
levels of the organisation. For example:
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The Department’s current performance indicators are not 100% useful. My 
area office was given 4.0 points [performance score], despite the fact that 
we’ve achieved more than 1 million baht of tax collection revenue ... 
(R52).
I’m quite feeling indifferent to the Department’s performance indicators, 
except those for tax collection activity which I quite agree with. However, 
I think the performance indicators in the other areas seem useless, not 
much beneficial to the department. (R57).
This scepticism seemed to be seen by respondents as largely a result o f the imposition 
by the OPDC without consultation within the Department resulting in the 
misunderstanding of the Department’s key operations and the real improvements 
required. In this respect it seemed that the staff were not resisting the need to improve 
and provide a better service, but rather they were unconvinced by the method that had 
been imposed. For example, in the following quotation the respondent expresses not 
only scepticism but also the concern, echoing the hierarchical framing identified 
above, that the appearance of compliance was more important than the actual result:
They [The OPDC] want us to streamline the Department’s administration 
e.g., to reduce service time in area offices. But I’m just questioning; how 
could they prove if we really did what we put on paper? I don’t agree with 
their performance indicators, which I think they are totally wrong. They 
[the OPDC] have to find more concrete evidence. If they really want to 
measure our performance, they have to ask those people who come to use 
our services. In reality, they just gave us faulty performance measures. 
Their principle is totally mistaken. For example, one performance measure 
requires us to have a HR development plan. Just having a plan, I could do 
it, putting it on paper. (R31).
The responses from operative staff were the most negative of the respondents and 
tended to focus in particular on both the Department’s operations and their working 
lives. The first quotation is o f interest as it echoes the view expressed by more senior
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managers about the style of management, giving emphasis to notions of being ‘forced’ 
and of demands being made on them:
For certain performance measures, although they [the OPDC] know those 
indicators are impractical, they still force us to use them. W e’ve already 
known that we could not make use of them. Tax collection revenue is an 
example. They demand us to achieve what was written in the 
Government’s spending plan which is normally produced at least one year 
before the time we are in right now. As a result, we still have to adhere to 
what was forecasted at least one year ago. Anyway, when looking at the 
current economic situation, we’re very sure we couldn’t make it. (R20).
W e focus only on task completion. Well, we used to suggest to them [the 
Department] that KPIs normally should put focus on quality performance 
as well. But it isn’t included in performance measurement and also we 
don’t have a group/team which is in charge. So we cannot see any reason 
for doing so [measuring quality performance or other aspects of 
performance]. I talked to them and they said that we don’t need to do it. So 
we don’t and won’t do it. (R28).
The second statement above tends to correspond to the report by Norman (2002, 
p.623) that organisations often measure and formally report only what they are 
comfortable with such that quantity is given priority over the quality aspect of  
performance. In addition the way in which the PMM system was operated appeared to 
bring about increased workload and work complexity for operative staff rather than to 
motivate them to work harder or seek improvements. As one respondent discussed in 
more detail:
It is about KPIs [that makes considerable change in our working life]. It 
makes me feel that it takes us away from our job despite the fact that we 
already have high workloads. It seems to me that we’re working for 
others; this departmental unit, that departmental unit. They all come to ask 
us for data and we always give them what they want. It becomes that 
we’ve done nothing so far. We, a bureau in charge o f revenue data 
collection, know everything. But in the performance measurement process, 
we really don’t know why we’ve given low performance score. The 
Bureau A ’s using our data. The Bureau B ’s also using our data. They all
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come and ask for the data. But those data have never been regarded as our 
contribution! (R38).
The above comment reveals a number of potential issues. First, it suggests that the 
KPIs serve to cause a distraction from day-to-day activities and, second, also that 
there is a fundamental unfairness within the measurement system. Finally, it seems 
apparent that this perceived unfairness not only reflects on the Department/group 
itself but also acts to create tensions between different groups/units within the 
Department. In this respect the issue is not merely one of a poorly designed system 
but of the way in which this creates wider tensions and dissatisfactions within the 
organisation both in vertical (between the out-of-touch more senior managers) and 
horizontal (between different operating units) terms.
The perceived mismatch between everyday practices and the PMM metrics seems to 
confirm Lawton et al.’s (2000, p. 17) view that performance measures externally 
imposed can prove unfavourable to the primary needs of public services (also see 
Bourne et al., 2000, p. 762). As Krause (2003, p. 12) has shown feedback from users 
may be important to ensure the success of a PMM, and in the current situation it may 
appear that this seemed to be a lacking dimension, given that the most detailed 
criticisms were apparent at the lower levels in the organisation and these did not 
appear to be being addressed at more senior levels (although they expressed 
dissatisfactions that were more general with the system). It seemed that the 
introduction of PMM had caused stress problems for those staff required to meet the 
operational targets but this was viewed from management levels in terms of the need 
to always maintain compliance by exercising greater control over operating staff in 
order to report satisfactory target results to more senior levels. This appeared to mean
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that managers often ignored actual problems that arose in the Department, and put the 
focus only on the achievement desired/intended outcomes. In this respect the system 
seemed to be creating tensions across the organisation in different ways. In ironic 
terms it seemed that although the system had turned into a form filling or box ticking 
exercise (Radnor and McGuire, 2004, p. 253), it had the potential at the level of the 
human side o f the organisation to significantly generate tensions and dissatisfactions.
To understand this more fully it is useful to examine how respondents saw their own 
roles in relation to the PMM system and the extent to which they felt they had control 
over its activity and could influence its form of operating. As previous studies (e.g., 
Cavalluzzo and Ittner, 2004 ; Krause, 2003; Martin and Bartol, 2003) have shown, the 
input and involvement from the PMM users is significant for their acceptance and the 
success of PMM system and this is therefore of relevance to explore.
From the perspective of senior managers, it seemed that none of the respondents felt 
that they were involved in the design of the Department’s PMM framework. They 
appeared to agree that performance monitoring was their major role. However there 
were some differences in how they interpreted this position. In some cases 
respondents presented a view where they defined themselves clearly as an ‘order- 
taker’ (Collins, 2004) and appeared to display an ‘external locus of control’ (Rotter, 
1954) despite their relatively senior positions:
You must get the staff from a powerful government agency to help fix the 
problems in the Department. For me, I’m only Deputy Director General. I 
don’t have authority in management. What I can do is only giving my 
advice to the Director General. But it all depends on whether he [Director 
General] would agree with me or not? The Director General had never 
allowed for other people’s different ideas. He always defended his idea by
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referring it as the Ministry’s policy .. .  If our boss doesn’t like our idea, we 
shouldn’t talk about it again . . .  I mentioned it only once. Because he did 
not agree with me, I won’t mention it anymore. Because he is my boss .. .  
(R37).
I don’t have such authority to argue against. The Director General asks us 
in a management meeting if his idea makes sense. If most of us are saying 
‘yes’, I would say ‘yes’ as well. (R32).
At the middle manager level, most respondents similarly felt that they had no 
involvement or decision making power in the PMM system; they commonly 
perceived their role as a follower or order-taker.
In general, w e’re only an operator because every single assigned task 
always comes with specific target, scope, and deadline. This is 
strengthened by the belief of most Thai government officers that for the 
order from the upper levels, we must only agree and carry out without 
argument. (R52).
Interestingly two interviewees pointed out that frequent replacement of the top leader 
of the Department had a major impact on the PMM implementation, again suggesting 
their relative perception o f powerlessness within their roles:
... W e’ve experienced frequent replacements of the top leader and those 
top leaders in the past then had no chance to take part in the Department’s 
strategic planning. Our present top leader wasn’t involved in that sort of 
thing due to such frequent replacements. (R31).
In dealing with the Department’s annual strategies, we have a 
management meeting to review the Department’s strategies as well as 
vision statement. Every time w e’ve a new Director General, the 
Department’s vision statement will be changed accordingly. It’s legitimate 
to do so. Directors General are as a leader, as the head of organisation, 
each o f them has different visions. (R25).
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At the operational level as expected, none o f the participants perceived themselves as 
decision makers. Almost all regarded their role only as followers who were expected 
to follow the directives from their managers. A junior interviewee from the head 
office expressed her view on this issue:
. . .  Creating tasks within the Department always falls within managers’ 
responsibility; i.e., they always tell us what we have to do. For example, 
this year, we have one performance indicator that requires us to develop 
IT system to support our tax administration system. It is only one 
performance indicator that we have. After its requirement’s been met, the 
system’s not further developed. Because it’s got only one requirement and 
thus this project isn’t further developed. Or perhaps we can do something 
more on this project. That’s all their [managers’] business. (R38).
Another respondent from an area branch office described the way the Department’s
PMM process operated within her part o f the organisation:
They [senior managers] always give us clearly what they want us to do. 
They sign a Performance Agreement which becomes their obligations to 
the success of the strategic plan. They only sign the Performance 
Agreement, and we, as operators, then carry out our clearly defined action 
plan. (R50).
The two statements above clearly suggest that there appears to be no group decision 
making process within the group of operative staff or between managers and 
subordinates. This emphasis on order-following confirms the view of the organisation 
as structured around command-and-control lines in the classical bureaucratic form
This suggests that unlike the Bank, they did not have a formal role or expectation to 
be involved in the development of the Department’s PMM system. Furthermore, like 
the findings from the study by Radnor and McGuire (2004, p.255), the role of the 
Department’s senior managers seemed only like an administrator chasing
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performance data and monitoring the progress of tasks. This was attributed to the fact 
that the Department’s PMM framework was developed by external agencies. It 
seemed that the Thai government decided to centralise and standardise its PMM 
framework in order to save time and resources in the formulating and implementing 
of the PMM framework for government organisations. The evidence from the studies 
by Chan (2004) and by Sotirakou and Zeppou (2006) also supports this view and 
indicates that the time and resources required are inhibiting factors for the effective 
implementation of PMM. In contrast, the role of the Department’s senior 
management team also contradicts the findings from the study in a PMM leading 
country like the UK by Lawton et al. (2000) which reports that senior managers in the 
UK public sector played a big role in developing performance measures (p. 16).
This lack of involvement can be explored further by examining the ways in which 
respondents linked their involvement with the PMM system to their own personal 
goals (Hale and Whitlam, 1998). It can be argued for that personal goals tend to 
reflect the success of a PMM system in aligning the organisation’s goals with 
individuals’ personal goals or, in other words, the extent to which individual staff are 
committed to the organisational goals through the PMM system.
The personal goals of senior managers seemed associated with the main responsibility 
of the Department (i.e., revenue tax collection activity). However, these goals tended 
to be at a quite general level: all participants emphasised the need to provide fairness 
in tax collection and tax laws enforcement and tended to describe their goals for their 
area of responsibility in general terms rather than making explicit reference to the 
specific objectives of the PMM system. For example:
185
CHAPTER SIX THE EXCISE DEPARTMENT
From my perspective, we could increase the Department’s tax revenue by 
20-30%  per year by recruiting more staff into some areas o f the 
Department’s activities. I’ve found some mistakes in our tax audit 
documents . . .  Only one company can cost the loss of tax revenue that 
accounts for a million baht [About £15,000 at that time]. (R32).
The personal goals of staff in middle management positions seemed also to reflect 
these general concerns. One respondent captured this clearly in terms of a general 
legal duty to ensure good governance. This can be seen as interesting as it points to 
the classic bureaucratic notion of ‘ legal rational authority’ (Weber, 1978) that is an 
impersonal duty towards the rule of law rather than the notion of performance driven 
by individual interests (as could be argued to be the case under a strong PMM system 
where individual performance and targets are the dominant driver for employee 
behaviour):
. . .  In fact, w e’ve got a duty under the law to fairly collect tax revenues 
and ensure compliance with relevant laws and regulations. To bring 
fairness to all taxpayers, in my view, truly is our duty. (R31).
Others made the point already emerged above that the focus on targets tended to put 
the emphasis on quantity rather than the quality o f their work:
I wish those terms [effectiveness and efficiency] went along very well in 
our department. But most of government employees put focus only on 
effectiveness; well, they put task completion the top priority. However, the 
quality of completed tasks is another issue. (R36).
At the operational level, almost all informants reported routine task completion as one 
of their most common personal goals. In general most respondents felt that the PMM 
system was something external to their routine tasks and there seemed to be limited 
commitment to it. This was seen as not only an attitude amongst operative staff but
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also a failure o f management to organise the system properly or to take a real interest 
in making it work effectively. In the following quotation a respondent explains how 
she was left alone to deal with her departmental unit’s action plan on her own, and her 
account confirms the view outlined above that the PMM system was experienced by 
many staff as a ‘empty ritual’ (Collins, 2004):
I don’t want to say that none of our staff has an interest [the Department’s 
PMM system]. I wish everyone shares their ideas together. Every time I go 
and ask them for comment on our departmental unit’s action plan, they 
always say ‘you carry on doing it’ . I still believe that we should work 
together and more collectively. But they’re not interested actually. They 
prefer us to carry on with routine tasks. As a result, I have to formulate our 
departmental unit’ action plan alone, submit to the head of departmental 
unit to approve, and distribute the plan to every groups within the 
departmental unit. It seems like it’s only my idea in which I don’t think 
it’s good enough. Why don’t they even advise me? (R26).
Another interviewee perceived the lack o f staff involvement in the PMM system to a 
missing connection between individual staff performance and the reward policy, but 
mainly to the rigid and imposition of the PMM frameworks from outside:
From my experience and talks with the staff of the other departmental 
units, many staff put focus on the routine tasks rather than the tasks 
according to the Department’s strategic plan. They’re not interested in 
really. This may be due to motivation as well. Because the staff from a 
certain departmental unit said that they felt their performance results were 
not related to bonus or promotion. Their departmental unit had not much 
role in the Department’s strategic plan. This is because all tasks have 
already been fixed by the OPDC. If we could formulate the Department’s 
strategic plan on our own, we then could allow them to set their 
departmental unit’s performance indicators, we could allow them to be 
part o f the Department’s strategic planning process. They may get more 
interested. Well recently they phoned us and asked that why their 
departmental units were not included in the list o f the Department’s 
strategic plan. I could only say that the department regarded them as 
supporting departmental units. But those departmental units felt they were 
not a key owner o f the plan. As a result they were not interested. If they 
were key responsible departmental unit, they would have been more 
interested. (R21).
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This quotation is interesting as it points towards the role that humiliation and insults 
may play in the adoption o f policies. According to Gabriel (1998): “Insults include 
behaviour or discourse, oral or written, which is perceived, experienced, constructed, 
and at times intended as slighting, humiliating, or offensive” (p. 1331). In particular, 
Gabriel points to how important exclusions are in generating perceived insults:
Refusal or failure to invite a person to an important function or party is a 
cause of innumerable family feuds and conflicts. It is also encountered 
in countless stories and myths, such as the incident that set in motion the 
Trojan War. Eris, the goddess of discord, who has not been invited to the 
nuptial reception o f Thetis and Peleus, takes her revenge by sending her 
carte-de-visite, the apple of discord. This will precipitate the dispute 
among the goddesses, which in turn, will spark off the 10-year war 
between Greeks and Trojans. In the Grimm brothers’ story Little Briar- 
Rose (the source text of Sleeping Beauty), one o f the 13 “wise women” 
was not invited to the feast in honour of the newborn princess, because 
the king “only had twelve plates”. She pronounced her curse that the 
princess would prick herself with a spindle and die on her fifteenth 
birthday. (Gabriel, 1998, p. 1337).
In the quotation from the respondent above, it seems that a departmental unit was not 
mentioned in the strategic plan which appeared to create a sense o f exclusion and 
which lead to an enquiry about why they had not been included. From the fact than an 
enquiry was made it seems clear that the excluded unit perceived its position as being 
regarded as inferior and therefore insulting. As Gabriel (1998) makes clear, 
“Exclusion lies at the heart o f many insulting experiences” and he makes the point 
that “Even if no slight is intended it is easy for a person left out to feel offended”, as 
seems to be the case with the representatives of the departmental unit in this case. 
Gabriel (1998) also goes forward to suggest that such insults can be compounded by 
three factors: first, where exclusion is seen to have implications for status and power; 
second, where the humiliation of being excluded is public; and third, when this 
“throws the victim off balance so that his retort is feeble and ineffectual” (p. 1337).
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Each o f these three elements appears as being present in this case. The exclusion of 
this unit signals that it is perceived more widely as lacking power and influence and 
therefore o f contributing little. Second, the fact of being not included in the strategic 
plan was public to the wider department and other government bodies. Third, the 
weakness o f the unit was further indicated when they had to telephone another 
employee to enquire about their position (this can be seen as a more feeble response 
than having been consulted in advance). It therefore seems that this problem in the 
communication o f the PMM system also created tensions and conflicts within the 
organisation (as in the examples above, beyond those issues relating directly to the 
system itself) and also contributed to the loss of commitment ( ‘lack of ownership’) 
felt about the system.
This wider effect o f the PMM system and its state of embeddedness within the 
Department can be examined in more detail by examining the ways in which 
respondents perceived the culture of the Department and its match with the principles 
of PMM. In many countries where PMM systems have been introduced, cultural 
change has been regarded as one o f strategies to support its practice (Tze and Boon, 
2008, p. 449; Kennerley and Neely, 2002, p. 1236). Almost all of the senior managers 
perceived the Department’s underlying culture as a major barrier to the use of the 
PMM system. In particular, there was a strong emphasis on the notion of hierarchical 
authority, as exposed in earlier accounts outlined above (which can also be seen as 
one reason why the case of the unit excluded from the strategic plan discussed above 
was viewed as so serious by those who saw this as an insult in the face of real power 
differences that could be used against them). In fact, several of the more senior 
managers tended to describe the culture in terms of the perceived weaknesses of lower
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level employees, who they regarded as behaving reactively and always wanting to 
follow orders from managers:
Basically, our staff have some weaknesses, in particular the lack of 
creative ideas. Moreover, the way they work as a team remains ineffective 
because they’re still waiting for the orders from the top, but lacks their 
own ideas of what they should do or not to do. They have no creative 
ideas. They’re still in the old box; they do not dare speak out or even think 
ahead because they’re aware of speaking o f the wrong things or generating 
the wrong ideas [in front of mangers]. The organisational culture lies 
within the state of being humble, high compliance, and no arguments 
against managers. (R32).
It appeared that the sense o f obedience to authority was identified as a difficulty but 
interestingly the respondents at this level seemed not to recognise that this could be 
something to do with their own actions towards subordinates, but preferred to see it as 
something happening lower down in the organisation. For example, one respondent 
approached this as a clear weakness of subordinates that he felt always obliged to try 
to correct through monitoring and control:
I spend most of my time following up, reminding, warning, giving 
deadlines or doing whatever which I think it could get the job done in 
time. Everyone is supposed to be accountable. If I ordered and quality of 
work went missing, this means it was not over yet, but they would have to 
revise it. I would have to reply to such work that do not be careless, use 
more brain. (R32).
Interestingly and with irony, at the middle management and junior management level, 
respondents also tended to view the Department’s organisational culture negatively 
but attributed this to senior managers not listening to their subordinates’ opinions or 
recommendations, and not allowing their subordinates to think out for themselves. 
There was a great depth o f feeling by one participant who had dared to challenge their 
manger and felt that he had lost his chance to promotion because of this:
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The Department’s current vision statement came from the previous 
Director General’s idea. No one dared argue against him and we didn’t 
have part in it. This is a major drawback o f the Thai government system. 
The meaning o f participation in theory and that in practice totally differ. 
The basic participation when you’re studying at school is that people 
always accept the differences of individual idea and opinion. But in our 
government system, if you’re talking about what’re irritating to them, this 
means, in the future you have to stay still, you have to keep away from 
them. I’ve been a victim and have lost so many chances for pay increases 
and advancement. I understand that a majority of people understand me 
and even agree with me. But none o f them is as brave as me. (R23).
And as another stated:
. . .  It’s Eastern culture that doesn’t allow others to be creative or think out 
of the box. It’s an impediment. It would be good if we can be more 
innovative. But we would still have to make choice carefully and 
selectively . . .  (R25).
However, some other respondents appeared to be more attached to the notion of being 
an order-taker, reflecting again the strength of the underlying bureaucratic values that 
seemed strong within the Department. In particular, these views suggest that whilst 
there was a sense that managers felt they had to exercise control over a workforce that 
would be lazy, some o f those subject to such control saw it as legitimate and 
obedience as a duty. It therefore seems that the authoritarian aspects of the 
organisation gained support from across the organisation to some extent rather than 
being imposed on an unwilling workforce. For example:
W e’re that sort of person who makes no argument, no conflict. If  we can 
follow, we then follow. W e’re tolerant and we do what are told. 
Sometimes we cannot see the way to achieve, but are told to do it, we 
always do it. W e never argue against! W e’re patient! (R45).
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Our department’s strength would be that our staff have self discipline. It’s 
a lot better than any other department. This may be due to the fact that 
their educational qualification on average is not so high. Most o f them 
obtain a first degree. They’re only like ordinary people. If  they have high 
educational qualification, they would be stubborn. In giving commands 
from managers, there are no disputes from the staff... (R36).
From the perspective o f  operational staff, the emphasis on obedience was more 
consistent although this appeared to be perceived as less virtuous than the responses 
of the middle managers immediately above. Whereas the latter respondent pointed to 
employees’ self-discipline as the source o f compliance, the employees themselves 
seemed to perceive this in terms of a lack of choice and simply the following of 
orders. In fact it was interesting to note the extent to which they were aware of the 
short-comings of this approach but felt they had little or no opportunity to do anything 
about this. For example:
...  It seems to me that our department lacks intention to make its staff to 
feel as part o f it. It may be due to the Department’s missions or its 
manpower. Also when we’re talking about work, the senior managers 
always say, ‘don’t say that you don’t have enough staff or ‘don’t say that 
you cannot do it!’ . . .  As a government official, we must follow what are 
told . . .  (R50).
. . .  If the Department really wants us to work as a team, it must establish 
such organisational culture that supports team-working. But so far, it 
doesn’t exist yet. (R20).
. . .  Sometimes I feel that we’re too responsive to the top leader. This leads 
to the fact that many organisational problems have never been brought to 
the ear of the top leader. From my view, the Director General doesn’t 
k n o w  everything. And the senior managers don’t dare tell him the truth, 
don’t dare tell him the possible negative impact o f his policy or decision in 
the long run .. .  (R28).
Ironically this latter view appeared to reflect a sense of unity between operatives
within their units as they took a pride amongst themselves in fulfilling their orders
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diligently which they saw as loyalty to the overall department and the professional 
conduct of their actions, but at the same time, felt that they were not receiving the best 
leadership and support from their immediate managers. Interestingly it may be that the 
imposition o f PMM in a top-down manner served to reinforce the established culture 
of bureaucratic obedience to rule-following as it was perceived that this was a deeper 
organisational value that needed to be protected against weak local management and a 
system that was seen to be disconnected from the deeper value of government service. 
In the comment o f the last respondent, it seemed almost as if there was a belief that if 
the most senior managers knew what was really going on, they would restore the old 
values that they were assumed to still uphold (being unaware that systems like PMM 
were undermining this at the lower levels). This seems to be in line with the findings 
from the study by Swierczek and Onishi (2003) which revealed that Thai workers 
perceived obedience and role clarity as important to them in the work place. However, 
this study gives a more complex picture of the view o f these writers that the seniority 
system was perceived negatively by Thai staff. The findings of this study show that 
there were in fact, negative perceptions of seniority issues, but that these were mixed 
in many respects, with some perception of problems being associated with local 
problems rather than questioning the principle o f seniority as such. It seemed more 
that the views tended to be ambivalent on this issue, although the general feeling was 
towards a sense that the system was no longer delivering the stability that had once 
been valued and had not put anything effective in its place.
This form of complexity can be seen as an issue relating to commitment towards 
PMM -  in the absence of what appeared as being clear commitment from top 
managers, managers at all levels and employees appeared to have to develop their
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own explanations in response to their direct experiences rather than from the position 
of a unified organisational core value (as tended to be more of the case in the Bank).
Management commitment to PMM has been shown to be a crucial factor for the 
success o f its implementation. It has been shown that if a top management team is 
committed to the use of performance measurement data (Cavalluzzo and Ittner, 2004, 
p. 245) and held accountable for performance results, this will enhance the benefits 
from PMM and, in turn, the success o f PMM as a whole (p. 261). The responses from 
the interviewees at the more senior levels showed little evidence of firm commitment 
towards PMM which appeared mostly as a reflection of their lack o f faith in the 
commitment of the most senior managers. It was pointed out by nearly all respondents 
that the top leader o f the Department held absolute power, but that this was a position 
that changed frequently in response to shifts in government policy. As a result, this 
was seen to result in a discontinuity of work and policy at lower levels. For example, 
the previous Directors General (recently left) was mentioned by several respondents 
for lacking personal interest and competency in managing the Department and 
presenting a vision statement that was regarded as not relevant to the Department’s 
key operations and showing that he lacked knowledge and understanding of the 
Department’s work:
It seems the Department’s current vision statement doesn’t make sense at 
all. Our department is a tax revenue collecting organisation. Therefore, I 
really don’t agree if we have to shift our focus towards society, 
community or energy saving. It’s absolutely wrong. W e’re taxing people 
and at the same time we also have to discourage those people to reduce the 
consumption of excise goods. If we have to support the reduction o f the 
consumption of excise goods [e.g., alcoholic beverages], I think this must 
be the responsibility of other government organisations, for example, the 
Ministry o f Public Health. As a result, I don’t agree with the present vision 
statement which is the Excise Department for society, community, and
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environment. I believe that that is not our duty o f our department at all. I 
think the right vision statement of our department would be associated 
with, for example, the collection o f tax revenue in a fair and transparent 
manner or the improvement of tax revenue collection standard. It is these 
things which are more likely to be our determination or the vision o f a tax 
collecting organisation. (R37).
This quotation is interesting because it demonstrates clearly the strength of the 
bureaucratic mentality. This was partly apparent in the views of all these more senior 
managers in their feeling that they were dependent for their own success on the 
behaviour o f those above them, but more specifically in the above case in the belief in 
specialisation and professional autonomy and expertise. It seemed that the PMM 
system was associated with attempts to introduce general targets (across different 
specialist areas) that were seen as undermining what was perceived as the proper 
commitment to specialist expertise. The result was that there seemed to be ambiguity 
rather than clearness and this resulted in no individuals accepting clear responsibility 
for actions that were considered the core activity of the Department:
There is no ownership of the job [tax audit]. For example, if the tax 
revenue from X  or Y  drops, what do we do? No one would take 
responsibility. No one knows how to cope with it. No one is able to fix it. I 
do realise that those taxpayers pay taxes less than they should have paid, 
but no one responds to it. Why not? It is because those operative staff 
don’t dare take action against it. The head doesn’t move, nor does the tail: 
no senior managers or any other managers take action, (R37).
From the perspective of middle and line managers, there was also a concern that 
commitment from above appeared to be confused. Here it seemed clear that the 
implementation of the PMM system was associated with top management (as already 
shown above, all respondents felt that the system was imposed) and that this was 
further confused by the frequent changes in the most senior position so that it was 
unclear whether the system was really to be taken seriously or was something that
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would lose importance as new top managers were put in place. In particular there was 
seen to be discontinuity in the Department’s vision statement and strategy, which in 
turn appeared to have a negative impact on the perception o f PMM and its 
implementation at the day-to-day level. Again it was apparent, as already mentioned, 
that much o f the process associated with the PMM system was framed in terms of 
hierarchical power and political game-playing rather than firm and explicit 
commitment to the performance principle. For example:
. . .  From the Department’s perspective, he [The Director General] may be 
waiting for the Division of X ’s proposal. But at the same time the Division 
of X  is also waiting for the Department’s directives. It depends on which 
side you’re looking at. Because it depends on individual Directors 
General’s personality. Most Directors General do not like to be told, but 
prefer to be a commander. (R45).
A top leader is supposed to be a role model for their subordinates. In our 
department, the underlying culture is currently not strong enough due to 
frequent changes in the position of top leader. As a result, the 
organisational culture is more varying by top leaders. Top leaders play 
significant part in imposing such culture. (R31).
The change of Director General every a year or every two years or so has 
led to staff de-motivation or has negatively affected the Department’s 
existing strategy. It’s confusing indeed. We really don’t know what sort of 
strategy our new leader would prefer. However, unfortunately some 
strategies were cascaded down from the Ministiy. Every change comes 
with different vision statements. This change often brings about either 
ineffective or messed up strategy. (R36).
In particular, the Department’s vision statement should have been based 
on the uniqueness of the organisation. The vision shouldn’t focus on 
multiple tasks, from my perspective, so I would be able to put my focus on 
the right direction then. With a new vision statement comes every new 
director general. (R57),
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As one respondent explained, this could have a significant impact on how the PMM  
system was perceived as there seemed to be continually mixed messages about its 
significance and the commitment of top managers towards it. For instance:
I understand that those senior managers don’t pay Fill attention to the 
Department’s strategic plan. Well they just do what they are told and do 
like the others do. They don’t seem to have any interest in performance 
indicators to measure their performance or for self development. It seems 
like others want us to do it more than they want to do it. (R23).
From the perspective o f operational staff there was a similar response. All had the 
same opinion that the way the Department had been managed was responsible for 
current problems. In particular they emphasised the over-reliance on top leaders with 
absolute power in decision making, and that changes here always lead to 
discontinuity making it difficult to perceive clear direction and continuous 
commitment. For example:
The Department’s been negatively affected by change in top leader. One 
factor is that those former directors general all are grown up from other 
departments, but they may have potential. After they’re starting to 
understand and thinking about making tangible contribution to the 
Department, they’re always rotated to another department. It seems to me 
that we get almost nothing from them ...  (R28).
As was described by the middle managers there was a feeling that the Department’s 
current vision statement was seen as not fit for the Department’s key operations, 
which created confusion regarding the PMM system and an apparently conflicting 
vision about what was really important. In particular it was seen that there was too 
much political manoeuvring by top management which was experienced as a lack of 
support and lack of interest and commitment to the Department which undermined 
faith in how the PMM system was used. For instance:
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The management policy is very important. If it’s a right one, the 
Department goes right then. If they make a good policy, they should come 
and evaluate whether it’s achievable or not and if there is any problem or 
not as well. If  it’s impractical senior managers should provide enough 
support to make it come true. (R27).
Top management was seen by many interviewees as putting too much focus on telling 
staff to achieve goals and targets but lacking the understanding of how to achieve 
these goals in practice, and showing little recognition of when good work was done:
. . .  Because at present, we’re not motivated. Many staff members only 
come to work and know that they would definitely get salary increase by 
at least 1-1.5 step every year. The morale o f those staff members who 
work hard have gone low then because the senior managers have never 
specially rewarded them. I think the patronage system still exists within 
our department. (R26).
It therefore seemed that management commitment was almost unanimously seen by 
respondents at all levels as one o f the big barriers to the development o f the PMM 
system. This corresponds to Chan’s (2004, p.219) findings which identified the 
inadequate top management commitment as a major cause o f the failure of the 
implementation o f PMM system. On a similar theme Greiling (2007, p. 17) points to 
the issue of communication in the introduction of PMM systems and how if this is not 
undertaken effectively it may lead to fear and distrust: “when implementing a 
performance management system, questions may arise concerning the purpose of such 
an instrument. Those supposedly being coordinated by the instruments of performance 
management suffer from the fear of being controlled by it”. However, in the case of 
the more senior managers there seemed to be a limited conception o f what 
communication involved that very strongly reflected the classic bureaucratic 
principles o f ‘downward instruction’ through formal meetings. The following 
response was typical:
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. . .  W e’ve got continuous communication with our staff because w e’ve got 
a number o f meetings. The director general has a meeting with the deputy 
directors general. The director general also has a meeting with the regional 
office managers. There are also the meetings at the head of departmental 
unit level, and other meetings at the lower levels almost every two months.
For the cross country level, we have at least two meetings and site visits to 
every regional office once a year. I think we’ve done a lot. This is the way 
we communicate with those who’re at the lower levels ... (R29).
It seemed clear that such meetings served as much to reinforce power positions within 
the hierarchy as they did to communicate information, not least because of what 
appeared to be the relative infrequency of these events, such that they would be likely 
to take on a ‘ceremonial’ quality (as has been suggested above, reflecting the notion 
of a ‘power ritual’ in which participants are defined as order-givers and order-takers; 
Collins, 2004) rather than encouraging the free exchange of information, especially 
about difficult issues or problems. Another admitted that communication on a more 
regular basis was often ad hoc and could be influenced by ‘time factors’, a form of 
operating that would be likely to reinforce the view from below o f a lack of interest 
from management:
The ways we communicate with our subordinates may vary from one to 
another according to individual senior managers’ personality. Many may 
put much effort, while some may put little effort. But I rarely have enough 
time to talk to them [staff at the lower levels]. (R54).
Middle management respondents confirmed that meetings were a major 
communication channel within the Department but they were more open about the 
effectiveness of this medium and attributed low staff understanding of the 
Department’s PMM system to this poor communication. For example:
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W e’re not ready yet. Perhaps we’re lacking in co-understanding. 
Sometimes some words have been spoken out, but no one understands 
them. It seems to me that we’re lacking in communication. We need to 
build trust and co-understanding. (R45).
Another respondent felt that these formal meetings also exposed their senior managers 
lack o f understanding o f PMM which lead to confusion between senior and middle 
managers and often to conflict at the operational level:
.. .  The problem is that the senior or top managers don’t seem to have 
enough understanding o f the PMM system. Well! I mean they just take it 
for granted, and their understanding isn’t right. When conflict arises, 
middle managers like me will have problems with the lower level 
employees. This happens in every departmental unit. (R23).
From the perspective o f operational staff there was a view that the flow of the 
Department’s communication was not effective and was often poor between different 
levels of organisation. The result was seen to be that operators were often unclear 
about the specific aspects of the PMM and how they should respond to the demands:
.. .  So far, there is a problem on disseminating KPIs to operators. They are 
still carrying out their routine jobs. For example, those who are in charge 
of tax payment always stick to tax payment related activities. They won’t 
be aware o f the fact that they have to do things in accordance with the 
Department’s strategic plan. In terms of effort in making communication, 
the Department’s attempted to communicate all necessary information is 
along the chain of command; i.e., from Director General to Deputy 
Directors General, from Deputy Directors General to heads of bureau, and 
from heads of bureau to operators. If  asked about the extent to which they 
pay attention to this, we must look at the results! (R20).
Another respondent revealed that communication meetings were really only open to 
managers, reinforcing the view that the emphasis was on ‘telling’ and command rather 
than engagement, especially at lower levels. For instance:
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. . .  Meetings within the Department are always open to only managers, 
while operative employees like us are never allowed to be part of the 
meetings. This is the big problem that we cannot sort it out. Moreover, 
even in the meetings at the upper level, when those managers are asked 
whether their responsible areas have got a problem or not, they all always 
say ‘no’ despite many problems still existing .. .  (R50).
Other interviewees pointed towards the perception that managers always withheld 
important information from staff, again reemphasising the existence of the low-trust 
syndrome suggested earlier:
I really don’t know about how our departmental unit’s target has been set. 
There are only those managers that know and are allowed to attend the 
meetings. They’ve never let us know about what they got from the 
meetings. They meet up quite often but don’t brief us on what we need to 
know .. .  (R27).
The staff at the operative level like me hardly know. But it’s those 
managers who know. We don’t know as much as they know. W e may 
know only that Risk Management has been used as one indicator that is 
used to measure this, measure that. That’s all what I know. If asked about 
what activities that we have to concern as our contribution or our 
performance indicators are, I don’t know at all. If you ask those managers, 
they may know the answers. (R38).
As far as we know, the policy we’ve received is not clear enough. W e’re 
confused and really don’t know what the Department is doing so far. In 
some occasions, we hadn’t known the Department has a strategic plan.
Well, the information we received is not clear. (R21).
A broader aspect o f the issue of communication is the way in which this reflects the 
relationship between more general HR policies and the PMM system. Experience of 
public sector reform in the UK has shown that the centralised HR policies had 
restricted PMM development against situations where there was more decentralisation 
to create greater flexibility (Stewart and Walsh, 1992, p.505). Similarly, there 
appeared to be a link between reward and performance results at local levels
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(Cavalluzzo and Ittner, 2004. p. 307). In fact, within the Department, respondents 
identified many aspects o f HR policy that they associated with the effectiveness of the 
PMM system. From the perspective of the more senior managers, there was a general 
concern that HR did not operate effectively. However it was also interesting to note 
that these managers felt that they had little direct responsibility in this regard and were 
more likely to look for others to blame, either in terms of staff shortages or by 
claiming that other departments received more favourable treatment:
I admit, our department is short of staff. It’s weird that there is only one 
person who is in charge o f tax audit that accounts for 20,000-30 ,000  
million baht [About £300-£450million]. (R32).
From my point o f view, this problem [the presence of double standards in 
the Department’s tax law enforcement] results from those managers who 
ignore it, the shortage o f operative staff, or even having those operative 
staff who don’t have enough knowledge. On the other hand, the 
Department o f X  has a large number o f developed staff. There are a lot of 
training programmes provided and well defined rules and regulations [for 
staff to follow]. All are a lot better. Here we have loads of things that need 
to be improved. (R37).
Although there may be truth in the latter charges from the quotation above, the 
framing o f the issue in these terms suggest the view that even more senior managers 
did not have a strong sense of their ability to make change happen against the 
‘system’ and were more comfortable following policy instructions than acting more 
entrepreneurially. In addition, most o f the respondents also recognised the issue of the 
Department’s bonus plan. This also was seen as imposed from the outside and as 
having little relevance to the Department’s actual organisational performance results:
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The bonus for individual staff was quite small; only 3,000-4 ,000 baht per 
head [Around £45-£60 per person]. Despite the achievement o f an overall 
performance score o f 4.9 out o f 5.0 [the Department’s total performance 
score at the time], they [the Department staff] still received a small amount 
of financial reward. (R37).
From the perspective of middle managers, there was a similar view that the 
Department’s HR policy was a major problematic area that contributed to staff 
motivation remaining poor. This was seen to be caused by several weaknesses of the 
HR policy and in particular the reward policy. One interviewee’s narrative on the 
bonus she received demonstrates that in spite o f the Department having the PMM 
system in place, its bonus policy failed to link to the actual performance results of 
individuals or units:
I thought the bonus wasn’t motivating. In the form o f bonus, we were 
given a small amount of money. Unlike those state enterprises or private 
sector companies where the bonus rate is normally set based on individual 
salary, we, in some years, received less than 1,000 baht [Around £15].
Some staff members were given only 700-800 baht [About £11-13] in that 
year. That was due to the fact that the Department did not allocate the 
bonus according to individual departmental unit’s actual performance 
result. It seemed the Department preferred equally allocating the bonus to 
its staff members. So it seems not effective, I think. On the one hand, the 
Office of Public Sector Development Commission wanted to see bonus 
allocation according to actual performance result; the better performance 
you achieve, the more money is given. On the other hand, the Department 
preferred to give equal bonus to all departmental units as the Department 
regarded the contributions of all departmental units as part o f the 
Department’s achievement. (R31).
In particular it was reported that the Department seemed to find it difficult to achieve 
effective rewards as there was a lack of the alignment between the PMM system at 
the organisational level and performance appraisal at the individual level, meaning 
that the link was broken at the bottom level. For example:
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We must be satisfied with it [The bonus policy] because we don’t have 
any rights to react against it. When it came to us, we just had to distribute 
it to all o f our staff. We really didn’t know what to do, we only followed 
others. (R45).
From the perspective of operational staff, the issue of staff low motivation appeared to 
be complex and mainly caused by the Department’s HR policy. One participant 
claimed that staff were faced with high levels of workload and dissatisfied with the 
Department’s pay increase policy which was set according to the quota policy.
. . ,  When we look at staff in other departmental units, we feel very inferior. 
W e’ve got high workload, but have received a very limited number of 
quotas [for salary/pay increase]. I really don’t know how quotas have been 
determined for our departmental unit! But I only know that w e’ve got high 
workload. W e’ve been working very hard. W e’ve made a lot of  
contributions to the success of the Department. You know what! I just 
think we should have received more quotas in order to meet the 
contribution we’ve made. (R28).
Many o f the interviewees stated that although the Department had the PMM system in 
place, there had been no change in its HR policy to support the practice of the PMM 
system (i.e., the Department’s pay increases policy were not determined according to 
individual staff performance results), and that individual staff performance was still 
rated based on manager discretion under the traditional guidance set by the Office of 
the Civil Service Commission (OCSC), as one respondent explained:
What I’ve observed is that they’re really not measuring individual staff 
performance at all. I think they rather attempt to provide equal opportunity 
[for salary increase and promotion] for all staff. It’s because although you 
may have worked harder than any other staff member, you still receive as 
much as what others do. Because it may be seen that all staff are working 
for the departmental unit. But individual staff contribution may differ 
according to potential. It predominantly depends on managerial discretion. 
(R38).
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Additionally, the respondents appeared to become cynical about the bonus they 
received under the PMM system. It was reported by many respondents that those in 
management positions earned much bigger bonuses than their subordinates, which 
was seen as extremely unfair. One informant gave a detail on this issue:
They [The OPDC] emphasised that senior managers should receive more 
money due to the higher level of responsibility. Assuming, director 
general receives 200 ,000  baht [About £3,000], while an ordinary operative 
employee gets 2 ,000  baht [About £30]. We really differ in terms of 
significance much more than the effort involved. The bonus cannot 
motivate at all. (R20).
. . .  The money the Government gave us or the bonus! Well, if they really 
intended to financially reward us, I think, they shouldn’t have given us 
that money. After we received it, many staff unanimously said, ‘w e’ve 
been working very hard and nearly die now. We don’t think it’s the actual 
bonus.’ It’d better to be termed as the change for a cup of coffee .. .  (R50).
It [The bonus]’s not motivating at all. In terms of the bonus w e’ve 
received, they [the Department] should have spent this money on investing 
more in the IT system. They don’t need to pay us at all with that amount of 
money. I wish they could make our database system as good as that of the 
Department A .. .  (R27).
All interviewees seemed to agree that the Department’ HR policy was incapable of 
providing support for the Department’s operations, in particular the practice of its 
PMM system. There was a feeling that the latter was not yet linked to the performance 
appraisal system at the individual level which was still based on managerial discretion 
Kim (2002, pp. 456-457) points out that the errors caused by managers’ subjective 
assessments frequently weaken the credibility o f the performance appraisals process 
and the lack of credibility also decreases the perception that “pay reflects 
performance”. This phenomenon is similar to the findings from the studies by Radnor 
and McGuire (2004) in which the principle o f performance bonus schemes was not
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seen as reasonable and fair, but led to staff de-motivation (p. 254). The Department’s 
current performance appraisals system appeared to impede the coordination of staff. 
Kim (2002) makes it clear that under the limited budget for pay increases, employees 
often compete with one another for a larger share of the limited amount. This also 
hinders the achievement o f shared goal among employees, or in other words, team- 
working (p.457). Interestingly, unlike the Bank, none of the respondents at the 
Department talked about the Department’s support or the role o f the HR Division or 
the Training Division to help equip them with the necessary knowledge and skills to 
deal with the requirements o f the PMM system. In fact, the Department’s HR policy 
was highly centralised by the OCSC and was often perceived as out of the 
Department’s management control, confirming the warnings o f Sotirakou and Zeppou 
(2006, p. 1298) that the role of HR policy should be to provide extensive training on 
PMM and performance oriented reward system at the local level.
This issue of the integration o f practices around the PMM system has often been 
associated with the availability of dedicated IT resources, especially for performance 
data collection, and performance reporting systems (Kennerley and Neely, 2002, p. 
1236; Bititci et al., 2000, p. 695). At the same time the inadequacy o f IT system can 
become a major barrier to the implementation and development o f PMM (Kennerley 
and Neely, 2002, p. 1236). Many studies have shown the importance o f IT system to 
the success o f PMM (e.g., Tze and Boon, 2008; Cavalluzzo and Ittner, 2004). Given 
this issue and the results reported above, it is not surprising to find that the 
Department had been struggling to establish a capable IT system for many years. The 
current system failed to support the practice of the Department’s PMM system, in 
particular the preparation of performance reports, and resulted in work complexity
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and increased staff workload. Most of the more senior managers felt dissatisfied with 
the capacity of the Department’s IT system. They perceived that it had been 
developed over many years, but still could not support the Department’s operations 
effectively. One of the interviewees referred the Department’s procurement process to 
as a major impediment to the development of the IT system:
.. .  Information technology changes quickly. What w e’ve bought now 
becomes obsolete. Today w e’re looking for new [IT] systems. The 
procurement process remains a problem. At the start, we outlined our basic 
requirements. After that those requirements change. Our requirements 
change over the time. But those vendors that feel uncomfortable to sell 
what we want. This prolongs our procurement process. (R29).
From the perspective of middle managers, the inadequacy o f the Department’s IT 
system in providing support for the operations of the Department was widely 
recognised by all informants. Most felt sceptical about the IT system but tended to 
perceive the causes of failure with the Department’s IT staff and senior managers. For 
example:
Our IT system remains problematic. I don’t know what’ve caused this 
problem. It seemed to me that those who’re appointed as a head of IT 
Centre tend to escape from this job. You know! When reporting to the 
upper level managers, they [senior managers] said that our IT system had 
been successfully established despite the fact that we cannot even make 
use of it. It totally failed. Maybe it’s because of our senior managers. None 
of them is an IT expert. I just feel pity for our IT system which doesn’t 
work. (R45).
W e’re still experiencing the shortage of IT experts. W e’ve put our effort in 
developing our IT system for 10 years. It’s not been successful or a bit 
developed yet. (R36).
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The senior manager who is in charge o f  IT  system must be energetic. As 
least, he/she must have enthusiastically followed up the progress. In  the 
past, those senior managers who are in charge o f IT  system were not in the 
position long enough. As a result, we’ve received messed up master plan, 
messed up specification, messed up auction criteria or that sort o f  thing. It 
becomes that those contractors [IT  consulting companies] have never been 
successful. (R52).
From the perspective o f  operational staff, there was also a perception that the failure 
o f the Department’s IT  system was the lack o f competent IT  s ta ff and the 
incompetence o f  the senior manages in charge o f  IT  policy. The fo llow ing was a 
typical response:
... I got very upset because there are only three s ta ff members who are 
c iv il servants that w ork for the IT  Centre. The rest are those who are 
contract or temporary workers. W e’ re short o f  staff. We don’t know  
whether those who are now working fo r the IT  Centre really have potential 
to perform the job. But we know w e ’re now short o f  IT  staff. In reality, the 
IT  Centre becomes something that we need to recruit more staff. B ut they 
are s till underdeveloped like such old turtles ... (R28).
However, some interviewees pointed out that despite the incompleteness o f the IT  
project, the Department’ s senior managers had decided to approve the closure o f the 
IT  project, which le ft all s ta ff in doubt about their commitment to improvement:
That system is what we get from  the IT  contractor so far and i t ’ s now  
o ffic ia lly  over. I t  should have been successfully completed, but i t ’ s s till 
not completed. W ell! The senior managers jus t have signed a project 
approval form. In  fact, w e’ve received only four subsystems out o f  total 
twelve subsystems according to the agreed contract. There are many 
reasons w hy most o f  these have failed and we even thought that these 
problems should have been sorted out already because we know what 
actions are needed. However, they’ve already approved the completion o f  
the project. (R38).
Respondents at this level seemed to be aware more clearly o f  the impact o f  the
inadequate IT  system 011 P M M  practices. As one explained:
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W e’re ready fo r the strategic plan and KPIs in all aspects, except IT, 
because we’ re short o f  desktop computers. A t present there are a few PCs 
[personal computers] we can use w ith in  our office. W e’ve got to share our 
computers w ith  another division. W e’ve got our own ones, but some o f  
them have broken down ... Our department’s IT  system works very s low ly  
and breaks down very often. A t present, we cannot log in into the tax 
offender suppression system and as a result we cannot submit our report to 
the Department, because o f  such breakdown. The breakdown lasts 
sometimes 3-5 days. Sometimes a week. (R51).
The respondents also revealed that the Department’s IT  system fails to support the tax 
collection performance monitoring and reporting system, which was as part o f  the 
Department’s P M M  system, and this lead to w ork com plexity (i.e., increased 
paperwork). It is interesting to note that different offices were still required to produce 
hard copy performance reports (as a result o f  the Thai O ffic ia l Letter Regulations 
which require each office to keep a copy o f  the original paper documents for proof 
and reference -  in the tru ly  classical bureaucratic way). M any informants seemed to 
feel hopeless and de-motivated as a result o f  the Department’ s IT  system:
I really don’t know w hy w e’ve never made it. I  observe that they’ve tried 
to install such system fo r many times and they always fa il in the end. 
Recently, they’re try ing to make it again. I cannot foresee the positive 
result actually. (R27).
This seems to correspond to the results from the previous studies (e.g., Sotirakou and 
Zeppou, 2006; Chan, 2004) that the capable IT  systems are important to the success o f  
PM M . However it  may also be possible that this level o f  dissatisfaction reflects and 
reinforces the more general feeling o f  dissatisfaction w ith  the nature o f the PM M  
system and the feelings o f exclusion from  involvement in  this so that the lack o f IT  
support reconfirmed the general impression o f  respondents that this was not an issue 
that was regarded as important by the organisation in reality.
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C o n c lu s io n
The themes emerging from respondents’ views o f  the Department’s P M M  system ' 
showed significant differences from  the views o f  Bank respondents. In general it was 
found that although there was often an in itia l appearance o f  the acceptance o f  PM M , 
this was on closer inspection an overly sim plified picture. In  particular, the senior 
managers in the Department were shown to frame P M M  in a way that suggested the 
primacy o f hierarchical authority rather than ‘performance’ as w ith  the Bank. Thus 
although their accounts appeared to support PM M , it seemed that this was only as a 
condition o f  maintaining obedience to centralised requirements. In particular, almost 
all o f  the respondents perceived the Department’s P M M  system as a ‘test’ or a ‘ game’ 
set by the OPDC which required high compliance in order to ‘pass’ and meeting the 
expectations o f  the most senior officials appeared more important than the actual 
performance outcome.
It seemed that s ta ff were using a framing that linked the P M M  frame to the hierarchy 
frame w ith  the latter appearing to operate as the primary frame -  although this was not 
how it often appeared in itia lly  when support was given to the P M M  system. Therefore 
it could be argued that the supportive framing o f P M M  was in fact a ‘ fabrication’ that 
was used by respondents to disguise the real practical primary frame o f  hierarchical 
power. This created a complex interpretation in which it seemed that support had to be 
stated for P M M  (even though as it emerged later, this had little  genuine support in 
practice) in order to avoid challenging the dominance o f  hierarchical authority (which 
would be undermined i f  it  was admitted that a policy that had been imposed from  
above, was not accepted or agreed w ith). Thus by looking at the secondary frames 
behind the prim ary (fabricated) framing o f PM M , it emerged that the real dominance
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in shaping understandings and actions was the power structure o f the Department and 
its bureaucratic logic o f  control. In fact, as responses were taken from respondents at 
progressively lower levels in the Department, the strength o f  the prim ary hierarchical 
authority frame increased and the performance framing decreased. A t the lower levels 
it  seemed that the hierarchical frame took on an explic it primary significance w ith  less 
emphasis on presenting the P M M  system as a legitimate process, this seeming to be 
the result o f  the lower level employees having significantly less involvement in the 
process (other than being ordered to comply w ith  requirements) than those in 
managerial positions (who had lim ited involvement in the design o f  the system but 
had more responsibility fo r its application). Few respondents at any levels but 
especially at lower levels emphasised real benefits to either them or the organisation 
from adopting P M M  but did tend to identify difficulties.
From this perspective it was suggested that the role o f  P M M  w ith in  the Department 
was to operate as a ‘power ritua l’ (Collins, 2004): a situation in which individuals or 
groups engage w ith  each other as ‘ order-givers’ and ‘order-takers’ , resulting in the 
exercise o f D-power (deference-power or order-giving power) rather than E-power 
(efficacy power, based on making things happen). I t  was suggested that this sort o f  
power did not translate into actions that changed things (such as im proving real 
performance) but tended to reproduce existing behaviours to maintain the status quo.
This seemed to be close to the understanding o f  P M M  as a control tool (Greiling, 
2007) associated w ith  strengthening o f  bureaucratic regulation rather than producing 
more flexible and performance-driven behaviour (such as w ith  post-bureaucratic and 
N P M  models; Sanderson, 2001; M cK evitt et a l., 2000; Hoggett, 1996). On this theme
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there also emerged a view  that many managers tended to adopt Theory X  assumptions 
which appeared to encourage a ‘ low discretion syndrome’ (Fox, 1974) and associated 
low  trust. The P M M  system seemed to act in this respect as a focus for underlying 
tensions and dissatisfactions. This was seen in one instance in the expression from one 
unit which was insulted by its exclusion from the process (Gabriel, 1998). Even 
though, w ith  irony, few respondents expressed any positive commitment towards 
being involved in the process, it  seemed that the exclusion had a symbolic 
significance in the context o f  the hierarchical authority (indicating in feriority) rather 
than suggesting offence at not participating in the P M M  process, which again 
highlights the issue o f  its framing as a fabrication.
In fact as more detailed views o f  respondents were explored, it  became clear that 
despite the formal acceptance o f  PM M , there appeared to be little  fu ll commitment, 
even at more senior levels (Cavalluzzo and Ittner, 2004) where nearly all respondents 
placed responsibility for the system’s lim itations not w ith  themselves but w ith  the top 
leader o f  the Department who was seen to hold absolute power. This concern w ith  
fo llow ing authority from  above was apparent also in the form  o f  communication 
adopted fo r the P M M  system which consisted o f  ‘downward instruction’ through 
formal meetings. This was also being reflected in h ighly centralised HR  policy 
(dictated by the OCSC) and the lack o f any integrated training, individual 
development or reward systems to support P M M  (as was the case in the Bank).
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C H A P T E R  S E V E N  
T H E  R E V E N U E  D E P A R T M E N T
This chapter presents the results o f  the investigation o f  the P M M  system o f the 
Revenue Department. As w ith  the Excise Department (previous chapter), the Revenue 
Department operates under the Finance M in is tiy  and is the highest tax collection 
agency, generating more than h a lf o f  the total tax revenue fo r the Government 
(Individual Income Tax, Corporate Income Tax, Value Added Tax, Specific Business 
Tax, Stamp Duties, and Petroleum Income Tax). In 2006, it had 19,812 permanent 
c iv il servants, 12 Regional Revenue Offices, 96 Area Revenue Offices, and 848 Area 
Revenue Branch Offices throughout the country.
To give an overall v iew  o f  the Department o f  Revenue’s organisation structure, its 
organisation chart at the time o f  the study is presented below. L ike  other government 
agencies, it adopted a functional structure, split into a number o f  functional groups for 
specialisation.
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Figure 7.1: The Revenue Department’s Organisation Chart
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This structure was not affected by the introduction o f  PM M , prior to which, in an 
attempt to increase flex ib ility , the Department attempted to in form ally  organise its 
sta ff into teams, each o f  which comprised a sta ff member at level 8 as a team leader 
and 6-7 s ta ff members at the lower ranks as team members. The Department’s overall 
management style, like the Excise Department, seemed to reflect L ike rt and L ike rt’ s 
(1976) Exploitative-Authoritative model. S taff at lower levels claimed that they were 
reluctant to express their genuine views to managers but simply followed directives in 
order to secure favour fo r promotions or pay increases. As a result, there was no 
evidence that the Department put an emphasis on involvement or group decision 
making. The formal organisation o f  the P M M  process was the same as that for the 
Excise Department (to save repetitions, the reader should refer to in the previous 
chapter i f  necessary).
W ith in  the Revenue Department, the Tax Policy and Planning Bureau was responsible 
for preparing strategic/performance plans, KPIs, and standards at the departmental 
level, coordinating w ith  internal units/staff and other government organisations. In 
this regard, the Department’s performance measurement and targets were effectively 
imposed from above. Interestingly, the Department’ s strategic plan was seen by 
almost all interviewees as having failed to help improve organisational performance 
and having resulted in s ta ff being taken away from  the Department’ s key operations. 
Ironically, the strategic planning process did not make use o f  feedback or 
performance data derived from KPIs and the preparation o f  action plans from the 
strategic plan was perceived as time consuming. The respondents at operative level 
appeared to feel most strongly about the consequences o f  the plan.
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Among the more senior managers, respondents expressed dissatisfaction w ith  the 
technical terms used in the strategic plan (which had been translated from  English into 
Thai) and perceived that these terms were d ifficu lt for ordinary people to understand 
and resulted in communication difficulties. The fo llow ing view  was typical:
... I t ’ s got too many KPIs. I  th ink i t ’ s over the top. And what made us a 
headache was the technical terms after translated into Thai. Those terms 
seem indifferent. I t  looks dull and confusing. I t ’ s d ifficu lt to te ll those 
technical terms apart. (R42).
Furthermore, two respondents also pointed out that the improvement requirements 
according o f  the plan were not worth doing. One respondent explained this as follows:
... I f  you asked those operative sta ff directly, they w on’t accept it  [P M M ], 
I  think. What I  mean by ‘ they w on’t accept i t ’ is that they’re not against it, 
but some KPIs force them to leave their main responsibility to do what’re 
required by the KPIs instead. So they keep te lling us that they cannot meet 
the tax revenue target because fo r one day they must c lick 20 items keying 
in performance data into the Department’s database system. They te ll us 
that today they have an appointment w ith  taxpayers. They must go out to 
meet the taxpayers. They’ l l  get some money [tax income] fo r sure. But 
today is also the last day that they must click! They have to stick to KPIs 
first; otherwise they may m in the image o f  the Area O ffice and o f  the 
Regional Office. The image o f  the Regional O ffice also has an effect on 
the image o f  the Department as a whole. (R64).
Here in much the same form  as the Excise Department these more senior managers 
did not automatically, as in the Bank, draw on a performance frame to explain their 
P M M  system but rather located it as a secondary frame in relation o f  hierarchical 
authority and status reputation w ith  other parts o f  the public sector.
A t the level o f  middle managers, there was less concern expressed about weaknesses 
o f the strategic plan, probably because they had less direct involvement w ith  its
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content, simply being the receivers o f decisions made at a higher level and having to 
translate these to local relevance. However, there were generally critical views about 
the organisation o f  the planning process. The fo llow ing was typical:
... Sometimes the preparation o f  the strategic plan takes too much time. 
The form at o f the strategic plan requires us to handle large amounts o f  
paperwork ... W e’re required to w rite  plans, to w rite project plans. We 
have to w rite  a lo t o f  things. It  takes time and wastes papers as w e ll ... 
(R55)
From the perspective o f operational s ta ff there was a wider level o f  dissatisfaction. 
Respondents who worked for the area offices tended to identify more weaknesses than 
those at the head office. The negative impacts o f  the strategic plan on their w ork life  
were identified as follows: unrealistic requirements sometimes leading to fabricating 
performance data; wasting tim e and making w ork more complicated; redundant and 
complicated performance reports; not compatible w ith  the Department’s routine tasks; 
not easy to understand; fa iling  to build trust w ith  staff; and fa iling to motivate staff.
The fo llow ing quotation captured the way the strategic plan was perceived by 
operative staff:
The strategic plan or whatever they call it. I t  brings about lots o f burdens. 
W ell, w e’ve to collect data to produce performance reports. I ’m not sure 
what i t ’ s called. W e’ re required to align our jobs w ith  the Department’s 
strategic plan. From m y opinion, in formulating the Performance 
Agreement, some tasks shouldn’t have been considered qualified enough 
and included. Senior managers and we may have got different ideas. I ’m 
not sure i f  they’ve chosen such tasks because o f sim plicity. But from  m y  
point o f  view, w orking on such tasks or matching the chosen tasks w ith  
the Department’s strategy [paperwork], i t ’ s really nonsense! Those tasks 
may have been regarded by the Department as not too hard to achieve, I 
don’t know. Anyw ay those tasks are wasting our time indeed. (R39).
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This is an interesting quotation that gives a clear indication that these operatives did 
not frame strategic P M M  objectives in terms o f  a performance frame (as was the case 
in the Bank) but rather in a more strong form  o f  the framings found in the Excise 
Department. In the latter case P M M  was generally framed prim arily  through the 
exercise o f  hierarchical authority (rather than ‘ real’ performance) and was largely 
accepted as a set o f  rules that had to be obeyed. Here there is also a challenge to that 
authority (rather than acceptance) in the sense that the application o f  PM M  
undermines the credib ility  o f  the latter.
S ignificantly although this view  was strongly expressed at the operative level it could 
be found in echoes at the more senior level. When asked about how w ell KPIs work, 
one senior management respondent replied that in an imaginary comment to the 
OPDC:
... Y ou ’re measuring our department’s performance. We accept that 
you’ re measuring our performance! But at present, w e’re th inking that 
some KPIs that you’ve set for us may be useless. We don’t have to use 
them. We should have more tim e to do something else more profitable, 
because our main responsibility’s collecting tax revenue. (R65).
In fact there seemed no major differences in the ways the participants at all levels 
responded to the Department’ s KPIs. M ost respondents pointed out that they fe lt the 
P M M  system was made up o f  too many KPIs which were leading to the need to 
undertake many new tasks that were seen as unnecessary, thereby intensifying the 
workloads o f  all. As a m iddle manager pointed out in a typical comment:
... There are too many compulsory performance indicators. I t ’s d iffic u lt to 
specify which ones are qualitative or quantitative; fo r example to save 
water supply, to save the electricity, to save fuel. Our department has to go
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out to meet taxpayers, but they [the OPDC] require us to save fuel by 5% 
based on our last year’ s fuel consumption. How could we do so? I have to 
go out to v is it the taxpayers. I  cannot save fuel at all ... (R55).
I t  is interesting to note that one cause o f some o f  the dissatisfaction appeared to be the 
movement from optional Pis towards compulsory ones. For example:
The number o f  optional performance indicators is decreasing, w hile  that o f  
compulsory indicators is increasing. This becomes a problem and results 
in only paperwork. (R56).
Although this concern was expressed directly in terms o f the effect on the workloads 
o f employees, it is also like ly  to be the case that this moved from  optional indicators 
(under the control o f  the local department and units) to compulsory imposed Pis had a 
symbolic effect in terms o f  the relations o f  discretion available particularly to 
managers. From recalling the discussion o f  high discretion and low  discretion 
syndromes (Fox, 1974) discussed in the previous chapters, it  seems to be like ly  that 
this reduction in discretion (to choose optional Pis) would also lead to a reduction in 
trust between department managers and the w ider bureaucratic authority (mainly the 
OPDC), already suggested in the quotation from  Respondent 39 above. This w ill be 
explored in further detail below. Overall, nearly all participants agreed that 
performance indicators, except tax collection related indicators, were very broad and 
did not f it  the Department’s business, but instead led people to focus only on the 
organisation’s performance score, again reflecting the framing o f  P M M  as a form o f  
‘power game’ as identified in the Excise Department Chapter. In fact, views in this 
department were even stronger as they saw the P M M  process (particularly that part 
which involved it being ranked by its ‘ customers’) as making their position more 
d ifficu lt, as one respondent v iv id ly  described:
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... D ifferent government agencies have different roles. In  particular the 
government agencies in charge o f collecting tax revenue from people, no 
one w ill regard them as good organisations. Because w e’ re taking 
money from  those people. Therefore, there is a big difference between 
what our department’s doing and what the Department o f Public A ffa irs  
is responsible for; helping people. When asking people about how they 
feel about the Department o f Public A ffa ir, they must say this 
organisation is very nice. In contrast, based on the same question and the 
same respondents, our organisation w il l  receive negative perception 
definitely. However, i t ’ s s till part o f  our organisation’s goals [collecting  
tax revenue]. This is a problem. None o f  those people w ill have positive 
view  on our organisation definitely. No one wants their money taken 
from their wallets ... (R44).
This is an interesting perception as it suggests that respondents may actually perceive 
the P M M  system as being associated w ith  a double undermining o f  trust: on the one 
hand, reducing discretion leading to less trust from  higher in the organisation; on the 
other one, a perceived reduction in trust from  clients resulting from  the PM M  
measures that make an already and unavoidable negative perception appear to be 
something o f  a new problem (whereas it was perceived by department members as an 
inevitable issue that was merely being highlighted as a ‘problem’ by the introduction 
o f  the measures). N o t only this but also it was fe lt that some o f  the Pis also introduced 
competition between departmental units, particularly based on location, and could 
therefore further reduce trust w ith in  the organisation. One m iddle manager 
respondent described it as follows;
There are some indicators I strongly disagree w ith. For example, the 
indicator like the number o f  taxpayers filed via Internet. As w e’ve 
known that a m ajority o f  people in our country are still illiterate; so how  
many people in rural areas are good at computer? I  think, i t ’s applicable 
only to those who live in the Bangkok area. When it ’ s been set as one o f  
our performance indicators, we must achieve the assigned target 
according to this indicator ... Because we want those people to submit 
tax payment form  via  Internet, then we have to help them w ith  keying in 
their information or whatever online. What w e’ re doing is to ta lly  wrong, 
but we have to do it. We cannot avoid not doing it. W e’ve been given 
such performance target. I f  we don’t  do so, w hy other area offices are
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still being able to do it? We have to compete w ith  them. Despite we all 
having the same problem, we have to compete w ith  each other under 
such condition. (R49).
Several respondents spoke o f  how the way the performance indicators were used to 
create competition among units under the same cluster was demotivating due to the 
lack o f  control over the main performance objective. The fo llow ing  was a typical 
view:
... In addition to our own department’s performance results, we also share 
certain performance results w ith  other two tax collecting departments, 
which refer to the Revenue Cluster’s performance. This means i f  any o f  
three departments fails to meet or to exceed a revenue target, this w ill 
unavoidably affect other two departments’ performance; despite the fact 
that those other two departments make a positive growth rate, say, o f  20%  
o f the last year’s performance. A lthough those two departments are doing 
their best, they all must collectively lose some performance score. 
Therefore, i t ’s not motivating us. (R44).
A t  the operative level s ta ff spoke about the more direct effects o f  the P M M  system on 
their w ork life, the fo llow ing  respondent g iving a common account o f  how things at 
her office had changed due to one particular PI:
There is one indicator that we cannot comply w ith. You know what? I t ’ s 
about energy saving such as electricity, water supply, or fuel. I t ’s 
unreasonable. They force us to save fuel. The price o f  the fuel has gone so 
high. A lso we have to go out to meet taxpayers almost every day. Our 
office cars are hardly idle. I t ’ s unrealistic. To me, such indicator is weird  
... (R60).
This is interesting as it shows how one particular indicator that is experienced as 
unrealistic and unfair can influence perceptions about the whole system. She 
continued her explanation in more detail:
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... In the past after w ork hours, our office sta ff did not go home yet, but 
wanted to stay un til 5 pm or later, you know? Since the Department 
imposed such performance indicator that requires us to save more energy, 
we have had to turn o f f  the electricity, to turn o f f  air conditioners at given 
hours. Our s ta ff have decided not to w ork late any longer since then 
because the room temperature in the office is norm ally very high. W e’ve 
got to call it a day instead o f  staying longer and making more progress. By  
contrast, we make less progress. In the past we always stayed at the office  
until 6 pm. I f  we didn’t  fin ish our daily jobs, we would stay longer and 
could make more w ork progress. The Department told us that w e’ve got to 
turn o f f  air conditioners after 4 pm. In the past we were always w illin g  to 
stay even until 11 pm. A t the present, the latest time we stay could be only  
5 pm. and we leave the office then. I t  is this indicator which stimulates us 
to do so. I  think, the indicator has a huge negative impact on our w ork life. 
Although it seems insignificant, we have to comply w ith  its requirements. 
I t ’ s part o f  our performance. (R60).
This response is w orthy o f  long quotation because it raises a number o f  interesting 
points that reflect issues raised by other s ta ff and respondents in the Excise 
Department (o f the previous chapter). First, it  can be noted that there are issues that 
relate to the organisation o f  trust and discretion. It can be remembered that Fox’s 
(1974) book was entitled ‘Beyond Contract’ and sought to explain how different 
forms o f  discretion and trust in w ork would have influences on performance and 
cooperation between groups and individuals. Here in the above quotation however, it 
can be seen that the imposition o f a particular performance indicator created not only 
perceived distrust associated w ith  a lack or reduction o f  discretion but also seemed to 
result in the previous willingness o f  employees to w ork ‘beyond contract’ to be 
removed and for them to move towards a position where they sim ply followed rules 
and instructions rather than showing individual motivation and commitment to the 
quality and quantity o f  their work. In this respect, therefore, it  appeared that this 
effect o f  the P M M  system was the exact opposite o f  what was actually intended (that 
is, greater commitment and more improved performance). Second it can be noted that 
throughout the quotation above there is a repeated use o f  terms such as ‘ imposed’ ,
2 2 2
CHAPTER SEVEN THE REVENUE DEPARTMENT
‘ have to ’ , ‘ requires us’ , which emphasises how the P M M  system is framed strongly 
w ith in  the notion o f  hierarchical authority and it seems that it is this framing that 
leads to the actions that undermine the actual performance requirements, it being 
reflected in the phrase ‘ it  is this indicator which stimulates us to do so’ -  suggesting 
that employees have developed this understanding (framing) o f  how the system works 
and the sort o f  response that is appropriate to this.
Therefore as the P M M  system seemed to be operating to provide dysfunctional 
effects in both terms o f  performance and individual attitudes, it is necessary to 
examine in greater detail how the Department organised itse lf to deal w ith  the P M M  
requirements and whether this contributed to this apparently negative response 
pattern. From the immediate account provided above it appears that there was lim ited 
effective alignment between the high level organisational objectives (as set by the 
OPDC) and those o f  the operating objectives and indicators at the lower levels. This 
can be contrasted w ith  the approach o f  the Bank which appeared to have strong 
alignment and ‘ f i t ’ between its performance and other HR systems. Here, as w ith  the 
Excise Department, there was strong determination o f  objectives from  the top but it 
appeared d ifficu lt fo r this to be made to f i t  effectively w ith  what was perceived to be 
appropriate w ork activities at the operational level. This can be seen as the reason 
why respondents used the prim ary frame o f  hierarchical authority to define the PM M  
system rather than the performance frame found in the Bank.
In particular, in try ing to understand the way in which P M M  systems are adopted and 
used, this account provides evidence o f  the usefulness o f  a qualitative approach that 
focuses on the experiences and perceptions o f organisation members. For instance, it
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uncovers levels o f  d ifficu lty  that m ight be not apparent from sim ply observing the 
formal structure o f  the organisation and its formal policies. This is the case in relation 
to team w orking which has often been seen as associated w ith  performance driven 
cultures (Holbeche, 2005) and which form ally appeared to be apparent in the 
Department. However as w ill be seen below, although team w orking was form ally in 
existence the experienced reality o f  what this involved was very different to what 
might have been expected. M any organisational units had their s ta ff allocated to what 
were called teams by organising them into groups o f  individuals from across different 
ranks. In practice this assured that rather than operating as an organic unit, these 
‘teams’ tended sim ply to reproduce the hierarchical authority structure o f  the wider 
organisation. Individual tasks were typ ica lly  broken down from the tasks at the team, 
unit, and departmental levels, respectively but there seemed no unified shared goals 
across units or w ith in  teams. The reason seemed to be that individual employees were 
given clearly defined operational tasks that were expected to be done individually. As 
a result s ta ff members interacted w ith  each other and performed jobs w ith in  their 
individual areas o f  responsibility that did not require coordinated skills or mutual 
judgements. In consequence, the group performance appeared to be no more than the 
summation o f  each group member’ s individual contribution. In addition, the teams did 
not facilitate greater employee participation in operating decisions which remained 
under the control o f  the most senior members and were not delegated.
I t  was therefore not surprising that expressions o f  feeling part o f  a team were not 
found in the accounts o f  the respondents at any level. The term ‘team’ appeared only 
to exist as part o f  formal organisational structure; it was not considered w ith in  a
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performance frame or even mentioned specifically w ith in  the hierarchical frame, 
suggesting that, in practice, it held little  real meaning for understanding or action.
In fact, the more common theme to emerge from  respondents when talking about 
relationships w ith in  the Department was the issue o f  conflict and disagreement. For 
example, as the more senior managers commented:
Everyone is h igh ly individualistic. Everyone doesn’ t like change. 
Everyone’s always insisting that they’ re right; we must put new ideas into 
their thinking. W e’ve been doing brain storming but this makes it more 
d ifficu lt fo r those sta ff to work as a team ... (R44).
The level o f  coordination isn’t as high as I  wish, because everyone has 
their own boxes. They stick to different regulations. There are still 
conflicts among those staff. I  have to keep encouraging them to w ork  
more collectively. (R42).
This type o f  view  was reflected also among the m iddle managers and the fo llow ing  
quotation again interestingly captures the sense o f  deferral to hierarchical authority 
and gives an insight into w hy w ith  this attitude it appeared d iffic u lt to implement 
genuine team working rather than reproducing existing power relationships on a 
smaller scale:
Frankly speaking, our department is like a good boy o f  the Government.
We can do what the Government wants us to do. We always do. W ith in  
the Department, although w e’ve achieved the assigned goals or w e’ve 
achieved the most advanced IT  system, the coordination among 
departmental units, the interaction between people remain weak ... (R62).
The issue o f  shared goals also raised some sceptical comments from most respondents 
and appeared to confirm  this fragment position, the fo llow ing being a typical 
response:
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What do you mean by shared goals? Because w ith in  our office, there are 
almost no shared goals, I think. A l l  tasks are different and allocated to 
individual s ta ff to carry out. W ell, i f  we ta lk about the shared goals at the 
unit level, we hardly have shared goals as w ell because all tasks are 
norm ally separated. D ifferent s ta ff members are w orking on different 
operating tasks ... (R 41).
A t the operational level, respondents pointed out that task allocation w ith in  units was 
typ ica lly  done according to an informal structure that reflected the interests o f  
particular managers’ purposes. A  m ajority o f  respondents claimed that this led to high 
levels o f  competition fo r promotion among employees by seeking to please individual 
managers. When asked about the extent s ta ff coordinated w ith  each other, one 
operational respondent confirmed the fragment view  o f  the middle managers above:
... A ll the responsibilities o f  the Bureau are normally separately allocated 
to all s ta ff members. A ll s ta ff members are responsible for specific jobs ... 
(R35).
We each have a clear role and responsibility. We know who is doing what. 
M y  job  is clearly defined as I  already to ld you. For others, they are dealing 
w ith  handling financial related matter. And still others are dealing w ith  tax 
returns and refunds. We each have a clear and separate role. (R40).
This fragmented pattern o f  w orking seemed to be encouraged by the importance o f  
legal requirements that governed the nature o f  its actions and meant that there were 
lim ited options to restructure w ork processes in more innovative ways. Legal 
regulations made it d ifficu lt to combine operating units due to the specialisation 
involved and this was also seen to operate against a ‘performance culture’ which was 
perceived as too risky in relation to the very careful and standardised w ork that had to 
be done to ensure legal compliance ( it being clear that many o f  the respondents in this 
department were committed to the principles o f  a ‘professional bureaucracy’ 
[M intzberg, 1983; 1981] which was seen as opposed to the notion o f  high
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performance based on quantity rather than quality). As one senior manager pointed 
out:
The Thai government system too relies on the regulations that apply to all 
government organisations. From m y point o f  view, different regulations 
should have applied to different types o f  government organisations. It 
seems to me that the Government applies one law fo r all tasks o f  the 
Government. So i t ’ s not right at all. Some tasks should be flexible. Some 
tasks should use another type o f  regulations. That’ s my opinion ... (R42).
This was also reflected in the emphasis that senior managers placed on the formal 
qualifications o f  their s ta ff (another feature o f  the classic bureaucratic principles):
W e’ve high quality o f  staff. I  dare say so because I ’m a member o f  many 
boards o f  directors in several state enterprises. M ore than 70% o f  our s ta ff 
members [in  the Department] have more than one degree. This isn’ t jus t a 
new phenomenon. But i t ’ s been w ell established by our department’s clear 
rules and regulations e.g., promotion criteria. For example, i f  you hold 
only one degree, you get a given score [used in getting promoted]. I f  you 
obtain more than one degree, you’ ll get a higher score. So those sta ff 
members are attempting to gain extra knowledge. The more educated 
those sta ff become, the higher quality o f w ork we have achieved. In many 
government departments, from m y experience, only 6% o f  all employees 
obtain a bachelor degree as the highest educational qualification. In some 
organisations, s ta ff members w ith  a bachelor degree account fo r 50% or 
less than that. But here w e ’ve got more than 70%. (R44).
This specialised and ‘ s ilo ’ nature o f  the Department was also reflected in the way that 
respondents spoke about the w ider organisational processes associated w ith  PM M , 
specifically, H R  policy and the IT  system. Whereas in the responses from the Bank 
these two processes were defined as supporting the primary P M M  system (through the 
performance frame), here they were seen as having little  real integration.
There appeared to be no strong linkage between the P M M  system and the 
Department’s H R  policy in terms o f  individual performance appraisals and
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compensation practices and the Department’ s H R  policy was cited by all respondents 
as a problematic area, associated as being responsible fo r s ta ff shortages and low  staff 
morale. Individual salary increases were based on an annual performance appraisal 
rating but almost all respondents fe lt that salary increases were not directly under their 
control and often pointed out that they had never known what the criteria used for 
their annual performance appraisals were. The Department also rewarded operative 
employees w ith  bonuses according to the Department’s performance result but most 
participants claimed that the bonuses they received had little  to do w ith  individual 
performance and were so small as to be meaningless, the total o f  amount o f  money 
being determined by the Government and the OPDC. A ll respondents s im ilarly felt 
that the criteria for individual performance appraisal or for promotion were not clear 
as neither were the career paths for employees. One senior manager criticised the 
Government’s overall H R  policy as the basis for these problems:
The performance appraisal criteria are not clear. Moreover, the rotation o f  
positions is regarded as punishment. This results in in flex ib ility . W e’ve 
wasted a lot o f  money. The cause o f  such problem is this [the 
Government] system ... (R64).
Such a response from  a more senior manager is interesting as it suggests a sense o f  
powerlessness against the ‘ system’ that reflects as in the previous chapter the 
embeddedness o f  hierarchical authority and the ways in which this leads employees to 
frame their activities and policies in restricted terms rather than through a more 
entrepreneurial perspective o f  the sort found in the Bank.
L ike  the senior managers, almost all m iddle managers were keen to emphasise the 
educational qualifications o f  their employees and the high quality o f  their work:
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Our department has a large number o f  employees; this leads to high 
competition. Those who have passed our recruitment and selection criteria 
have high quality, I think. They all pursue se lf development, each o f  them 
obtains at least one first degree and many o f  them hold two bachelor 
degrees and one master degree. About 20% o f  our s ta ff members obtain a 
master degree. Everyone is energetic to learn. (R66).
As before this is interesting as it  may be one reason for the resistance to the principle 
o f P M M  given that in addition to the hierarchical authority frame, the respondents in 
this department also seemed to use an equally strong ‘academic expert frame’ which 
defined w ork performance in terms o f  specialised formal expertise.
This frame can be seen to be in tension w ith  the ‘performance frame’ which was 
perceived as emphasising merely quantity rather than quality and, possibly as a result 
o f the introduction o f  the P M M  system, also in tension w ith  the hierarchical authority 
frame which had been associated w ith  the performance frame, through the experience 
o f the P M M  system, as a double challenge to the respected academic expert frame 
which they had traditionally, and continued to do, used to understand their roles and 
status w ith in  the organisation.
In fact this com plexity may also have contributed to the rather paradoxical result that, 
on the one hand, managers would sometimes ta lk w ith  pride about the qualifications 
and capabilities o f their staff, but on the other hand, would complain about their poor 
attitude and need to be monitored and instructed (that latter being possibly associated 
w ith  their perceived need to enforce the performance frame o f  understanding, to 
maintain hierarchical authority, against their practical understanding o f  a more 
bureaucratic framing o f  everyday activities). Possibly as a result o f  these conflicting
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framings, all respondents admitted that the level o f  s ta ff motivation had gone down in 
recent times. The fo llow ing were typical concerns:
... Another problem is that w e ’ re facing sta ff shortages. We have a lim ited  
number o f  staff. There are more than ten thousands o f  taxpayers [in  our 
responsible area], but we don’ t have enough sta ff to deal w ith  them. We 
have to put the reduction o f  the tax offenders the top priority. We 
acknowledge that there exist a number o f  the tax offenders, but we don’t 
have enough s ta ff to deal w ith  all taxpayers. (R41).
Some middle management respondents also pointed to the rotation o f  salary increases 
w ith in  some organisational units which appeared to reflect a reluctance to engage in 
the judging o f  s ta ff performance which, in turn, made it d ifficu lt for other units to do 
otherwise:
They may fear their subordinates. They fear that their subordinates w on’ t 
obey anymore. They may fear that those who didn’ t get salary increase 
would feel de-motivated. But they look over the fact that those who w ork  
hard would feel de-motivated as well. I  don’t fear m y subordinates feeling  
demotivated, I  only th ink that those who w ork w ell must get what they 
deserve. (R41).
... Managers prefer to compromise w ith  their subordinates and to avoid 
conflict at work. Sometimes there were no outstanding s ta ff members 
really ... (R49).
From the perspective o f  operational s ta ff there were issues w ith  the way that staffing 
levels were handled, w ith  the result that what appeared as being a positive response 
resulted in actual negative outcomes. As one respondent explained:
... The H R  policy may have been mistaken since the beginning. W ell, they 
[The OCSC] are attempting to provide government employees w ith  more 
opportunity fo r career advancement. When we made a request fo r more 
management positions, they did give us what we wanted, but at the same 
time, they abolished some positions at the operative level in return. N ow
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w e’ve got plenty o f  grade 8 level-positions [fo r m iddle managers], but 
lack operative staff. (R39).
This illustration again illustrates the absence o f  thoroughly aligned policies and the 
disconnection between a key H R  policy and performance objectives; it can be 
contrasted w ith  the bank situation where HR policies were tigh tly  linked to their 
effect on performance related behaviours (again reflecting the Schuler and Jackson’s 
[1987] approach to H R  ‘ f i t ’ and the identification o f  the behaviours needed to meet 
strategic goals and the alignment o f  policies to produce such behaviours -  whereas in 
the current case, the H R  policies seemed to w ork in opposition to the behaviours 
needed for performance and to demotivate these rather than stimulate them). 
Respondents appeared to be constructing a view  o f  their organisation in negative 
terms, as dissatisfaction appeared to spread to cover most aspects o f  activity, 
associating these w ith  poor management o f  human resources. The fo llow ing  quotation 
captures this general spirit and, even i f  the claims made were not accurate, it  reflects 
the apparent tendency to perceive the organisation as in a fa iling state that seems to be 
associated w ith  the changes in w orking practices associated w ith  the introduction o f  
PM M . For example:
Our department recruited a large number o f  staff, and many o f  those s ta ff 
have now le ft the Department. This is because w ith in  our department there 
are high workloads unlike other government organisations. In particular, 
for pay in which many people perceive that our department provides better 
pay than other departments. This is not true at all. We may have received 
less compensation, in particular lower bonus. In fact, we’ve been working  
harder than any other department. (R40).
These sorts o f  negative comments exposed not only a lack o f  trust in the ability  o f  
management to look after employees, but also seemed often to indicate tensions in 
relation to dealing w ith  change. In fact, although there was a widespread view  that the
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existing pay and reward policy set by the OPDC was uncompetitive, respondents also 
tended to relate the problems w ith  motivation and turnover to attitudinal issues. For 
example:
So far, most o f  the Department’ s employees are adaptable. But new 
generation employees are a b it less tolerant. The old generation employees 
who are often stereotyped as inflexible have been w illin g  to adjust 
themselves to the new w ork condition. They’ve attempted to learn to 
operate computer equipment and that sort o f  thing. I t ’ s only those young 
generation employees that are not tolerant and decide to leave the 
Department in the end. (R39).
This quotation above is interesting as it suggests not only that existing employees 
have responded positively to imposed changes but that this effort has not been 
appreciated (stereotyped as inflexible) and that loyalty was not respected. Although 
this was not directly linked to the P M M  system, it can seem that the introduction o f  
this system brought a number o f pressures to the surface and intensified existing 
tensions that make these, such as the inadequacy o f  some H R  practices, appear as 
larger issues than they had previously done. For example, one respondent noted that 
there was now more pressure for individuals to promote themselves w ith  managers in 
order to secure the performance ratings linked to promotion:
... Everyone has to show o f f  in front o f  their boss. Everyone has to 
establish their own marketing strategy. I t ’ s impossible at all that you do 
nothing and then get the highest salary increase. To be successful, you 
should have done a good job  and make your boss favour you. You may 
fa il to get promoted despite you having done a good job, i f  you don’ t 
present your contribution to your boss ... (R47).
It was certainly not the case that nepotism and favouritism were absent before the 
introduction o f  PM M , but it  now seemed to appear that the deliberate need to secure 
performance ratings had made this more important (rather than as such a system
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would be intended to do, making it less so and dependent on objective merit). This 
confirms the important point that where the commitment to P M M  remains as largely 
rhetorical or imposed on top o f  existing practices, rather than replacing them, then its 
intended effects can be undermined by the persistence o f  the status quo (as been seen 
already w ith  the dominance o f  the hierarchical frame in respondents’ accounts rather 
than the performance frame which was apparent in the Bank). Therefore, despite the 
introduction o f  strategic plan and KPIs, the Department’s individual performance 
appraisal process s till relied on the OCSC guidance in which managerial discretion 
was the major determinant o f  results. M any respondents fe lt that they were not given 
adequate information on the criteria used or how individual s ta ff performance was 
rated and ranked by their managers:
I ’ve been here for 5-6 years and I ’ve witnessed the rotation o f  salary 
increases among staff, whether their performance is good or bad ... (R35).
M ost o f  the senior managers were also dissatisfied w ith  the bonus plan, which they 
too saw as being disconnected in reality from the process o f  performance and 
determined by the amount o f  overall money available to distribute which was usually 
small and meant that it was not appreciated by sta ff or seen as appropriate fo r their 
efforts, but by introducing even small differences, provided the grounds fo r conflicts. 
The fo llow ing was a typical account:
Y ou ’d better not ta lk about it [the bonus plan], I  think, because the senior 
managers are the target o f  criticisms every year. The sta ff always compare 
the bonus to that o f  local government organisations. In particular we have 
a large number o f  staff, w e’ve got to a large number o f  sharers ... Instead 
o f being a m otivating tool fo r our staff, the bonus becomes a tool that 
leads to conflicts between people. For example, w hy M r. A  gets more 
money than M r. B, though the difference is only 100 or 200 baht [about 
£1.5-£3.0 at the tim e] ... (R65).
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A t the level o f  m iddle managers there seemed to be mostly indifference and 
disillusionment towards the bonus plan which again appeared to reflect both the 
perceived unfairness o f  the system and the relatively small amounts o f  bonus 
payments involved. For example:
When compared w ith  other government departments, our bonus is less 
than it should be. But I  don’ t take it seriously. (R66).
[The bonus] I t ’ s not m otivating at all. So far, a number o f  c iv il servants in 
many government departments have transferred to local government 
organisations in which travel packages are being offered as bonus to their 
staff. Our department s ta ff have been w orking very hard. W e have to 
depend only on salary, w hile  the bonus w e’ve received seems very small 
(R43).
But from the perspective o f  respondents at the operative level there appeared to be 
greater discontent about the system. One respondent put it in the fo llow ing terms 
which captured more graphically the feelings given by most at this level:
I t ’ s absolutely not appealing at all. By contrast, it turns to be an outrage. 
They [the OPDC] shouldn’t affirm  that i f  we w ork hard, we then w ill be 
rewarded. In fact, i f  they don’t do so, we still must do it. A fte r w e ’ve done 
it, it  seems to us that they’ re lying. W e’ve put our effort into it. W e’ve 
worked on it. W e’ve attempted to achieve it. W e’ve done a lot. When it 
[bonus] came to us, i t ’ s very small. Anyway, they shouldn’t have referred 
to it  as the reward. They’d better te ll us that i t ’s our duty that we must do 
it, or that what we’ve done significantly contributes to the Department, the 
nation as a whole, or whatever. I t ’ s a lot better for us to hear that. (R39).
I ’m not satisfied w ith  it [bonus] because I know it was not transparent. 
The way the amount o f  money was allocated is not clear. The small 
amount o f  money ju s t appeared on my bank statement. I f  asked to what 
extent I fe lt excited: not much! Especially when compared to other 
departments in which their s ta ff were delighted because it was a better 
reward. We really don’t  know how they [the Department] determined sta ff 
bonus. (R34).
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These above comments are interesting because they reflect not only on the issue o f  the 
value o f  bonus rewards but also are suggesting o f  a strong emotional reaction that 
appears to be potentially linked to the issue o f  trust and discretion. In  the first 
quotation above in particular, returns to the issue o f  insults discussed in the previous 
chapter where it can be recalled that according to Gabriel (1998): “ Insults include 
behaviour or discourse, oral or written, which is perceived, experienced, constructed, 
and at times intended as slighting, hum iliating, or offensive”  (p. 1331). In  the previous 
chapter the nature o f  the insult was around the issue o f  a group’s exclusion from  the 
strategic plan, but here it appears to be experienced more as slighting, that is, that the 
bonus disregards the hard w ork that operatives perceive themselves to have 
undertaken and causing a sense that the small bonus is an insult because o f  this lack o f  
recognition. The emotional tone o f  both these accounts also suggests that the way the 
system has operated to emphasise performance but only produces in fe rio rly  perceived 
rewards could be also seen as a breach o f  the psychological contract. According to 
Conway and Briner (2005) breaches o f  psychological contract can occur fo r four main 
reasons:
1) inadequate human resource policies, that is where policies are poorly 
developed or implemented, and also where “ there is a mismatch between 
management communications about human resource policies and what 
employees actually experience”  (p.67);
2) employees feel a lack o f  support from the organisation or supervisors;
3) previous individual experiences o f  other organisations breaching the 
psychological contract;
4) when employees ‘“ compare their deals unfavourably w ith  other employees 
and perceive inequality”  (p. 68).
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From the quotations and the previous views o f  respondents across levels (above) it 
seems that at least conditions 1, 2 and 4 appeared to be present in this department. It is 
not therefore surprising that respondents appeared to feel the emotions identified by 
Conway and Briner (2005) as being associated w ith  breaches, see Table 7.1 below, 
and what is significant from  the responses o f  respondents, most o f these feelings seem 
to be present, often in the same individual, suggesting that the psychological contract 
is in a poor state in the Department.
Table 7 .1 ; The Consequences of Breach :
Things a Person M ight Feel, Think, and Do Following Psychological C ontract Breach
Feel Think Do
• Anger • ‘How can I trust this organisation any • Put in less effort
• Violation more?’ • Not prepared to go the extra
• Upset • ‘I’m not going to put myself out again’ mile for the organisation
• Dissatisfaction • ‘What’s the point in being loyal when • Refuse to work beyond their
• Betrayal they behave in this way?’ contract
• Sadness • ‘How dare they treat me like this?’ • Retaliate, being late, leaving
early, being difficult.
Source: Conway and Briner (2005, p.70)
And, i f  not the entire cause, the introduction o f  P M M  would seem to have played an 
important part. For example, although it  could not be claimed that P M M  caused 
inadequate H R  policies (1), the focus that P M M  created tended to expose the latter in 
a particularly clear way, although in the other cases, issues associated w ith  P M M  do 
seem to have had a more direct impact (that is lack o f  support from  supervisors, such 
as the disaffection o f  m iddle and senior managers, and perceived inequalities between 
departments and units caused by KPIs).
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Some o f  the reasons fo r this apparent disruption o f  psychological contracts more 
directly associated w ith  the P M M  system can be explored, looking firs tly  at the issue 
o f  setting KPIs and performance targets. As stated previously, the performance 
targets were norm ally imposed by the upper levels w ith in  the hierarchy without 
consultation. This increased the level o f  resistance to performance targets and 
deteriorated the value o f  P M M  system. A t senior management level this seemed to be 
largely accepted as inevitable and there appeared to be some cynicism towards the 
process. For example:
W ith in  the Thai government setting, the power distance between the 
senior and the ju n io r s till matters. For example, when the Department’s 
proposing forecasted tax revenue based on its baseline data, they [The 
M in is try  and other parties] always insist that the Permanent Secretary 
wants a given figure. F ina lly  we all have to set the government budget 
based on that figure. It isn’t based on any factors at all. I t ’ s only the fact 
that they want that figure. (R44).
I t ’ s d ifficu lt to say. For our side, w e’ve to defend our estimated figure. I 
understand that the figure forecasted by our sta ff is based on the fact. But 
the upper levels always want a bigger one in order to balance their 
expenditure. V ery often, that figure flies to us, it is not based on any fact. 
A fte r w e’ve taken such figure, we really don’ t know how to push it away. 
I t ’ s absolutely not based on the fact. (R42).
W e’ re ready to w ork  under the key performance indicators. W e’ve also 
thought that i t ’ s not as effective as you [the O PDC]’re expecting. We have 
to ask you; before you’ re imposing KPIs onto the Department, have we 
ever achieved tax revenue targets? Yes, w e’ve already achieved all o f  the 
targets. Y ou ’ re introducing KPIs into our w orking system, w hile  w e ’re 
given the same sort o f  targets. So what? Because those targets are what 
you ’ve set, but not what we want to see. (R64).
What is significant from the above quotes is that they appear to show a lack o f  
confidence at the more senior level in the robustness o f  the target setting process and 
it can be expected that this w ill be inevitably understood by lower level employees,
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even i f  the dissatisfaction is not voiced openly, through the lack o f  enthusiasm and 
apparent personal commitment to the targets (which was a feature o f  the Bank). Any  
perceived lack o f  commitment in senior managers is like ly  to create the conditions for 
the firs t type o f  psychological contract breach, by formal communications not 
matching w ith  experience, and the second type, by creating an anxiety that i f  senior 
sta ff are not committed then there w ill not be real support for those lower down. 
Although this effect cannot be directly tested w ith  the present data, the accounts o f  
operatives and m iddle managers (anger and indifference respectively) suggest that 
even i f  such top management attitudes are not causing the disaffection, they do little  
to redress it. This therefore seems like ly  to maintain the position o f  the P M M  system 
as being concerned w ith  more o f  the preservation o f  hierarchical power than w ith  the 
management o f  actual performance.
For example, from  the perspective o f  the m iddle manager respondents there was a 
shared view  o f  the goal setting process in which all respondents viewed it as a top 
down approach in which they expressed little  evidence o f  trust or confidence. For 
example:
M ost o f  things [the action plans and KPIs] have been already done from  
upper levels. However, the final outcome is not always what w e’ve 
expected. Those senior managers must have taken something from  the 
upper level managers already. We just have to agree. (R43).
The Department calls us in to discuss performance targets every year. But 
whether they listen to us or not is another point because the Department’ s 
goals and targets are already received from the Government. (R49).
I  th ink i t ’ s not fa ir fo r our department, because they [the Government] 
focus only on how much tax revenue we can collect for them. (R55).
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In these accounts can be seen the combined evidence o f  sadness and upset rather than 
anger (Conway and Briner, 2005) as the respondents seemed to be resigned to the fact 
that they would play little  real part in the process and suggested that this appeared 
more like an ‘empty ritua l’ . This can be seen also to echo what was discussed in the 
previous chapter about the exercise o f  ‘D-power’ (deference power) rather than ‘E- 
power’ (efficacy-power) (Collins, 2004), in which compliance is to the rank o f  
seniority (position power; George and Jones, 2005) rather than based on the evidence 
o f turning claims into actions. The lack o f  enthusiasm shown by the m iddle manager 
respondents could be in conform ity w ith  C ollins’s (2004) claim that having to 
participate in ‘power rituals’ (that is to act as order-takers in deference to others’ 
order-giving under conditions where they have little  control; Doern and Goss, 2009) 
acts to drain emotional energy in individuals in subordinate positions, resulting in a 
loss o f  enthusiasm and an unwillingness to take initiatives (Collins, 2004, ch. 3). As 
previously discussed, such reactions are the opposite o f  what is intended to be created 
by a P M M  system which should show the exercise o f  E-power through getting things 
done and increasing emotional energy and stimulating higher performance.
This emphasis on conform ity and taking orders in a routine form was more apparent 
even in the respondents at operative level. As respondents explained:
I t ’ s a top down approach in which we have only to fo llow  our supervisor’ s 
directives. I  don’t know i f  i t ’ s also been found in any other government 
organisation. But we here must do what the senior managers te ll us to do.
It  seems to me that despite the fact that w e’ re allowed to express our 
opinion or argue against them, they seem not to listen to us ... 
Participation in meetings? Problem-solving! I rather would like problem­
solving. I f  we had a chat, and they gave us advice like you should do this 
or do that. Things could get better then. Or even every month we should 
have discussed our problems and how to f ix  the problems together. (R40).
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W e’re not part o f  such process [the goal setting]. In  practice, they always 
command us clearly to do what they want us to do. In terms o f  KPIs for 
this year, they provide our area office w ith  clear goals and targets. We 
must achieve this, achieve that, blah, blah, blah, and then we w ill get 1, 2, 
3, 4, or 5 marks. W e’ re expected to do what we’ re told. (R47).
They may perceive that w e ’ve already got high workload. W hy do we 
have to collect those data? W hy has such target been set in the w ay it has? 
Though we fin a lly  accept it, it  always begins w ith  the feeling o f  resistance. 
A fte r that, everything turns to be d ifficu lt. (R39).
There are very few people w ho’ re interested in the Department’s 
performance results so far. We just carry on our duty. Our big boss is 
always complaining about our office ’s performance; w hy we couldn’t 
achieve this, w hy we failed to meet that performance target, w hy our tax 
revenue dropped. W hy should operative sta ff like us have to pay attention 
to it? I t ’ s not our concern at all. Salary is s till salary. W e’re not interested, 
whether we get salary increase or not. (R46).
O nly one thing that the Department hasn’ t achieved yet is its s ta ff 
happiness. Apart from  this problem, the Department’s exceeded all set 
targets. (R34).
In these views the response seems to be more negative than in the case o f  the middle 
managers and rather than passive resignation seems to be more towards dissatisfaction 
and violation (Conway and Briner, 2005), as shown in the sense o f  resentment in the 
first quotation above ( ‘w e’re allowed to express our opinion . . [but] they seem not to 
listen to us’ , which would be consistent w ith  the type 1 breach o f psychological 
contract, above, involving a gap between what is claimed and what is experienced; 
which could also be seen as a form o f  ‘reneging’ which has been shown by Robinson 
and Morrison, 2000, as a cause o f  breach), and in the second quotation where the 
phrase ‘blah, blah, blah’ , suggests that there is little  real connectedness between the 
orders o f  managers and the respect o f  operatives expected to carry them out (again 
suggesting empty D-power rather than E-power) and consistent w ith  a type 2 breach 
where there is seen to be little  genuine support from  managers. In the th ird quote there
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also seems an indication o f  the effect o f  moderate resistance (rather than direct 
retaliation) reflected in the sense o f  ‘not being prepared to go the extra m ile ’ , by 
questioning the legitimacy o f  the P M M  demands (Conway and Briner, 2005, p. 70). 
This response appeared also to be recognised by more senior managers who placed 
the blame w ith  the m inistry-level OPDC. The fo llow ing was a typical response:
Whether a top down approach is used, it depends on the audience [the 
OPDC]; how much they stick to their belief, how much they’ re open to 
feedback. I f  they’ re listening to feedback from the bottom, the use o f  a top 
down approach is not a problem. They must pay attention to what the 
operators th ink about the performance indicators they’ve set and how w ell 
feedback is consistent w ith  the way the indicators operate ... (R44).
W e’ve witnessed an increase in the number o f  performance reports but in 
fact, w e ’re s till doing business as usual ... I don’t th ink I considerably 
benefit from the performance measurement data. I t  has been said that we 
don’t need to pay much attention to the strategies that are not involved  
w ith  performance score ... (R42).
Again this supports the view  o f  the predominance o f  D-power, as even the more 
senior managers seek locate responsibility fo r what appears to be a recognised 
problem as something that is beyond their control and responsibility, this being like ly  
to contribute to a sense o f  a lack o f  genuine support from  management in making the 
PM M  system w ork effectively.
... I  fu lly  admit that the Department can achieve any goals by using any 
means. Just asking any amount, for example, at the m id o f  the fiscal year. 
The Department never says ‘no’ , but only ‘yes’ and ‘yes’ . And i t ’ s gone 
mad. I t ’ s been able to provide all o f  what the Government wants. In doing 
so, whether its employees almost die or not, who care? The Department 
jus t puts the goal achievement the first. (R47).
A t the m iddle manager level, respondents also pointed to inadequate support from the 
OPDC in terms o f  training and mentoring and claimed that the OPDC lacked
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sufficient understanding on the Department’ s nature o f  business. Again it can be 
suggested that regardless o f  the truth o f  such claims, the tendency for managers to 
want to pass the blame for an unpopular po licy upwards, supports the view  o f  the 
dominance o f  hierarchical authority and position power rather than a firm  focus on a 
genuine performance frame w ith in  which to structure activities.
In fact when asked about commitment to the P M M  policy members o f  the 
management team did not express firm  support but rather appeared to regard it as 
something imposed and that was unsatisfying and stressful and made little  difference 
to actual performance and could even detract from it. In continuing the themes 
previously exposed, this lack o f commitment appeared to be associated w ith  the need 
to comply w ith  hierarchical authority which appeared in nearly all cases as the 
prim ary frame used by respondents w ith  P M M  being framed as a secondary frame 
that had to be interpreted only in the light o f  the former. This appeared as being 
reflected in the formal ways in which P M M  objectives were communicated, which 
was generally through meetings between representatives o f  different levels, making 
an approach which retained the top-down direction and order-giving style, rather than 
encouraging w ider involvement through participative discussion. For example:
... We admit that some o f  indicators which have been set only by those 
responsible persons who lead the operators. I  strongly agree that we must 
have such indicators, but we must have a ta lk between the operators and 
those who set the performance indicators. (R41).
Generally I  delegate my authority to m y subordinates and I ’ m now  
m onitoring the assigned target at the organisational level then. W ith in  our 
department, w e ’ve meetings every month. W e’ve a senior management 
meeting once a month, a regional office manager meeting every two  
months. (R42).
2 4 2
CHAPTER SEVEN THE REVENUE DEPARTMENT
... We usually invite other departmental units to the presentation o f  the 
Department’ s new performance measurement. But this is lim ited to only  
those who w ork fo r the planning and evaluation section o f  each unit. The 
extent to which the Department’s strategic plan is assimilated by all s ta ff 
depends 011 regional office managers. The managers who are interested in 
the strategic planning would convey our messages to their subordinates. 
The success depends on the way they communicate w ith  their 
subordinates. (R56).
As the above quotation suggests there was like ly  to be a sense in which such an 
approach would depend largely on the inclination o f  particular managers as to how  
far they decided to share the details o f  P M M  requirements w ith  lower level 
employees. As one operative explained, this could amount to little  more than being 
instructed what to achieve:
We, operative s ta ff or lower ranking staff, often don’t understand the 
strategic planning, because it started from the senior mangers to the senior 
sta ff at level 6 or 7 along the hierarchy. Those who are at the management 
level know more than we do. In fact as operative staff, w e’ve heard o f  it, 
but don’t have enough understanding. We just fo llow  what are told, but 
don’t understand it at all. W ell, we do what they tell us to do. (R63).
In a slightly different form  there was a sim ilarly fatalist understanding among the 
middle managers, who again showed how they did not use a prim ary performance 
frame but tended to explain their activities in terms o f  more ‘professional’ standards, 
associated w ith  ‘ doing one’ s best’ and regarding the P M M  results as secondary to this 
(rather than ‘doing one’s best’ being defined in terms o f  performance criteria as was 
the case at the Bank). The fo llow ing was a typical form o f  expressing this 
understanding:
A lthough the performance result isn’ t influential to me very much, I ’ l l do 
m y best. I f  I  cannot meet the assigned target, I ’m not worried about it. I t ’s 
one o f  our performance appraisal criteria. I f  w e’ve put all o f  our effort into 
it  and we fa il, [ I  w on ’t regret it  because] I ’ve done my best. (R41).
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This type o f  attitude appeared to suggest that despite the levels o f  scepticism shown 
above regarding the va lid ity  o f  the P M M  system, most employees appeared to assume 
that, in the traditional bureaucratic paternalistic style, they would be protected by 
their top leaders. As one m iddle manager explained it:
... The strength o f  the Department is the top leader. Those who were our 
top leaders in the past always followed the policy o f  the top leaders who 
came before them. The department po licy has been always in the same 
direction then. When we order, they always obey. I f  we don’t  have such 
culture, we cannot be what we are now. Our department’s organisational 
culture is that everyone always moves towards the same direction. W ell 
they’ re listening to their leader. (R56).
This type o f  attitude may appear as paradoxical given the lim ited trust that appeared 
to be shown in the P M M  system and the view  that this was not an honest or 
appropriate way o f  organising w ork and the apparent breaches o f  psychological 
contract, but it  can be considered as an illustration o f  the contradictory form  o f  
strongly hierarchical authority which has been referred to as paternalism which 
according to Goss (1991) involves a combination o f  ‘ identification’ and 
‘ d ifferentiation’ . The latter is based on differences in formal authority and status (such 
as organisational position), but the former is based on the dependence o f  the 
subordinates on their superiors. This distinction means that although subordinates 
may be aware that their interests are not necessarily the same as those o f  their 
superiors and that com plying w ith  these may be to their disadvantage, they realise 
also that compliance w ill be a better option than resistance and they may therefore 
decide to accept the authority o f  the superior on pragmatic grounds and in the hope 
that their expressed loyalty w ill be recognised by those in power and offer some 
protection. As one respondent expressed the situation:
2 4 4
CHAPTER SEVEN THE REVENUE DEPARTMENT
I t  seems like we’ re in the same boat. W e’ re given performance targets.
When our boss promises to meet those assigned goals, it  then becomes our 
obligations we w ill help our boss from losing face. (R34).
This approach therefore involves a tension between identifying w ith  leaders out o f  a 
need to demonstrate obedience and a fear that the power o f  the superior could be 
turned against them i f  dissatisfactions are openly expressed, and the latter sense o f  
employees being not prepared to confront their more senior managers from concern 
that this would be seen as disloyal and damaging to their position, has been shown to 
be common throughout both public sector organisations. However this was made most 
explic it by two operatives who rarely expressed the underpinning o f  fear in this 
compliance w ith  hierarchical authority:
A lthough they allow us to make personal request, no one dare tell the truth  
like, I don’ t want to w ork in this team; I  would like a new supervisor; I  
don’ t want to w ork here anymore; I  need change, fo r example. That’s all 
what’s been now missing in the Bureau...Because we fear ... We fear that 
the persons w e’re w orking fo r may know about it and would get upset. As 
long as we w ork fo r this unit, we cannot avoid meeting these people from  
tim e to time. We then never dare express our feeling that we dislike them  
and also that sort o f  feeling. (R47).
The expression o f  individual thoughts or ideas heavily remains lim ited by 
the influence o f  seniority. The ideas that are generated from the bottom are 
rarely allowed to occur. (R35).
C o n c lu s io n
The respondents from  all three levels shared in different ways a sim ilar v iew  on the 
nature o f  PM M . M ost perceived it in quite abstract and superficial ways. There was 
no use o f  performance measurement data analysis fo r challenging whether the 
Department’ s current strategy led to the desired outcomes (i.e., improvement 
requirements) or even fo r guiding the Department’s strategy. Respondents did not
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seem to frame P M M  objectives in terms o f  a performance frame (as was the case in 
the Bank) but, like the Excise Department, P M M  was generally framed through the 
exercise o f  hierarchical authority and was defined as a set o f  rules that had to be 
obeyed rather than as an invitation to make changes to improve actual performance.
M ost respondents fe lt the P M M  system had too many performance indicators leading 
to new tasks that were unnecessary and intensified workloads. They claimed that 
performance indicators, except tax collection related indicators, were too broad and 
led people to focus only on performance scores, rather than actual performance on the 
ground. As w ith  the Excise Department respondents perceived P M M  as a form  o f  
‘power game’ . In fact, respondents seemed to perceive the P M M  system to be 
creating a double undermining o f  trust: by reducing discretion and creating less trust 
w ith in  the organisation; and by reducing trust from clients by using measures that 
encouraged them to be critical o f  the service.
It was found that the imposition o f  performance indicators that were perceived to be 
w ithout legitimacy seemed to reduce respondents’ willingness to w ork ‘beyond 
contract’ and encouraged them to sim ply fo llow  rules and instructions which was the 
opposite o f  the intention o f  P M M  initiatives (as portrayed as part o f  the move to 
NPM ). In contrast to the claimed view  that N P M  is associated w ith  a reduction in 
bureaucratic organisation, as w ith  the Excise Department, the Revenue Department 
showed a persistence o f  conventional bureaucratic practices reflected in the 
respondents’ use o f  a prim ary frame o f  hierarchical authority to define the P M M  
system rather than the performance frame found in the Bank. As an example, it was 
found that although team w orking was form ally in existence the reality was that sta ff
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were allocated to ‘ teams’ according to their rank which meant that rather than 
operating as an organic unit, these ‘ teams’ reproduced the hierarchical authority o f the 
wider organisation. Group performance appeared to be no more than the sum o f each 
group member’s individual contribution and did not support employee participation in 
operating decisions which remained under the control o f  the most senior members. In 
a sim ilar form , individual salary increases were based on an annual performance 
appraisal rating that almost all respondents fe lt were not directly under their control 
and not influenced by their actual performance.
Overall there appeared to be an absence o f  aligned policies and a disconnection 
between key H R  policies and performance objectives, even w ith  H R  policies seeming 
to w ork in opposition to the behaviours needed fo r performance. W ith in  this context 
the introduction o f  P M M  appeared to have maintained nepotism and favouritism as a 
means to secure performance ratings and commitment to P M M  from  the organisation 
was perceived as largely rhetorical or imposed on top o f  existing practices, rather than 
a different way o f  working.
Respondents expressed emotional reactions that suggested they were insulted by the 
operation o f  the system (Gabriel, 1998) which seemed to be experienced as a ‘ slight’ 
that disregarded their hard work, and appeared to be seen as a breach o f  the 
psychological contract (Conway and Briner, 2005) in terms o f  inadequate human 
resource policies, lack o f  support from  the organisation or supervisors, and 
unfavourable comparisons w ith  other employees. It  was found that respondents 
seemed to be resigned to the fact that they would play little  part in the P M M  process 
which appeared more like an ‘ empty ritua l’ that reflected, as in the Excise
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Department, the dominance o f  ‘D-power’ (deference power) rather than ‘E-power’ 
(efficacy-power) (Collins, 2004). This was seen to lead to a passive approach from  
respondents where they appeared not to approve o f  the way the P M M  process was 
managed but were unw illing  to challenge to power that was perceived to be behind it, 
reflecting a form o f  paternalism (Goss, 1991) that involved a combination o f  
‘ identification’ and ‘ d ifferentiation’ w ith  those in power.
In summary, therefore, as w ith  the Excise Department, and in contrast to the Bank, the 
results from  the Revenue Department confirm  the view  o f  the Thai public sector 
organisations as remaining strongly bureaucratic in their forms o f  operation and w ith  
the introduction o f  P M M  systems as ‘ additions’ and supports to this system rather 
than representing the move to an alternative form o f  more performance driven 
organisation (as associated w ith  N PM  theory). I t  therefore needs to be considered 
whether this situation is merely part o f  a temporary progression towards a more 
performance driven form  or whether it represents merely an adaptation o f  
bureaucratic power that w ill give an appearance o f  development but retain its 
established operating practices. This w ill be discussed in the final chapter.
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C H A P T E R  E I G H T  
C O N C L U S I O N
This thesis has sought to explore the nature and effectiveness o f  P M M  by comparing 
the experiences o f  s ta ff in two departments in the public sector w ith  those o f  
employees in a private sector bank. The emphasis has been on the using o f  qualitative 
data in order to be able to present a picture o f  how P M M  is experienced from  the 
perspective o f  those who are involved in the application and use o f  such systems. This 
approach was considered important to provide the detailed understanding o f a 
phenomenon that has had only lim ited investigation in the Thai context (w ith  very few  
qualitative studies o f  organisations being available and even fewer in the public 
sector) and the need to recognise that systems such as P M M  are often complex in 
terms o f  their effect on employees and need to be understood in terms o f  their effects 
on experiences rather than sim ply described and measured in terms o f prevalence and 
formal characteristics. For this reason, the current study was concerned not w ith  
absolute statistical generalisability but w ith  the depth and texture o f  the data in order 
to be able to present an account o f the operation o f  P M M  from  the organisation 
members’ position in order to demonstrate the sorts o f  issues that can be involved in 
the application o f  such systems that m ight be overlooked by approaches that took 
simple cross-sectional measurements o f  implementation. The research questions to 
emerge from  the literature review were as follows:
i) Is there a shift away from  bureaucratic model toward a post bureaucratic 
model in the Thai public sector? (This was addressed by considering both the 
nature o f the organisation o f the departments studied and by com parison w ith  
a non-public sector organisation)
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ii)  To what extent has the Thai public sector undergone structural and cultural 
changes to accompany the introduction o f  PM M ? (This was addressed by 
considering a model o f how the organisations studied have developed the ir 
P M M  systems and the ro le  o f s tructu ra l fa c to rs  and psychological contracts)
iii)  To what extent has the Thai public sector adopted HR initiatives to provide the 
strategic and operational context for the introduction o f  PM M ? (This was 
considered through an analysis o f trust and discretion and d ifferent fo rm s o f 
pow er)
iv) H ow  effectively has the Thai public sector integrated its P M M  system w ith  
other organisational and individual activities? (This was considered through 
an analysis o f how respondents fram ed PM M )
v) H ow  does the Thai public sector formulate and communicate the use o f its 
P M M  system and how does this affect individual responses to it? (This was 
considered through a com bination o f the fa c to rs  above)
To summarise the results o f these questions it  is necessary to begin by addressing 
parts o f questions 1 and 2 by summarising the main differences and sim ilarities that 
were identified from the formal specifications o f the three case studies and some o f 
the issues raised through the interviews. This w ill be followed by a consideration o f  
the subsequent research questions which are concerned for the ways in which 
organisation members responded to these P M M  systems. B y  comparing the two 
departments and the private sector bank it w il l  enable it to be determined both what 
structural and cultural practices are present in the public sector cases and how these 
are different or sim ilar to those o f  a non-public sector organisation. This comparison 
is considered useful as it allows the research to suggest that the differences identified
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are part o f  the organisational processes o f  the public sector rather than reflecting only 
an established national/regional cultural pattern o f management (Hofstede, 1980). 
This comparison w ill be shown firs t as a summary table (Table 8.1) and then brie fly  
elaborated on key points.
Table 8 .1 : Comparisons of Three Case Studies
The Nature of PMM The Bank The Excise 
Department
The Revenue 
Department
1. Objectives of the 
Implementation of 
PMM
Improving organisational 
performance;
Resolving problems which 
arise;
Communicating strategic 
direction to employees.
Conforming to government 
requirements
Conforming to government 
requirements
2. Performance 
measures
Developed within the 
organisation
Externally imposed (by 
central government)
Externally imposed (by 
central government)
3. Emphases of PMM 
system
Performance measurement 
and Performance 
Development
Performance measurement Performance measurement
4 Content of 
Performance 
Measurement
Financial (Revenue) and 
Non-flnancial (Individual 
employee development)
Financial (Revenue) and 
Non-financial 
(Organisational 
improvements)
Financial (Revenue) and 
Non-financial 
(Organisational 
improvements)
5. Implementation 
Process
Top-down with discussion Top-down Top-down
6. Goal/Objective setting Internally developed and 
agreed
Externally imposed Externally imposed
7. Performance 
monitoring
Organisational level (senior 
management) and 
individual level 
(coaching by line managers )
Organisational and unit 
levels (senior management)
Organisational and unit 
levels (senior management)
8. Analysis of 
performance data
To support management 
decision making;
To determine individual pay, 
reward, and promotion;
To support individual 
development;
To support budget allocation 
at the local level
To produce performance 
reports for the government
To produce performance 
reports for the government
9. Performance 
Measurement Review
Modification based on 
feedback from managers and 
employees and the Bank’s 
business direction
No control over the 
modification of a framework 
of PMM
No control over the 
modification of a framework 
of PMM
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The Nature of PMM The Bank The Excise 
Department
The Revenue 
Department
10. Integration of PMM 
with other Management 
Systems
Comprehensive HR policy; 
Accounting system
Bonus (weakly linked) Bonus (weakly linked)
T h e  P u b lic  Sector A p p ro a c h
Objectives of the Implementation of PMM: Follow ing the Thai public reform  
programme, all government agencies were encouraged to take fu ll accountability for 
the results o f  their public services. P M M  was regarded as a crucial part o f  this 
programme. The Thai government required all government agencies to adopt PM M . 
The adoption therefore was an imposed requirement driven by the central government 
bodies beyond the specific Departments affected.
PMM Development: The framework o f  P M M  was formulated by upper level central 
agencies such as the OPDC. This framework outlined what government agencies were 
expected to improve in line w ith  the national agenda o f  the government. The two  
departments studied had no control over the development or m odification o f  the 
framework but were required to adopt a one-size-fits-all approach.
Emphases and Contents of PMM: The Thai government’s P M M  framework 
comprised financial and non-financial performance measures focused on quantifiable 
targets w ith  little  or no managerial discretion. W ith in  a department, a modified  
Balance Scorecard was used to define and measure organisational and unit 
performance. Performance agreements were made w ith  senior managers but did not 
involve lower level staff. There was no coaching fo r s ta ff or a coherent link  to
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performance related pay. The emphasis was on organisational improvements rather 
than recognising the performance development o f  individuals.
Implementation Process: There was an emphasis on a standardised and top-down 
approach w ithout opportunity fo r significant changes to be made. Centrally imposed 
performance objectives and targets, as w ell as performance measures, made 
government agencies responsible only for executing operations. However, the way in 
which these were executed was le ft to the Departments and varied from one 
department to another. However in both the cases studied, a top down approach was 
used w ith  little  opportunity to involve sta ff in the decision making process in relation 
to PM M .
Goal/Objective Setting: Goal setting appeared to offer little  opportunities for 
involvement and put an emphasis on measuring performance only at the 
organisational level. Government departments were supposed to be permitted to 
propose their own targets, and negotiate those targets w ith  their m inister but in 
practice goal setting in both Departments was purely a top-down approach where 
goals were imposed from  above.
Performance Monitoring: Compliance w ith  performance measurement was form ally  
the responsibility o f  senior managers and reported to the Bureau o f  Tax Planning and 
Policy. There seemed to be no evidence that performance measurement was used to 
check whether the organisation’s non financial performance improved and 
performance o f  individual employees was not form ally monitored or included as part 
o f normal performance m onitoring process.
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The Analysis of Performance Data: There appeared to be no clear evidence that 
performance data was o ffic ia lly  discussed or analysed for improvement purposes or 
guiding future actions. Both departments appeared to focus on recording the 
requirements rather than on the outcomes o f  those requirements. Thus senior 
managers attempted to measure only performance targets required by the OPDC.
Performance Measurement Review: As the P M M  framework was imposed 
externally, the Departments were not directly involved in the review o f  performance 
measures. Thus there was no formal review o f  measurement and targets based on 
reported feedback o f  results from staff.
PMM and Other Management Systems: Despite the public reform programme via  
PM M , the Thai public sector did not a llow  government agencies for financial or 
organisational flex ib ility . Budgeting policy and H R  policy were kept highly  
centralised and therefore had little  real connection to P M M  processes or results.
T h e  P riva te  Sector A p p ro a c h
Objectives of the Implementation of PMM: P M M  was regarded as a means o f  
keeping the Bank competitive. The current P M M  system was the outcome o f  
attempt’s to improve business performance and to meet bank employees’ expectations 
(and retain high level talent). The adoption o f  P M M  was driven by intense 
competition w ith in  the Thai banking industry fo r pro fit and staff.
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P M M  Development: The Bank’s P M M  was developed internally over several 
consecutive years on a continuous improvement basis. The Bank sought feedback 
from its employees to formulate and refine the system.
Emphases and Contents of PMM: The Bank seemed to have succeeded in linking  
individual employees’ goals and objectives w ith  those o f  the Bank through the use o f  
performance agreements at the individual level together w ith  a Balanced Scorecard 
framework.- The performance measures were designed to reflect all areas o f  
performance that bank employees regarded as important to both personal and 
organisational success. Other than performance measurement, the Bank also put 
emphasis on performance development via the use o f  individual performance 
agreement and coaching process.
Implementation Process: The Bank put s ta ff acceptance o f  P M M  as its top priority. 
This resulted in an incremental employee-oriented change process in which goals and 
targets were customised to f i t  local level needs. The Bank heavily invested in training 
its managers and employees, communication and improving its H R  policy in the area 
o f reward. A  w ide range o f  supports (e.g., P M M  manuals, training, site visits by the 
Change Team) were provided to help sta ff to deal w ith  the implementation and related 
changes.
Goal/Objective Setting: Goal setting was intended to reflect the Bank’ s business 
direction and provided bank managers and employees w ith  fairness and transparency. 
Goals and targets were derived from  the Bank’s strategy and cascaded down to 
managers and employees who could specify the expected behaviours and performance
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needed to meet these objectives. Negotiation was allowed throughout the process o f  
goal setting to help reflect the actual circumstances at the local level. Every individual 
employee was involved in the setting o f  his or her performance goals and targets.
Perform ance M o n ito rin g : The Bank’s performance m onitoring system was 
enhanced by the support o f  IT  (although w ith  some technical problems), along w ith  
coaching processes carried out by line managers to ensure the achievement o f  
established goals at all levels. Thus line managers played a major role in monitoring 
performance, encouraging and providing needed support for their subordinates.
The Analysis o f Perform ance Data: Performance data was analysed and used by the 
Bank for several purposes e.g., budget allocations, individual pay increases and 
promotions, individual performance improvement, and organisational strategy 
formulation. The Bank used performance data (i.e., sales and seivice performance) for 
making decision on budget allocations for bank branches.
Perform ance M easurem ent Review: Managers and employees were allowed to 
review performance measures that applied to them. A fte r every change to 
performance measurement, a ‘ Change Team’ was sent to help embed the changes.
P M M  and O the r M anagem ent Systems: The Bank had integrated its P M M  w ith  
other management systems such as IT, H R  policy and accounting system. In effect 
this meant that employees perceived these functions as supporting the P M M  system 
rather than the P M M  system as jus t another policy. Other policies were defined in 
terms o f  their contribution to supporting the P M M  approach.
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Having summarised the main approaches to P M M  in the case study organisations, to
address question 1, the remaining research questions w ill be addressed through an
examination o f  the key themes that emerged from  the data analysis as these provide 
overlapping insights into the issues covered by the research questions such as 
structural and cultural changes (Q2), H R  initiatives to support strategic and 
operational use o f  P M M  (Q3), com patibility w ith  other organisational processes and 
individual activities (Q4), and individual responses and understanding o f  P M M  (Q5).
To address these questions the analysis w ill be summarised in relation to the 
fo llow ing key themes that emerged from the study:
i) the fram ing o f the P M M  system;
ii)  the significance o f  structural factors and the nature o f  power; and
iii)  the operation o f  trust and discretion.
Together these themes offer a number o f  insights into the nature and application o f  
P M M  which w ill be brought together in the fina l part o f  this chapter. But first each 
theme w ill be discussed in separation.
i) F ram ing the P M M  system
I t  w ill be recalled from  the Methodology chapter that the approach o f  a variation o f  
‘ frame analysis’ (Goss, 1996; Goffman, 1974) was decided to be used as a technique 
for providing an in itia l analysis o f  the interview data in order to identify the existence 
o f patterns in the ways in which respondents talked about the P M M  approach o f  their 
organisation in order to identify possible sim ilarities and differences. This approach 
was adopted because it  had the possibility to assist in linking different ideas together
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to provide an overall picture o f  the p rio rity  and significance o f  an issue in relation to a 
range o f  possible influences (rather than focusing on one factor in isolation). Attempts 
were therefore made to identity the ways in which respondents framed their views o f  
P M M  from the examination o f  the interview transcripts. B y  examining how they 
spoke about the P M M  system an assessment was made o f  whether they were 
understanding P M M  as a prim ary frame and how this was linked to other secondary 
frames. I t  w ill be recalled that a primary frame was defined as a section o f  text in 
which an issue o f  interest (the P M M  system) was spoken about as the dominant issue 
relative to other issues being discussed such that other issues (such as fo r example HR  
issues) were presented as fo llow ing from  or subordinated to the dominant issue (that 
is as secondary concerns). There are taken to be two main ways in which primary and 
secondary frames are linked (Goss, 1996): a) ‘ keying’ (linked secondary frames that 
connect dominant and less dominant themes in a consistent way that is informed by 
the underpinning logic o f  the prim ary frame; this being a metaphor based on the 
musical notion o f  changing keys; b) ‘ fabrication’ (where the prim ary frame is 
presented as a way o f  ‘disguising’ the real nature o f  a situation that may be 
represented by what appears as being a secondary frame but is, in reality, the 
dominant issue, fo r example, this would be equivalent to the distinction between 
rhetoric and reality). The fo llow ing pattern was identified from the data.
Table 8.2 : Sum mary of Response Pattern
Case Organisation Response Pattern
The Bank:
All respondents PMM as primary ‘performance’ frame.
Keyed to secondary supporting flames o f HR; hierarchy; reward, 
promotion.
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Case Organisation Response P attern  v
Government D epartments:
Senior and middle managers
Operatives
PMM as fabricated performance frame.
Influenced by real primary frame of ‘hierarchy’ keyed to seniority, 
reward, promotion.
PMM as secondary frame keyed from primary hierarchy frame 
keyed to seniority, reward, promotion.
In the Bank, it was clear from all the respondents that ‘performance’ was regarded as 
a central concern that was presented as being relevant to both the organisation and to 
individuals. When asked about the P M M  system, respondents spoke easily about its 
nature and emphasised its relevance to them both directly and in terms o f the 
company culture. In particular, the respondents made clear that the purpose o f  the 
system was to improve actual performance and several, recognising that this also 
involved increasing the effort they put into their w ork and being conscious o f  the need 
to make improvements as an ongoing process. When they spoke about other aspects 
o f the organisation, in particular the organisation o f  more general H R  processes such 
as reward, promotion and communication, they tended to frame these in relation to the 
P M M  system that is they described them in relation to how they helped to make the 
P M M  system w ork and how they enabled the improvement o f  performance. In  
summary, therefore it seemed that the ‘performance frame’ was used by respondents 
to make sense o f  and to define most other aspects o f  the way their w ork was organised 
w ith  these secondary frames being keyed from this (as the latter were defined by 
respondents as being consistent w ith  the logic o f  the primary performance frame and 
treated as an extension o f  this).
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In terms o f  the way in which public sector respondents framed their accounts o f the 
P M M  system, both Departments w ill be treated together as respondents in each 
adopted the same form  o f  framing. Here the picture was more complicated than that o f  
the Bank. I t  became apparent when respondents talked about the P M M  system that 
they regarded it as a subsidiary issue to that o f  the principle o f  hierarchical authority 
which all respondents identified as the dominant factor in explaining how the 
organisation and their own roles worked. Therefore although it appeared as a primary 
frame in terms o f  the fact that respondents could identify the system as a major feature 
o f their organisations, it emerged from  the more detailed analysis o f  their accounts 
that this appeared to be more o f a ‘fabrication’ such as when they spoke o f  it, it  was 
apparent that they saw it  as being underpinned by the frame o f  hierarchical authority. 
This was most apparent fo r the more senior managers who seemed anxious to 
maintain the view  that they were not criticising this imposed measure even when 
recognising its lim itations. Thus what they spoke o f  was what was recognised as a 
‘ front’ that had a rhetorical existence (as a primary frame fo r presentation to the wider 
world) but that did not reflect the actual practice o f  how the organisation worked, 
which was framed by all respondents in terms o f  the need to conform to instructions 
from the top o f  the organisation. The framing also met the form  o f  fabrication, as 
respondents recognised P M M  as a ‘game’ that had certain rules which were designed 
to maintain the power o f  senior managers rather than to produce behaviours which 
changed the status quo o f  the organisation. A t the level o f  the operatives in particular, 
the concern to maintain the fabrication o f  support was less apparent and most 
respondents recognised the P M M  system as being merely a secondary framing o f  the 
established power o f  higher managers who they also appeared to recognise as being 
involved in presenting the fabrication. In both cases, the understanding o f  P M M  as a
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rhetorical fabricated frame seemed to mean that this understanding did not have large 
effects on changing the actual behaviours 01* performance o f  the organisation.
It therefore can be seen that the ways in which P M M  was framed in both 
organisations were very different leading to the suggestion that in the Bank there had 
been deliberate attempts to make the P M M  system central to most other organisation 
practices and also to ensure that this was communicated to s ta ff in  such a way that 
there was a strong match between the understanding o f  the system and how it was 
actually put into practice. As such the performance frame was w ide ly  used by s ta ff to 
explain both the nature o f  the scheme and its practice and can therefore be regarded as 
providing a ‘b inding’ framework that made the system appear central to all activities 
and because o f  this consistency, when employees spoke o f  the P M M  system using the 
performance frame, it seems like ly  that this w ould also reinforce their understanding 
o f how this had an impact fo r their behaviour. However in the tw o public sector 
departments there was not a sim ilarly unified relationship between the way that 
employees understood the P M M  system and the fabricated framing that was apparent 
seemed to reflect the situation where the practice o f  P M M  did not prove to be 
consistent w ith  its form al presentation. This disunity between rhetoric and reality was 
referred to frequently and was seen to reflect the disillusionment o f  many employees. 
Thus, unlike the Bank where there was a coherent framing o f  P M M  w hich reflected 
and strengthened practice, here it  seemed that the awareness o f the fabricated rhetoric 
o f P M M  resulted in a lack o f  connection w ith  actual performance and an approach to 
task performance that was based on passive compliance w ith  orders rather than w ith  
an interest in making real performance improvements. The reason for these 
differences in framings would seem to be related to the nature o f  organisation
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structures and the power relations associated w ith  these (as both organisations were 
using P M M  systems that were in technical terms rather sim ilar, being based on 
Balanced Scorecard techniques).
ii)  O rganisation structure
Both public sector departments were structured in sim ilar ways and w ill,  as above, be 
treated together fo r this discussion. I t  was clear from  the previous chapters that the 
public sector departments retained most o f  the features o f  a classical bureaucracy or 
mechanistic structure and appeared to have little  in common w ith  the notion o f  the 
post-bureaucratic organisation associated w ith  several o f  the approaches to NPM. 
Sim ilarly, its approach to H R M  was also more in the form  o f  traditional personnel 
management w ith  a strong emphasis on functional specialism rather than being 
concerned w ith  enabling the strategic alignment o f  organisational strategies. It was 
therefore not surprising that the respondents’ framings o f  P M M  reflected this form o f  
organisation. I t  was noted in Chapter Three (above) that bureaucracy has been 
claimed to suppress creativity, produce dissatisfaction, and de-motivate workers 
(Adler and Borys, 1996, p.61) and that even adopting a contingency position, where 
the relationship between formalisation and attitudinal outcomes depends on the 
context w ith in  w hich formalisation operates, the Thai context appeared to encourage 
these negative effects. Although it  has been claimed that “ employees w ill react 
positively both when high levels o f  formalisation are associated w ith  routine tasks and 
when low  levels o f  formalisation are associated w ith  non-routine tasks” , in the current 
context it appeared that formalisation was applied to all tasks and conditions resulting 
in workers lacking in autonomy and control, creating feelings o f  dissatisfaction and 
de-motivation (Adler and Borys, 1996, p.65). Under these conditions, the introduction
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o f  P M M  appeared, w ith  irony, to have created “ rules, regulations and procedures that 
are burdensome or ineffective”  (Bozeman, 2000, p.69) whereas in theory it should 
have reduced this ‘ red tape’ . It  seemed that the bureaucratic structure had 
dysfunctional effects, leading to over-conformance w ith  rales and regulations on the 
one hand (Blau, 1955; Merton, 1940) and to others often being ignored to meet 
performance targets (Crazier, 1964; Gouldner, 1954), encouraging technical 
inefficiency. In  terms o f  its culture, it  appeared as close to the framework o f  Claver et 
al. (1999, p.459) o f  a generic model o f  bureaucratic culture: authoritarian 
management style w ith  a high degree o f control; little  communication and the 
management w ith  a univocal, top-down focus; individuals searching fo r stability and 
having lim ited scope fo r in itia tive w ith  orientation towards obeying orders; repetitive 
and centralised decision-making process; reluctance to start innovative processes; 
high degrees o f  conform ity; and high reluctance to change.
In contrast, the Bank appeared to have adopted a structure that was closer in some 
aspects to the post-bureaucratic model. Heckscher (1994) identified twelve o f  his 
ideal type o f  post-bureaucratic organisation and these can be considered in terms o f  
their relevance to the findings from  the Bank (see Chapter 2 above for fu lle r details).
1. Emphasis on institutionalised dialogue to create consensus (present in the form  
o f consultation and negotiation about translation o f organisational targets to 
local needs).
2. Dialogue defined by the use o f  influence which is derived from  knowledge 
and experience to persuade others (present in the use o f  ‘ change teams’ to 
introduce changes to P M M  and direct involvement o f  senior managers).
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3. Influence underpinned by trust and interdependence (present in  the be lie f that 
all different parts o f  the organisation were m oving toward the same goal and 
were supported by senior managers and organisational processes).
4. Emphasis on organisational mission for communicating what is sought to 
achieve w ith  insiders and outsiders, and fo r linking overall organisational 
goals w ith  individual goals (present in m ultiple forms o f  communication w ith  
different levels o f  detail and complexity).
5. Widespread sharing o f  information about organisational strategy to link  
individual contributions to that mission (present through communication, 
above, and through regular meeting w ith  direct managers and performance 
reviews).
6. Focus on principles fo r greater fle x ib ility  and responsiveness to changing 
circumstances to guide actions that are expected to achieve that mission 
(partially present in the ab ility  to renegotiate targets).
7. Frequent restructuring o f  decision making process on the basis o f  contingent 
relationship between the ways the problem to be resolved and the nature o f  
problem itse lf (partia lly present in the ongoing performance review process 
and iterative development o f  P M M  practice in response to this).
8. Relationships o f  trust strengthened by the support o f  IT  that provide 
inform ation about who to go to for a particular problem or issue (partially  
present in the developing IT  system for managing performance targets but not 
entirely successful at tim e o f study).
9. Use o f  thorough and open process o f  association and peer evaluation to 
establish social recognition and foster trust among members (partia lly present
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through sharing o f  performance data but s till some differences between head 
office and branches).
10. Emergence o f  the new form  o f labour market as a result o f  the open 
boundaries o f  post-bureaucracies (some possible presence in recognition o f  
need to develop fairness in P M M  in order to attract and retain key staff).
11. Emphasis on PRP and a shift from collectivism toward individualism in 
employment relations (some partial presence, but seen as a longer term 
objective to be achieved).
12. Concentration on flexib le time frames which are subject to constant change 
(partia lly present as a driver from market competition and one reason for the 
development o f  an effective P M M  system).
Here it can be seen that the Bank appeared to match, in partial form  for some in strong 
forms fo r others, some parts o f  all o f  the features claimed for a post-bureaucratic 
organisation. In  particular, all o f  these features appeared as closely connected w ith  the 
practices and meanings o f  P M M  and, therefore as such, it can be considered that the 
overall structure o f  the organisation was w orking in alignment w ith  the P M M  system 
rather than, as in  the public sector departments, the P M M  system was merely an 
‘ addition’ which did not influence the underlying bureaucratic approach to rig id  and 
formal hierarchical authority. Thus it was suggested that in the public sector 
departments power took the form  o f  D-power (deference power; Collins, 2004) where 
respondents reported themselves as involved merely in obeying orders from  above on 
the basis o f  the position-power associated w ith  senior managers. Because employees 
were aware o f  the fabricated nature o f  the P M M  system and showed their compliance 
w ith  it in terms o f  respect for the D-power o f  senior managers it seemed that it had the
2 6 5
CHAPTER EIGHT CONCLUSION
effect o f  also creating the P M M  system as an ‘empty ritua l’ w ith  the effect that 
participation in it  served to drain energy and to demotivate those involved. In  contrast, 
respondents at the Bank made reference to the power o f  those in superior positions in 
terms that were more sim ilar to Collins’ (2004) E-power (efficacy power) by 
emphasising how they too were motivated by a concern fo r performance and saw all 
members o f  the organisation as taking actions that had the effect (rather than just the 
rhetoric) o f  im proving performance by changing practices and developing individuals 
in order to achieve this. As such this appeared as a more effective ritual for 
participation and respondents generally expressed commitment to the P M M  system, 
even though some recognised that it  required greater effort and application from them. 
In both these issues o f  organisation structure and the exercising o f  power there are 
also connections w ith  the final major theme o f  trust and discretion. I t  can be noted 
that this notion o f  power was not discussed in the literature review (o f Chapter Three) 
but reflects, as was stated in the Methodology Chapter, the awareness o f  an inductive 
approach to the analysis o f  the data and the commitment to apply theoretical ideas that 
were helpful in understanding the themes that emerged from  the data (rather than 
testing previously developed theories or hypotheses). However, the data itse lf 
suggested that these concepts provided useful labels fo r the relationships that were 
discovered and, as w ill be seen below, suggest areas for further research.
iii)  Trust and discretion
In understanding the nature o f  trust in relation to the P M M  process, use was made o f  
the framework developed by Fox (1974) that there is a relationship between trust and 
discretion. As w ith  the conception o f  power (above) the notion o f  F ox ’s ideas were 
not discussed in the opening literature review but were suggested as useful and
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appropriate frameworks for understanding as the data analysis developed. Although  
this is a theory that is many years old, it  relates to basic relationships o f  the workplace 
(task discretion and trust) that can be as s till h ighly relevant in contemporary 
organisations and offers a clear and concise framework fo r understanding that can be 
applied w ith  clarity to empirical data ( it is also an approach that has s till been in use 
recently by other writers such as Evetts (2009; 2006), Grugulis (2007), and Sitkin and 
Roth (1993).
Fox’ s (1974) low-discretion syndrome was made up of: i) superordinates behave as i f  
they believe subordinates w ill not deliver the w ork performance desired from their 
own vo lition; ii)  jo b  activities are tigh tly  defined and subjected to close supervision;
ii i)  close coordination is imposed and governed by rules and routines; iv ) inadequate 
performance believed to result from carelessness or indifference; v) conflic t between 
superordinates and subordinates is handled through bargaining processes and 
differences o f  interests are assumed as given. From the studies o f  the public sector 
departments it seemed that there was revealed a perceived shift from what 
respondents had in the past perceived as being a ‘professional bureaucracy’ 
(Mintzberg, 1983, 1981) form  o f  organisation and management (reflected in the 
numerous references to the high educational qualifications o f employees and the 
views often expressed that their w ork should be prim arily  regulated by legal-rational 
requirements). However there also emerged an apparent contradiction as more senior 
managers appeared as showing contradictory views that seemed like ly  to have been 
introduced by the introduction o f  the P M M  system. On the one hand there was a 
tendency to show pride and respect for the professionalism o f  s ta ff and their 
traditional tasks, but also when talking about the introduction o f  PM M , to speak about
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them as being unw illing  to change and not being able to be trusted to meet the 
specified targets. This latter attitude appeared to have encouraged the emergence 
towards a low  discretion syndrome in which sta ff fe lt that they had lost control over 
their ‘ real’ activities and were required jus t to fo llow  orders from  above, resulting in 
inefficiencies and a breach in their psychological contracts (Conway and Briner, 
2005) which had reduced their former willingness to w ork ‘beyond contract’ (Fox, 
1974). It  therefore appeared that although the existing ‘professional bureaucracy’ 
form o f  organisation o f  the public sector had been dominated by hierarchical control, 
this had been accepted as it had reflected long established practices and that appeared 
to be consistent w ith  the tasks that employees were required to undertake (directly 
related to the functions o f  the Departments) and had therefore not influenced directly 
on the discretion involved in day-to-day actions. This it  seemed had created a basis 
for trust in the hierarchy to protect and respect its employees. However, the 
introduction o f  P M M , by being imposed from  central government bodies outside the 
Departments, appeared to have challenged this situation. In particular it  introduced a 
range o f  targets that employees did not perceive to be relevant to the professional 
activities and that they perceived to be not given the genuine support o f  their 
managers.
However because o f the culture o f  obedience to authority from above these measures 
and targets were experienced as imposed w ithout good reason but had to be obeyed 
because o f  managers’ insistence on meeting the targets in order to maintain their own 
standing and that o f  the department w ith in  the w ider public sector which made them 
appear as a game or test that had to be passed.
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Because o f  this need to meet targets that were perceived as not relevant and that 
required the imposition o f  higher workloads, it  seemed that this created the perception 
o f the loss o f  discretion in  w ork tasks and the resulting statements that indicated a 
decline in trust on the basis that it  was perceived that management was only interested 
in meeting paper targets and not in the wellbeing o f employees or their professional 
status (as one employees stated, the more established ‘ professional’ workers were 
‘ stereotyped’ as resisting change and lacking commitment).
In contrast the Bank appeared to have retained higher levels o f  trust even though not 
all w ork activities appeared to be high in discretion. In particular, the front-office jobs 
appeared to have lost some o f  the former professional discretion and, w ith  the 
introduction o f  the P M M  system, to have become more influenced by sales targets 
and objectives. However unlike the public sector departments this did not appear as to 
have had a largely damaging effect on employees’ trust and motivation. The key to 
understanding this difference appeared to be in the level o f  involvement, consultation 
and communication that the Bank engaged in w ith  its employees at a ll levels to 
ensure that the P M M  was understood and perceived as merely being imposed and not 
connected to the w ork that was undertaken. In this respect also, the Bank had made 
more efforts in integrating P M M  as a core practice and in using H R M  systems to 
support and promote this (whereas in the Departments, HR systems appeared to have 
little  connection in practice or perceptions to the P M M  processes). I t  seemed that 
employees were w ell trained and supported in what was required by them to meet 
performance targets and through the use o f  Change Teams and direct communications 
w ith  managers, perceived the system as something in which all employees were 
involved. This appeared to create a sense o f  institutionalised trust so that even
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employees with lower discretion jobs felt that they had some responsibility for their 
actions and that there was a sense of ‘prescribed trust’ at these levels as although their 
work quality could be checked through the PMM system, it was perceived that their 
ability to be involved with managers in setting targets and feeding back local issues 
meant that this did not undermine the view that their work was respected and valued.
In summary these themes can be combined together to provide the following models 
of how the PMM process appeared to be experienced by staff in the case 
organisations (as previously done, the two public sector departments will be treated as 
showing similar basic features). Figure 8.1 shows the public sector process which can 
be seen to take the form of creating a negative cycle towards PMM.
Figure 8.1 : Negative Cycle of PM M  A cceptance in the Public Sector Cases
In Figure 8.2, the process at the Bank is outlined and this can be seen in contrast to 
create a positive cycle that appears to support the PMM system and its development.
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Figure 8.2 : Positive Cycle of PM M  A cceptance in the Bank Case
Contribution of the Study
The study of this thesis can be suggested to make four main contributions to 
knowledge of the area under study.
1. Understanding PMM as a process within a wider organisational context (HR 
practices, sector, power, work roles). This study has focused on the way in which 
PMM has been adopted in different forms of organisation by making comparisons 
between different sectors and in different organisational contexts. These factors have 
been shown to have an influence on how individuals respond to the adoption of the 
PMM system in different ways. It has therefore suggested that it is necessary to not 
only examine the practice of PMM itself in isolation but to also understand how it 
relates to wider factors ranging from organisational structure, culture and sector 
norms and practices. In addition it has shown how the way in which power and
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authority is exercised can be important for the way in which individual managers and 
employees respond to what may be similar PMM techniques. Although the influence 
of such factors have been identified in previous studies there were found to be few if 
any which examined them together in depth in terms of their effects on a range of 
stakeholders (rather than focusing on one main factor or offering prescriptive advice 
without detailed empirical at the whole range of levels).
2. Providing qualitative data on experiences of responding to PMM from different 
standpoints and forming novel inductive explanations and themes. Following from the 
above, it was shown in the literature review that there were relative few very detailed 
qualitative studies of the PMM as a process of organisation (rather than as a formal 
policy) affecting individuals in different ways across an organisation. This has 
hopefully provided significant insight into the complexity of the process as it is 
experienced by organisation members rather than treating it as a merely rational 
policy for application. This approach has allowed organisation members to ‘speak for 
themselves’ as far as possible but also to allow the researcher to make interpretations 
that have, as shown above, introduced possible explanations and concepts that had not 
been largely associated with the process of PMM, such as different forms of power, 
trust and discretion and the complex ways in which individuals make sense of such 
policies by framing their understandings.
3. Identifying the organisational and individual factors that together influence the 
acceptance of PMM. Here the study has allowed a tentative conclusion to be drawn 
(subject to more extensive testing, see below) about the factors that appear to 
influence the successful and unsuccessful adoption of PMM. Specifically it has
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emerged that a key issue in the extent to which employees are prepared to adopt with 
willingness the PMM process is the issue of the involvement of employees and the 
extent to which they can feel that they can have some control (through feedback and 
negotiation) of its operation at a local level. Although this is not a wholly new finding 
it is useful to see it as an issue in the context of Thailand as most of the issues 
concerning involvement and trust have been developed in western contexts. It 
therefore contributes to the debate that there may be some organisational processes 
that have universal application in terms of basic human processes such as the 
establishment of trust and respect, even in societies such as Thailand which are often 
characterised as having an acceptance of high power-distance (Hofstede and 
Hofstede, 2005) and therefore a willing acceptance of autocratic management styles. 
This study has shown that although there can be an acceptance of autocratic style, this 
is not necessarily merely a passive acceptance but may disguise underlying 
discontents and conflicts.
4. Providing a qualitative study of organisational practices in a context (the Kingdom 
of Thailand) that has been under-researched and mostly based on quantitative 
accounts. Finally the research provides a contribution to the study of comparative 
organisations and HRM by providing detailed qualitative analysis of Thai 
organisations and their workers. In general there have been comparatively few 
qualitative in-depth investigations of eastern organisational processes and very few in 
the Kingdom of Thailand. By allowing respondents to express their views fully on a 
range of organisational practices and understandings the study has contributed to a 
better comprehension of the extent to which there are real differences in 
organisational actions below the surface differences that may at first be apparent.
273
JLimitations of the Research and Ideas for Further Research  
Case Studies and the Generalisability of the Findings
This thesis and its conclusions are drawn from the three case studies. It has hopefully 
provided greater depth into the experiences of working with a PMM system that has 
been the case with most previous studies of this issue and has also done so from a 
range of perspectives (rather than the usual focus on managerial perspectives). But 
this can also be recognised as a limitation as it is not possible to generalise the 
findings statistically to a wider population. This could possibly be relieved by adding 
additional case studies to cover more types of organisation within the public and 
private sectors and to assess the similar and contrasting results to determine if there is 
an overall consistency that exists. Alternatively it would be possible to use the results 
produced inductively from this study as the basis for constructing more standardised 
instruments that could be administered to a statistically representative sample. For 
example, it could be possible to treat the three major themes identified as measurable 
independent variables and to investigate the relationship of these to a dependent 
variable such as individual commitment to PMM. It would be therefore possible to 
design an instrument such as a questionnaire to measure the variables of: ‘work task 
discretion’, ‘trust in management/employees’, ‘nature of power and authority’, and 
‘commitment to PMM’ and to analyse the results statistically to test the relationships 
proposed in the above analysis.
Non-inclusion of Respondents front the Office of Public Sector Development 
Commission (OPDC)
The role of the OPDC emerged throughout the accounts of the department 
respondents as playing an important part in ‘imposing’ the PMM system in the public
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sector. However, no members of the OPDC were interviewed for the study. This 
could be regarded as a limitation as it has had to be taken on ‘trust’ that it did provide 
the ineffective role suggested by respondents without real insight into this from those 
involved. It would provide greater balance and insight if such respondents had been 
included and this could also be seen as an issue for further research in order to 
strengthen the coverage of the investigation (see above). Although it cannot be proved 
beyond doubt that the respondents were correct in their assessment of the OPDC, it 
does seem that consistency of the responses did suggest this was a widely shared 
perception (and therefore not a fundamental challenge to the validity of the study), but 
it would be of interest to understand more about why such perceptions were generated 
and how these were recognised or responded by OPDC officials. This would not 
necessarily change the interpretation of the data in this thesis but could add another 
dimension of complexity to the understanding.
Thai Public Sector Characteristics and Readiness
A final limitation could be that the Thai public sector has only just begun to embrace 
the practices of PMM and that, therefore, the study has identified issues that are 
associated with a changing process and that will be resolved over time. In other 
words, that the results are untypical and only a temporary picture. This may be the 
case, but the study still captures the actual experiences of individuals involved and 
identifies the practices that are being changed in some detail. Given the strength of the 
views expressed it is likely that these influence the outcome of the changing process 
of adopting PMM. It would certainly be an interesting idea for further study to repeat 
the current study at different periods of time to be able to monitor how the adoption of 
PMM did develop and what role was played by early attitudes of individuals and how
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these modified over time. However this would not be regarded as a reason for 
questioning the findings of the present study although it could be accepted that they 
are not necessarily the end of the story. Although it could be suggested that having a 
detailed understanding of experiences of PMM could be used to help develop the 
process more effectively for the future.
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I. The Summary of frequency of quotations used by each respondent
No. C h ap ter 5 : The Bank Chapter 6: The Excise 
k- > , P S: id. Department
C hapter 7 : The Revenue 
Department
;• Respondent ; 
• V Code
Quotations Respondent
Code
Quotations Respondent
.. y  G odeY v?
Quotations
1 R l (M) 6 R 20 ( 0 ) 6 R34 (O) 3
2 R2 ( 0 ) 4 R21 ( 0 ) 2 R35 ( 0 ) 3
3 R3 ( 0 ) 4 R 22 ( 0 ) 1 R39 ( 0 ) 5
4 R4 ( 0 ) 5 R23 (M) 4 R40 (O) 3
5 R 5(M ) 3 R 24 ( 0 ) 1 R41 (M) 5
6 R 6 (S ) 3 R25 (M) 3 R 42 (S) 6
7 R 7 (S ) 5 R 26 (O) 2 R43 (M) 2
8 R8 (S) 8 R 27 ( 0 ) 4 R 44 (S) 6
9 R9 (S) 3 R 28 ( 0 ) 6 R 46 ( 0 ) 1
10 RIO ( 0 ) 4 R 2 9 (S ) 3 R 47 ( 0 ) 4
11 R ll(M ) 4 R31 (M) 5 R48 (O) -
12 R 12 ( 0 ) 3 R 32 (S) 7 R 49 (M) 3 1
13 R13 (M) 3 R 36 (M) 5 R53 ( 0 ) -
14 R 14 ( 0 ) - R 37 (S) 8 R55 (M) 3
15 R 15 ( 0 ) 1 R38 ( 0 ) 5 R 56 (M) 3
16 R16 ( 0 ) 1 R45 (M) 7 R 60 ( 0 ) 2
17 R17 ( 0 ) - R 50 ( 0 ) 5 R61 ( 0 ) -
18 R 18 ( 0 ) 2 R51 ( 0 ) 1 R 62 (M) 1
19 R 19 ( 0 ) 6 R 52 (M) 3 R63 ( 0 ) 1
20 R 30 ( 0 ) 2 R 54 (S) 3 R 64 (S) 3
21 R33 (O) 3 R 57 (M) 3 R65 (S) 2
22 R 58 (O) - R66 (M) 2
23 R 59 ( 0 ) -
Total Quotations 70 84 58
An A verage of 
Quotations per 
Respondent
3.33 3.65 2.63
Note: (S) indicates Senior Manager, (M) indicates Middle Manager and (O) indicates Operational Staff
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II. Sample Interview Questions (all interview schedules were 
variations on this approach)
Note: Text in [ ] indicates prompt and supplementary questions used if respondents 
did not elaborate on the relevant issues in their first answer.
1. Interview Questions for Private Sector Senior Managers
Could you please tell me about your educational background and work experience? 
[How long have you been in the Bank? Where did you first start your career?]
What is the title of your current position? [How long have you been in the current 
post?]
Could you please tell me about your role and responsibilities?
Could you tell me about the PMM process at the branch level [What activities are 
being measured and monitored? How is branches’ performance being measured and 
monitored? How important is this activity to your role as a senior manager? To what 
extent do you agree with performance measures concerned with these activities? How 
well do you think they operate? Which of them do you think needs to be reviewed?]
What do you think the Bank’s PMM system is intended to achieve? [How well do you 
think it does this? Are there any things you think are particularly good or particularly 
bad about the way bank branch performance is being measured at the moment? How
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often is the PMM system changed? How do you know if the PMM system needs 
changes? Who make this decision?]
How do you think the Bank employees have reacted to PMM? [What impedes 
managing your staff members? What do you think the staff like or dislike about the 
system? Why do you think this is? Do you think there are any changes that would 
improve? How does the Bank manage to get staff acceptance of its PMM system?]
Could you tell me a bit more about how the individual bank employee is being 
measured and monitored [Who measure his/her performance? How often? What are 
being measured and monitored? How are they determined? How well do you think 
this process operates? Why do you think this is? Are there any things you think are 
particularly good or particularly bad about the way the system operates? How could 
this process be improved?]
Could you tell me about the way goals are set? [How are the performance goals and 
targets set? What sorts of data are needed? Who participates in the goal setting 
process? Do you agree with the way performance goals and targets have been set? If 
you are not involved, why do you think this is? Do you think this is something you 
ought to be involved in? Does your department have any collective goals? What are 
they and how are they set? How do you manage to achieve these shared goals?]
Could you tell me to what extent the Bank is open to staff feedback on its PMM 
system? [How well do you think the Bank is responding to staff opinions?]
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Could you tell me how the Bank makes use of performance data derived from 
performance measurement? [How well do you think the available performance data 
helps with making decision? What are benefits of using performance results you have 
perceived so far? In making general decision, what sources of data are you concerned 
about? What would happen if the performance targets were not met? Is there any 
comparison in terms of results with elsewhere?]
Could you tell me about the incentives used in the Bank’s PMM system? [How are 
they determined? How well do you think incentives motivate the Bank employees to 
work effectively? To what extent do you think the employees are satisfied with their 
bonuses? Do you agree or disagree with the way it is?]
How well do you think the employees are working as a team? [How are the teams 
organised and reinforced? Is everyone given a specific responsibility? What about 
coordination between teams?]
Could you please define the term “Success” of the Bank? [Do you think the Bank has 
succeeded in what it is trying to achieve so far? What do you think are the key 
successes of the Bank? What do you see in your department’s operations at the 
moment? Do you think that is enough to achieve the Bank’s overall goals? Why do 
you think that is? Do you agree or disagree with this?]
Could you tell me about you understand the Bank’s vision statement? [Do you think it 
is easily understandable? How well do you think it reflects what the Bank does? And 
do you know why it is determined in that way? How often is it revised? Do you think
321
APPENDICES
everyone at your level understand about it in the same way? To what extent do you 
think it receives attention from you and your colleagues?]
What role is played by the HR Department? [How is the department organised? How 
does it communicate? Is there a HR strategy? What role does the department play in 
the PMM process? How effective do you think the department is?]
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